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Abstract 
The Korean peninsula is crucial to China's political, economic and security interests 
because of a combination of geographic, historical, and political circumstances. China's 
economic reforms and the end of the Cold War both provided new challenges and 
opportunities for Northeast Asian politics. This thesis will trace the shift in the policy 
of the People's Republic of China toward the Korean peninsula, and the resulting shift 
of primacy from North Korea to South Korea, as well as from political-military security 
to economic development. Yet this shift was not complete. The thesis will show how 
China has successfully maintained relations with both North and South Korea in what 
can be called a "double strategy" of ideological relations with the North and economic 
relations with the South. 
The two hypotheses of my research are: 1) China's economic reform policy was the 
most decisive factor which made China change from a "One Korea" policy to a "Two 
Koreas" policy, and 2) to maximize its national interest China has deftly used the 
"double strategy" to keep its traditional geo-strategic and military ties with North Korea, 
even as it has vigorously furthered new geo-political and economic ties with South 
Korea. The diplomatic history of Sino-Korean relations from 1978 to 2000 will be 
explored through an analysis of the empirical data of primary and secondary sources 
taken from documents, newspapers and academic texts. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction. 
The foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been shaped 
and altered by two factors: the external environment and domestic conditions, including 
the policy priorities established by leadership as well as their identification of China's 
national interest. The relative weight of these two factors, moreover, has varied with 
time and circumstances, but always, there has been a complex interrelation between 
them. 1 Among the foreign policy concerns of the PRC's leadership, the Korean 
peninsula is very important to China's political and security interests. The importance 
of Korea to Chinese policy calculations is the product of geographic, historical, and 
political circumstances. 
China's stake m the Korean peninsula can be summed up m two phrases: 
Korea's strategic location and history. The Korean peninsula shares a long border 
( 1,283.5 kilometers) with China and it is also contiguous with Russia and adjacent to 
Japan, two traditional rivals of China. That Korea has historically served as an object or 
arena of conflict and an invasion corridor among its four powerful neighbors, China, 
Russia, Mongolia, and Japan is well known.1 That is to say, history and geography 
have been conflated to make the Korean peninsula one of the central geostrategic 
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concerns of Chinese foreign policy.3 
China has traditionally regarded its relationship with Korea "as close as lips and 
teeth,"~ or in other words as vital to its security. This was a major reason why imperial 
China usually tried to exert paramount influence on the Korean peninsula within the 
framework of what is generally known as the tributary system. 5 Historically, China had 
sent its military expeditions to Korea to influence Korea to remain friendly to China. In 
612, Emperor Yang of the Sui dynasty dispatched an expedition to the Koguryo dynasty. 
Tai-tsung of the Tang dynasty (618-907) and Shih-tsu ofthe Yuan dynasty (1279-1368) 
followed similar policies. Beginning with the Tang dynasty, China asserted for the first 
time a claim of brother's relationship with Korea based on Confucian theory. China did 
this by transmitting successfully the Confucian idea of the father-son and brothers' 
relationship between states.6 
At times of great upheaval, the rulers of China or the dominant forces 111 
Manchuria did not hesitate to invade or occupy Korea. The Mongol invaded Korea in 
the thirteenth century. Moreover, the Manchus invaded Korea in 1627 and 1636 and 
extracted the promise of allegiance and tributary missions from the Korean king. 7 
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During the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) of Korea, China went to war twice against Japan. 
China dispatched troops to aid Korea during Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea (1592-98). 
China again fought Japan in 1894-95 when Japan attempted to dominate the Korean 
peninsula. After the annexation by the Japanese empire, Korea became a key logistical 
link in the Japanese invasion against China in the 1930s and 1940s.8 China, therefore, 
recognized that the Korean peninsula could serve as a convenient "invasion corridor" to 
and from Japan.9 
The opemng of Korea during the heyday of imperialism m late nineteenth 
century instantly transformed the "hermit kingdom" into a vortex of great-power 
rivalries. Since then, the fate of this Confucian tributary state long protected by the 
Sinocentric world order has come to be closely intertwined with the rise and fall of 
hegemony in East Asia. The Sino-Japanese War ( 1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese 
War (1904-05) were fought over the control of this strategic peninsula with highly 
significant consequences for all the parties concerned, paving the way for Japanese 
hegemony in East Asia for nearly half a century. 10 
The fact that smce World War li the frontier between the Communist-
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dominated mainland of East Asia and the non-Communist periphery bisected Korea, 
rather than passing through the Tsushima Strait between Korea and Japan, was the result 
of American insistence in 1945 on occupying South Korea, with the primary purpose of 
providing Japan with that much of a buffer against likely Soviet pressures.'' Failure of 
the occupying US and Soviet authorities-and later of the United Nations-to reach 
agreement about procedures for unifying Korea eventually led to continuing division of 
the country. The Republic of Korea (ROK) was established in July 1948 under the 
leadership of President Syngman Rhee; in September 1948 the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) was established under the leadership of Kim Il Sung. 
Until 1950, the Sino-North Korean relationship had been weak in spite of close 
informal cooperation between China and Korea. Large groups of Koreans fought with 
China against Japanese military invasion during World War II. In this campaign, 
approximately 50,000 Koreans joined Red Army in following Mao Zedong's policy that 
the Red Army would welcome anybody who was determined to resist Japanese 
aggressiOn. These Koreans had remained in the Red Army and been engaged in the 
civil war with Mao's campaign against the Nationalist forces. 12 
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Although Mao had already expressed an interest in Korean affairs by remarking 
in 1938 that China would take part in the liberation of Korea from Japanese rule, 13 Mao 
and his colleagues had to accept the fact that North Korea rapidly became a Soviet 
satellite after its occupation by Soviet troops and remained one after the withdrawal of 
those troops in 1948. 14 In contrast with the Soviet control of North Korea, Chinese 
influence had not increased until the period of Chinese intervention in the Korean War. 
The actual formal relationship between China and North Korea did not begin until the 
establishment of PRC on October 1, 1949. The first mutual defense pact between China 
and North Korea was concluded on March 17, 1949. The pact called for "common 
defense against aggression of whatever nature," joint action against any attack, and 
supply to North Korea of "arms, material, and manpower from Manchuria from July 1, 
1949 to August 3, 1950," and included an economic barter section. 15 
As mentioned above, China's ruling elite could not but v1ew Korea as a 
significant factor in safeguarding China's security. Their maximum goal therefore has 
been to keep Korea within Chinese sphere of influence. Failing that, they have pursued 
the minimum goal of preventing any other power from attaining hegemony on the 
Korean peninsula. The Chinese intervention 111 the Korean War was a graphic 
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demonstration of the linkage between Korea and Chinese security. 
The Korean War broke out under four conditions: an urgent desire on the part of 
Kim 11 Sung to liberate the South; Stalin's strong interest in the harbors of South Korea 
as a replacement for the Manchurian facilities that he was committed to turn over to 
Beijing by the end of 1952; a new and vigorous Sino-Soviet alliance; and a declared 
intent on the part of the United States not to defend South Korea if it were attacked. 16 
At the time of the eruption of the Korean War, China had gathered six armies in 
the coastal area of Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, preparing to liberate Taiwan. But the 
Korean War changed everything. Top CCP leaders had decided to postpone the 
preparations for the Taiwan campaign in order to focus on the management of the 
Korean crisis. This represented one of the most important strategic transitions in the 
early history of the PRC, which symbolized Beijing's main attention shifting from 
Taiwan to Korea. 17 
When, in mid-August 1950, the United States began to give indications of an 
intent to unite the peninsula by force, China began to issue warnings against a crossing 
11 
of the 38' 11 parallel by American troops, but to no effect. 18 When UN troops occupied 
Pyongyang on October 19, 1950, the Chinese felt their security to be in danger and, the 
same day, the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) crossed the Yalu River in massive 
numbers to save North Korea from the liberation of the UN forces. China's war to 
"Resist America and assist [North] Korea" had begun. As Zhou Enlai explained later, 
"We are not inviting trouble for ourselves; rather, the enemy is setting fire to our 
door." 19 China's primary consideration was obviously its security to be threatened by 
the advance of American forces to the Yalu River. According to the Chinese 
communists, the old saying, "when lips are gone, teeth get cold," was not just rhetoric 
as far as North Korea-China relations were concerned. It was within this context that 
Mao remarked at the Politburo meeting on October 13, 1950 that decided on China's 
intervention in the Korean War: "If we have to fight the enemy anyway, it is better that 
we do so on someone else's land, not our own."2° China's intervention in the Korean 
War was the most obvious evidence of how much strategic value it placed on North 
Korea. 
China's intervention, which cost the Chinese dearly in men and equipment, also 
delayed their prospects of entering the UN since they were dubbed the aggressor in the 
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Moreover, the intervention had adverse effects on China's territorial 
reunification and relations with the United States and Japan. But, in an important 
sense, the Chinese intervention helped to raise China's stake in the peninsula. China 
helped secure the continued existence of a friendly communist buffer state and 
established China's right to have a voice in the settlement of Korean problems by 
participating in the peace negotiations which began in July 1951. In 1953 a truce 
agreement was finally signed in Korea. China became more determined than ever to 
prevent the peninsula from falling into the exclusive sphere of influence of an 
unfriendly or hostile power.22 
The Korean War brought about unexpected and paradoxical consequences. The 
Korean War, in retrospect, can be said to have started the unraveling of the Si no-Soviet 
alliance, paving the way for the Sino-Soviet conflict which shattered the unity of 
international communism, on the one hand, and for the Sino-American rapprochement, 
on the other. And the deepening Sino-Soviet conflict gave Kim Il Sung more leverage 
opportunities and space than could be realistically considered under the Sino-Soviet 
alliance. fncleed, central to Pyongyang's independent foreign policy has been Kim's 
extraordinary ability to manipulate his country's relations with China and the Soviet 
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Union in a flexible and self-serving way, taking sides if necessary on particular issues, 
always attempting to extract maximum payoffs in economic, technical, and military aid, 
but never completely casting his lot with one against the other. 23 
While the PRC-DPRK ties were forged in "blood" in the early 1950s, with the 
Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) suffering more than half a million casualties during 
the Korean War, their relationship since has undergone changes depending on the 
circumstances which each nation confronted. The Sino-Soviet conflict that originated 
in 1956 and intensified in the 1960s had an enormous impact. The period of 1956-1961 
(neutrality) enabled Kim Il Sung to steer a neutral course in the dispute and assert his 
independence. In 1961, China and North Korea signed the Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Defense. During the period of 1962-64, there were political 
solidarity and ideological alliance between China and North Korea. North Korea allied 
itself with China. North Korea openly criticized the Soviet Union, charging MoscO\v 
with economic exploitation of North Korea. Nm1h Korea was against Khrushchev's 
handling of the Cuban missile cns1s and the Soviet posture toward the Sino-lndian 
border clashes.24 China desired a pro-Chinese North Korea in view of the Sino-Soviet 
conflict and wanted to improve its relationship with North Korea so as to implement the 
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Treaty of 1961.25 
However, during the period of 1965-69, the relationship soured when Chinese 
Red Guards criticized Kim Il Sung as a revisionist in the course of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution. This accelerated North Korea's adoption of a self-reliant policy in 1966. 
In the late 1960s, North Korea's frequent infiltration activities into South Korea were 
strongly criticized by the Soviet Union, including Kim Il Sung's reckless attacks on US 
fighters and capture of a US naval ship. Moscow issued a strong warning that 
Pyongyang should stop further provocations. This criticism caused North Korea to 
move closer to China, though, within limits at this time because China also did not want 
to provoke the United States.26 
Subsequently, it took the considerable efforts of Premier Zhou Enlai, including 
the master diplomat's personal visit to Pyongyang, in April 1970, to repair the damage 
to PRC-DPRK relations caused by the Red Guards and their radical sponsors in the . 
Beijing leadership. Especially in the wake of large-scale, armed clashes along the Sino-
Soviet borders 111 Manchuria 111 March 1969, it became imperative for the PRC to 
maintain good relations with North Korea as Beijing perceived an attempt by the 
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Soviets to invade or encircle China. 27 
During Kim 11 Sung's visit to China on April 18-26, 1975, in the wake of the 
US pullout from Indochina, he urged Chainnan Mao on joint actions to expel the US 
forces from the Korean peninsula and Taiwan, but found Mao unresponsive. 28 China 
was reported to have urged Kim to refrain from any military adventurism. Kim' s risky 
attitudes became a matter of serious concern for Chinese leaders. 29 
The Sino-American rapprochement of the early 1970s created a latent policy 
agenda related to Korea for China and the United States, with important consequences 
for the interest of both states on the Korean peninsula. During his visit to Beijing in 
1972, President Richard Nixon disclaimed any intention to threaten China. In response, 
Mao Zedong assured Nixon that neither did he threaten South Korea or Japan. This 
exchange helped create at least the theoretical possibility of tacit Sino-American 
understandings over the peninsula. 30 
Despite the oppmiunity for Sino-American understandings on the peninsula, 
China remained unwilling to play an intermediary role throughout the 1970s. China 
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repeatedly stated that it would not serve as an intermediary for Pyongyang, let alone 
negotiate behind the back of North Korea. China refused US offers to engage in 
confidence building or tension reduction measures, and instead described the continued 
US military presence in the South as a principal source of tension on the peninsula. It 
also advocated that US deal directly with leaders in the North. China argued that US 
had to withdraw its military forces and equipment from South Korea, thereby ceasing its 
intervention in Korean internal affairs and paving the way for the peaceful reunification 
of North and South. 31 
China's policy toward the Korean peninsula was unbalanced, discriminating 
and partial from the establishment of the PRC in 1949 to 1978. During the period of 
1949-1978, except the period of 1965-69, China maintained close relations with North 
Korea and totally ignored South Korea. In other words, China pursued a "One Korea" 
policy. China regarded N011h Korea as the sole legitimate govenunent on the Korean 
peninsula. China's foreign policy tovvard the Korean peninsula encompassed only 
Notth Korea. This was inevitable because the two countries shared a common 
revolutionary ideology and had a strategic-military alliance. In effect, there was no way 
to distinguish between China's North Korea policy and its Korea policy in general.' 2 
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----- -----------
Toward South Korea, China had a non-policy, Beijing foreswore dealings with the 
South at any level, and deemed Seoul an illegitimate client state that acted only at the 
behest of the United States.33 
In fact, for almost three decades from 1949 to 1978, China pursued a very 
antagonistic policy toward South Korea. The Korean War and China's intervention and 
alliance with North Korea set the tone. The legacy of the War, i.e. Sino-US enmity, the 
Cold War, and the regional alignment of forces also served to color Chinese perception 
of intemational reality and shape Chinese policy toward Korea. Thus, Chinese leaders 
saw South Korea as an American puppet regime and a US base from which the US 
imperialists could launch an invasion against China and North Korea. 34 
The purpose of my dissertation is to analyze China's policy toward Korea from 
December 1978 to 2000. China's policy toward the Korean peninsula has changed from 
a "One Korea" policy to a "Two Koreas" policy. The main point of my research is to 
examine political, strategic, and economic factors which made China change to a "Two 
Koreas" policy and to analyze China's "double strategy" toward the two Koreas after 
Sino-South Korean normalization in 1992. 
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The two hypotheses of my research are: first, China's economic reform policy 
was the most decisive factor and many political and strategic factors were a contributing 
factor which made China change to a "Two Koreas" policy; second, to maximize its 
national interest, since Sino-South Korean normalization, China has skillfully "played 
double strategy," strengthening its traditional gee-strategic ties with North Korea, even 
as it has actively promoted new geo-political and economic ties with South Korea. In 
other words, China's "double strategy" toward the two Koreas means that China neither 
wants to be blamed by either Korea, nor support one side at the expense of the other, 
maintaining a "Two Koreas" policy. 
To prove the two hypotheses are valid, I will employ diplomatic history as a 
methodological approach. Because, in the post-Mao era, China's Korean policy has 
constantly been altered by the rapidly changing domestic, regional, and global situations, 
diplomatic history IS a good methodological approach to understand China's Korea 
policy from December 1978 to 2000. From the 19th-century beginnings, political 
science was looked upon by many of its practitioners as primarily an historical 
discipline. 35 Little difference was recognized between history and political science. 
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According to Richard Jensen, "history is past politics and politics present history."36 
Thus, political science was really political history including diplomatic history. While 
the historical approach had its heyday in the 19111 century, it is still evident today. 37 
Diplomatic history approach gives detailed descriptions and analyses of China's Korean 
policy. Diplomatic history approach affords the means of appreciating the true nature of 
China's Korean policy and the peculiar way in which China's Korean policy has been 
fashioned. 
I went to China in 1999-2000 to collect sources of Sino-Korean relations, but the 
sources were very limited. This dissertation is based on primary sources to prove the 
two hypotheses, and many secondary sources also have been employed. I was very 
careful with sources, but recognize that they are not totally objective. As mentioned 
above, China's Korea policy has continually been adjusting to the Realpolitik logic of 
the rapidly changing domestic and international situations. Therefore, to track the 
changing relations between China and Korea, I use Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FB/S): China and FB!S: East Asia very often. This material permits 
comparison over time. FB!S has been very valuable as a primary source dealing with 
issues between China and Korea. This is a US government publication. But its contents 
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m no way represent _the policies, views, or attitudes of the US government This 
publication contains current news and commentary monitored by FBIS from foreign 
broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, and periodicals. Items are 
processed from the first or best available source. Items from foreign language sources 
are translated by FBIS. Those from English language sources are transcribed, with the 
original phrasing and other characteristics retained. 
Hong Kong publication Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) and Asiaweek are 
important sources for current events of Sino-Korean relations. China's official news 
magazine, Beijing Review, which is completely controlled by the Chinese government, 
is also a good source for China's official point of view. 
The two English daily newspapers in South Korea, The Korea Herald and The 
Korea Times are very useful sources for current news of Sino-Korean and inter-Korean 
relations. They frequently have very critical viewpoints of Sino-Korean relations 111 
News Analysis and Editorial sections. Furthermore, many Korean daily newspapers 
(which now have English versions on the web) in South Korea, are also good sources 
for current news. These newspapers very often have special features of Sino-Korean 
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and inter-Korean relations in detail. These sources are as follows: Joongarw lfbo; 
Donga lfbo; Chosun Ifbo; Hankook Ilbo, and so on. 
For analytic purposes in the evolution of China's policy toward Korea, the main 
body of my dissertation is divided into seven periods : Chapter 2: The Great Turning 
Point, December 1978-1984; Chapter 3: De Facto "Two Koreas" Policy, 1985-1988; 
Chapter 4: Toward Sino-South Korean Normalization, 1989-1992; Chapter 5: Sino-
South Korean Normalization on August 24, 1992; Chapter 6: North Korea's Nuclear 
Crisis and Four-Party Talks, 1993-1999; Chapter 7: China's New Leadership and North 
Korea's Missile Program, 1997-2000; Chapter 8: China's Position on Korea's 
Unification and US Forces Korea (USFK), the Present and the Future; Chapter 9 is the 
Conclusion. 
I will put great emphasis on analyzing what factors made China change from a 
"One Korea" policy to a "Two Koreas" policy in Chapters 2-5. In Chapter 2, I \vill 
analyze the reasons why China's "One Korea" policy started to change to a "Two 
Koreas" policy gradually during the period of 1978-1984. 
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In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping and his followers adopted bold economic 
reforms and open door policy as a strategy to speed up China's economic development 
at the Third Plenum of the ll th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC). 
China has since followed a more pragmatic diplomacy mainly based on a revitalization 
of the economy, the four modernizations program, and open door policy to the outside 
world. China's policy toward the Korean peninsula also entered a new phase. 
Moreover, the international environment in Northeast Asia changed. China and Japan 
signed a treaty of peace and friendship in 1978. China and the US established 
diplomatic relations in 1979. As China improved its relations with the US and Japan, 
Beijing's hostility toward South Korea also decreased. 
There were no official contacts except for the ones from early 1981 on, in which 
diplomatic personnel of China and South Korea exchanged greetings at international 
gatherings. But, the first official Sino-South Korean contact occurred in May 1983, 
ironically as a result of the hijacking of a Chinese jetliner, which landed in an airport 
near Seoul. Beijing hardly hesitated. To discuss repatriating the aircraft, its cargo and 
passengers, Chinese official delegation arrived m Seoul. Talks between China and 
South Korea started immediately, and the two sides addressed each other's country by 
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official titles for the first time smce 1949. This was seen as Beijing's indirect 
recognition of the South Korean government. After the hijacking incident, the 
unprecedented official contact between Beijing and Seoul paved the way for further 
contacts in various athletic, scientific, and economic contexts. The hijacking incident 
and the resulting unofficial contacts paved the way for the first thaw in Sino-South 
Korean relations since the two nations were pitted against each other in the Korean War. 
A serious difference between Beijing and Pyongyang emerged over North Korea's 
terrorism against South Korea, such as the attempted bombing of South Korean 
President Chun Doo Hwan in Burma in October 1983. Chinese leaders felt betrayed 
and distrusted the Pyongyang authorities. North Korea broke a promise given to China 
that it would not use force against South Korea except in self-defense. Beijing's 
subsequent public comments to Pyongyang warned of extremely severe political 
consequences for Sino-North Korean relations if North Korea should act again m a 
manner grossly contrary to its repeated reassurances of peaceful intent. As a 
consequence, Beijing decided not to allow North Korea a singular place in China's 
Korea policy, and to pursue unofficial relations with Seoul, regardless of Pyongyang's 
objections. 
24 
One of the most explicit manifestations of Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic foreign 
policy was the significant shift in Beijing's position vis-a-vis Seoul from a "non-policy" 
to "economic diplomacy." Such a transformation "from enemies to partners" had 
important implications for the regional stability in East Asia as well as for the security 
of the Korean peninsula. Deng Xiaoping's economic pragmatism laid the basis of a 
new order of economic relations with South Korea. China began to recognize the 
advantages of economic ties with South Korea-as a valuable trading partner and as a 
source of capital and high technology. China studied South Korea's successful 
economic strategies. China could not ignore South Korea's economic superiority and 
its increasing international visibility. 
In Chapter 3, I will analyze the reasons why China changed to a de facto "Two 
Koreas" policy during the period of 1985-1988. Since 1985, there have been 
affirmative and substantial improvements m Sino-South Korean relations politically, 
strategically, and economically. Relations between Beijing and Moscow were 
drastically improving after 1985. Sino-Soviet detente meant that Beijing and Moscow 
ceased their competition over Pyongyang. The Sino-Soviet rapprochement enhanced 
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the successful implementation of South Korea's _"Northern Policy" which sought to 
Improve its relations with the communist bloc nations_ Both China and the Soviet 
Union have expressed their desire to promote economic exchanges with South Korea. 
These developments clearly indicated that both China and the Soviet Union were 
pursuing a de facto "Two Koreas" policy. Both China and the Soviet Union began to 
take a more positive approach toward South Korea and to view South Korea as a vital 
player in a new and more stable security structure for the Northeast Asian region based 
on economic cooperation rather than conflict. 
The gradual improvement of relations between China and South Korea was 
ironically spurred ahead by sudden crises, such as the 1983 hijacking incident and the 
1985 Torpedo Boat Incident. In March 1985, the Chinese navy torpedo boat, adrift in 
the Yellow Sea after a mutiny, was rescued by a South Korean fishing boat and towed 
by a South Korean Coast Guard vessel. Through the Chinese Torpedo Boat incident 
Seoul and Beijing, for the second time m less than two years, engaged m official 
negotiations. This incident provided both China and South Korea with an opportunity 
to develop new relations. The Chinese Torpedo Boat Incident paved the way for the 
second thaw in Sino-South Koreans relations. 
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Soon after the torpedo boat incident was resolved in late March, Beijing officially 
announced its intention to participate in the Seoul Asian Games despite strong North 
Korea's objection, in mid-April 1985. China's participation in the Seoul Asian Games 
undoubtedly promoted peace and stability in Northeast Asia. China's participation in 
the Games also facilitated further contacts between China and South Korea in the 
political, economic, and sporting fields. 
In 1987, alarmed or threatened by Hu Yaobang's liberal orientation, a group of 
conservative senior leaders and military leaders persuaded Deng Xiaoping to demote 
Hu. Finally, General Secretary Hu Yaobang stepped down in January 1987. But, 
China's 13th National Party Congress in October 1987 was a victory for reformists. This 
indicated that the importance of economic reforms and open door policy was apparently 
accepted by conservatives as well as reformers. It made China take a more and more 
positive and pragmatic attitude toward South Korea. 
Meanwhile, one month later, the bombing incident of a KAL jet by North Korean 
terrorists shocked the Chinese leadership. This incident made Beijing leaders more 
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concerned that North Korea's aggressive action could start a major conflict involving 
Beijing and the United States in Northeast Asia that would destroy China's economic 
development in the future. The bombing made China review its traditional foreign 
policy toward North Korea, departing from the often unquestioning support for North 
Korea. 
Thereafter contacts between China and South Korea expanded, especially through 
sports and economic diplomacy. The most visible and dramatic breakthrough in 
Chinese relations with South Korea was China's participation in the 1988 Olympic 
Games in Seoul despite North Korea's boycott. The 1988 Olympic Games provided 
unofficial but increasingly lucrative trade and expanding contacts to both China and 
South Korea. This development greatly reduced Pyongyang's leverage in its efforts to 
keep diplomatic distance between China and South Korea. The Olympic Games 
apparently played an important role in promoting China's positive perception of South 
Korea. 
Since the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympic Games, the volume of trade 
between China and South Korea has grown by leaps and bounds. The rapid growth of 
28 
trade between the two countries has demonstrated that the desire to exchange goods 
could break down the most solid and longstanding political barriers. In a sense, 
bilateral trade has constantly raised the level of economic cooperation and has gradually 
facilitated the political rapprochement between Beijing and Seoul. 
In Chapter 4, I will analyze the reasons why China finally changed to a "Two 
Koreas" policy during the period of 1989-1992. In 1989, China's Deng Xiaoping and 
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev normalized relations between the two Communist 
states after a 30-year rift. Sino-Soviet normalization heightened the expectation of 
peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. As a result of the Sino-Soviet 
normalization, Beijing had less need to compete with Moscow over Pyongyang and the 
latter could no longer play one against the other. Regardless of North Korea, China 
could expand its economic ties with South Korea more actively. 
South Korea's Northern Policy brought about drastic and significant results in 
Sino-South Korean relations. The Northern Policy was aimed at giving top priority to 
establishing diplomatic ties with China, to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula. 
Chinese leaders also reacted positively and backed Seoul's Northern Policy. As a result 
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of the Northern Policy, non-political interchanges between China and South Korea 
intensified to the degree that they played a large role in establishing diplomatic relations 
between the two countries in August 1992. 
In September, 1990, South Korea and the Soviet Union set up full diplomatic 
relations. South Korean-Soviet normalization stopped the longstanding ideological and 
geopolitical Sino-Soviet rivalry over North Korea. For China the decisive Soviet tilt 
toward Seoul provided a convenient cover for its own shift to a "Two Koreas" policy in 
1992. After witnessing the swift development of South Korea-Soviet relations, China 
quickened its pace, leading to the conclusion of the Beijing-Seoul normalization 
process. 
South Korea had placed diplomatic priority on its UN entry since early 1990. 
North Korea consistently opposed separate UN membership of the two Korean states, 
saymg that would perpetuate the division of the Korean Peninsula and would not 
promote reunification. But China needed economic help not only from the Western 
world but also from South Korea to carry out its Four Modernizations. Beijing was not 
in a position to totally neglect the economic role of South Korea in Northeast Asia. In 
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this respect, China played a very important role in pressuring North Korea to apply for 
UN membership together with South Korea. It was obvious that China took a "Two 
Koreas" policy when Beijing withdrew its former support to Pyongyang's "One Korea" 
stand by refusing to cast its solo veto against Seoul's accelerated entry to the UN in 
mid-1991. 
The most impressive development in the Sino-South Korean relations has been in 
the economic sphere. Trade, which was virtually non-existent in the 1970s, increased 
steadily in the 1980s, reaching $3 billion in 1988 and over $5.8 billion in 1991, making 
South Korea China's fourth largest trading partner. The establishment of trade offices 
in 1991 was the most remarkable and dramatic breakthrough in Chinese relations with 
South Korea. After that, South Korea and China signed a trade agreement giving most-
favored nation status to each other's exports and an investment guarantee pact granting 
each other MFN status on investment and business activities. Such institutional 
guarantees sharply facilitated bilateral commercial exchanges and boosted South 
Korea's investment in China. Clearly, the trade offices served as a booster for the 
eventual Sino-South Korean normalization. 
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Moreover, the renewed policy of reform and opening directed by Deng in Jar~uary 
1992 prompted Beijing to further upgrade its relations with Seoul to an eventual 
normalization. The most decisive factor in establishing full diplomatic ties with South 
Korea was Deng Xiaoping's recognition of the value of the "South Korean cormection" 
for stepping up China's "Four Modemizations" program. Therefore, China's economic 
diplomacy toward South Korea was the most important factor that made China change 
to "Two Koreas" policy. Finally China and South Korea established diplomatic 
relations in August 1992. 
In Chapter 5, I will analyze the North Korea factor, official normalization talks 
between Seoul and Beijing, and Taiwan's response in the process of Sino-South Korean 
normalization. I will also examine the political and economic factors on China's 
historic decision to change to a "Two-Koreas" policy. Furthermore, to analyze China's 
"Two-Koreas Policy" on the Korean peninsula, I will also examine Sino-North Korean 
relations after Sino-South Korean normalization and historic Sino-South Korean summit 
talks. 
In the spnng of 1990 China had already declared that it would establish 
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diplomatic ties with South Korea. But China's plan was interfered with by its close 
relations with North Korea. Moreover, some top Chinese officials were reluctant to 
recogmze South Korea, due to China's firm reunification policy, "one country, two 
systems." 
Nevertheless, as the volume of economic cooperation increased rapidly, and as 
their diplomats had to have face-to-face encounters at multilateral conferences, Beijing 
and Seoul came to appreciate the need for direct official negotiation. Official 
normalization talks between Beijing and Seoul began in October, 1991. In the final 
stages of the negotiations between Beijing and Seoul, events developed rapidly. The 
negotiation proceeded with utmost secrecy at Beijing's behest. Finally, on August 24, 
1992, China and South Korea set up diplomatic ties. 
Taiwan became extremely embarrassed. Taiwan elected to sever all diplomatic, 
trade, and transport ties with South Korea. But in July 1993 South Korea and Taiwan 
agreed to establish informal ties and exchange a liaison office at the civilian level, 
similar to those in place between Taiwan and most other political entities. 
33 
Beijing's "Two-Korea Policy" deprived North Korea of its long-time privilege of 
enjoying one-sided support from Beijing. But North Korea did not publicly express as 
much displeasure toward China, mainly because it could not afford to alienate or 
antagonize China, who was its irreplaceable patron and guardian following the demise 
of the Soviet Union. After Sino-South Korean normalization, Beijing attached a great 
deal of importance to articulating a more balanced Korea policy. China's new 
diplomatic relations with South Korea was achieved without burning Beijing's bridge to 
Pyongyang. China tried not to hurt the feelings of North Korea, in a move to use the 
"Pyongyang card" m dealing with South Korea. Such an attitude of Beijing 
demonstrated that China has craftily played "double strategy" between South and North 
Korea. 
In Chapter 6, to analyze China's "Double Strategy," on the Korean peninsula 
during the period of 1993-1999, I will address the following issues: China's policy 
toward North Korea's Nuclear Crisis and Four-Party Peace Talks. 
In 1993, the outbreak of the North Korean nuclear crisis threatened a stable and 
peaceful Korean peninsula. During the North Korean nuclear crisis, Beijing played 
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"double strategy" deftly, extracting maximum payoffs at minimum cost. On the one 
hand, China advocated the principle of a denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, 
supporting South Korean and American position. On the other hand, China opposed the 
imposition of any international sanctions on North Korea. Finally, China's opposition 
to international sanctions on North Korea gave Beijing a favorable position in the fight 
against the linkage of MFN and human rights by the US. After Washington indicated 
that the MFN would be extended unconditionally, China played a decisive, behind-the-
scenes role in persuading North Korea to freeze its nuclear program. It meant Chinese 
foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula was flexibly guided by realistic and 
pragmatic considerations, not ideology. 
In April, 1996, South Korea and the United States jointly proposed the four-party 
peace talks between representatives of the four countries, North Korea and China and 
themselves, to ease tension and promote peace on the Korean peninsula and to replace 
the 1953 Korean Military Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. Despite North 
Korea's opposition to Chinese participation in the four-party talks, China has tried to 
play the role of "constructive broker" between the DPRK on one side and the ROK and 
US on the other, using its "double strategy" proficiently, helping break the stalemate in 
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negotiations and keeping the process moving. China has striven to play a positive and 
pragmatic part in the "four-party talks," because it needs peace and stability on the 
Korean peninsula, in order to continuously pursue its economic refonns and open door 
policy. 
In Chapter 7, to analyze the upgrading of Sino-South Korean ties, I will address 
the changes of China's Leadership in 1997. Also, to analyze how the new China's 
leadership plays "double strategy" on the Korean peninsula, I will address North 
Korea's Missile Program during the period of 1998-2000. 
The 15th Chinese Communist Party Congress was convened in September, 1 997. 
The 15th Party Congress was a major historical high-water point, as important as the 11th 
in 1978 when Deng launched his reforms. At the 15th Congress, Jiang's re-election as 
Communist Party chief enabled China to more freely pursue a policy toward the Korean 
peninsula. After the 15th Congress, in November 1998, China and South Korea agreed 
to upgrade their bilateral relations to a "cooperative partnership" for the 21st century. 
This move clearly showed that China emphasized pursuit of national interest over 
ideological alliance. Meanwhile, China "downgraded" its ties with North Korea after 
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1992. However, China still maintained close military ties with North Korea and could 
not ignore North Korea because of its strategic importance on the peninsula, while 
further expanding economic relations with South Korea. It signified China has played 
"double strategy" on the Korean peninsula to maximize its national interest since Sino-
South Korean normalization. 
In August, 1998, North Korea launched a three-stage rocket over Japan. The test-
firing caused immediate tension on the Korean peninsula. The launch prompted the US 
to sign an agreement with Japan in September 1998, to conduct joint research on 
developing a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system. China was dismayed, and the 
issue has emerged as a new flashpoint in East Asian security. China took an ambiguous 
position, using its "double strategy," on North Korea's missile development program. 
China said it was willing to play a role in dissuading Pyongyang from raising tensions 
on the Korean peninsula by launching missiles or taking other provocative actions while 
China opposed TMD system and transferred missile components to North Korea. 
China has been criticizing the United States and Japan for overreacting to North 
Korea's missile threat, claiming they are usmg it as an excuse to contain China 
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militarily. China is concerned that the TMD program will include Taiwan. However, 
Beijing has little patience for its stubborn Communist ally's development of missile 
capabilities which has propelled Japan toward military buildup. 
In Chapter 8, to analyze China's flexible and realistic foreign policy on the 
Korean peninsula, I will address China's position on Korean unification and the U.S. 
military presence on the Korean peninsula. 
China officially supports Korean unification if it is achieved peacefully and 
orderly through the concerted efforts of the two Koreas. Openly supporting a peaceful 
unification of Korea in principle, Beijing clearly prefers the status quo on the peninsula. 
Beijing's dominant interest is a peaceful and stable but divided Korean peninsula. 
Beijing has a strong sense of uncertainty over the future of the US-ROK military 
alliance, the political fate of the DPRK, and the fallout of Korean unification. 
Considering the possibility of military alliance between a unified Korea and the United 
States, and fearing the political and economic consequences of rapid Korean unification, 
Beijing has clearly ranked the stability of the status quo higher than unification in its 
policy calculations about the Korean peninsula. 
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China maintains an ambivalent stance regarding the stationing of US Forces 
Korea (USFK). China officially opposes the stationing of troops in foreign territory, but 
in recent years has acknowledged the stabilizing presence of American troops in East 
Asia, while placing hopes on Washington to curb any resurgent militarism in Japan. 
After Korea's unification, however, China does not recognize the need for a USFK 
presence. Obviously China does not want to face US forces at the Sino-Korean border. 
Chapter 9 is the Conclusion. As mentioned above, the two hypotheses of my 
research are: first, China's economic reform policy was the most conclusive factor and 
many political and strategic factors were a contributing factor which made China 
change from a "One Korea" policy to a "Two Koreas" policy; second, to maximize its 
national interest, since Sino-South Korean normalization China has deftly played 
"double strategy," keeping its traditional geo-strategic and military ties with North 
Korea, even as it has vigorously furthered new geo-political and economic ties with 
South Korea. In the Conclusion, I will argue that the two hypotheses are valid through 
empirical studies ofChina's Korean policy from December 1978 to 2000. 
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Chapter 2: The Great Turning Point, December 1978-1984 
China's policy toward the Korean peninsula underwent significant changes 
since Deng Xiaoping and his followers came to power in December 1978. Since 1978, 
Deng had regarded the "four modernizations" program and "open door" policy as the 
most important objectives of state work. To accomplish economic reform, China 
needed a peaceful and stable environment on the Korean peninsula because war on the 
Korean peninsula would clearly endanger the regional economy. Thus, Beijing began to 
modify its relations with Seoul after December 1978. 
Moreover, m the early 1980s, unexpected and different opportunities and 
pressures persuaded China to assume a much more active stance in relation to Korea, 
although this role remained constrained by the extraordinary sensitivities of leaders in 
Pyongyang. Especially since the hijacking of a Chinese aircraft to South Korea in May 
1983 and the Rangoon bombing in October, China was testing the possibilities of a 
more differentiated approach to the peninsula, despite the uncertainty and strain created 
for Beijing's relations with the North. 
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To analyze the reasons why China gradually began to modify its ties with South 
Korea during the period of 1978-1984, in this Chapter I will address the following 
issues: the Third Plenum of the 11 111 CCPCC, Determinants of Chinese Foreign Policy 
from 1976 to 1984, China's Policy toward North Korea, China's Flexibility toward 
South Korea, the Hijacking of a Chinese Aircraft to South Korea in May 1983 and 
China's Reaction, North Korea's Terrorism in October 1983 and China's Role as an 
Intermediary, and Sino-South Korean Economic Relations. 
The Political Significance of the Third Plenum of the 11 111 CCPCC 
Premier Zhou Enlai and Chairman Mao Zedong's deaths in 1976 precipitated a 
renewed power struggle that resulted in a victory for the "pragmatic" faction within the 
Politburo over the "radical" faction. After the rise of Deng Xiaoping as China's 
paramount leader in the Third Plenum of the 11 111 Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee (CCPCC) in December 1978, Beijing started to readjust its foreign policy. 
Mao's death and the purge of many radical CCP elites signified the start of a new era in 
Chinese foreign policy and its policy toward the Korean peninsula. 
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China was suffering from chronic malaise by 1976. The country's economic 
growth rates had declined and patterns of consumption had stagnated. 1 China's per 
capita income ranked last among the socialist countries, and productivity lagged far 
behind Taiwan and Hong Kong. In 1976, the Chinese economy was on the verge of 
collapse because of long-term underdevelopment. Deng was convinced that the three-
decade long "closed door" policy and the ten-year "Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution" had made the Chinese people lose all faith in Chinese Communism. Deng 
fully realized that unless the serious economic problems could be effectively addressed, 
the Chinese communists' credibility before the Chinese people could be significantly 
challenged. The Chinese leadership also understood the economic problems well 
enough to endorse a strategic policy shift. Consequently, at the Third Plenum of the 11 111 
CCPCC, they announced a historic project of economic reform.2 Deng Xiaoping and a 
small group of reform-oriented pragmatists within the party leadership formally shifted 
the focus of the CCP's work away from the Maoist emphasis on class struggle to the 
goal of developing the Chinese economy through the Four Modernizations. 3 Moreover, 
Deng Xiaoping and his followers reached a consensus to adopt an open door policy as a 
strategy to speed up China's economic development. At the 12th National Congress of 
the CCP in September 1982, Deng Xiaoping stated: "We will unswervingly follow a 
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policy of opening to the outside world and actively increase exchanges with foreign 
countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit."4 
After the Third Plenum, the new foreign policy orientations, i.e., pragmatism and 
open door policy, emerged in official statements and the actual behavior of Chinese 
foreign policy. Thereafter the Chinese leadership vigorously pursued the econom1c 
reforms and open door policy. The Third Plenum's decision was a contributing factor 
that made China gradually change policy toward Korea. 
Determinants of Chinese Foreign Policy from 1976 to 1984 
The objectives of Chinese foreign policy were determined by a small group of 
top-level Chinese leaders who have reflected the broad interests of the Chinese state as 
well as their own parochial concerns. From 1976 to 1984, there was an increase in the 
number of officials involved in advising about Chinese foreign policy, but key decisions 
remained the preserve of a small group of leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping. 
The primary concerns of Deng Xiaoping and a small group of reform-oriented 
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pragmatists had been to guarantee Chinese national security, maintain internal order, 
and pursue economic development. Especially since the death of Mao in 1976, the top 
priority of Chinese leaders had been to promote successful economic modernization. 
This development represented the linchpin determining the success or failure of their 
leadership. Thus, Chinese officials had geared China's foreign policy to help the 
modernization effort. 5 
But m order to accomplish economtc modernization, as well as to maintain 
national security and internal order, Chinese leaders recognized the fundamental 
prerequisite of establishing a relatively stable strategic environment, especially around 
China's periphery in Asia. The alternative would be a highly disruptive situation 
requiring much greater Chinese expenditures on national defense and posing greater 
danger to Chinese domestic order and tranquility. Unfortunately for China, it did not 
control this environment. It influenced it, but the environment remained controlled 
more by others, especially the superpowers and their allies. As a result, China's leaders 
were required repeatedly to assess their surroundings for changes that could affect 
Chinese security and development interests. And they were compelled repeatedly to 
adjust Chinese foreign policy to take account of such changes. 
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Thus, China's top foreign policy priority had remained the pragmatic quest for a 
stable environment needed for effective modernization and development. Chinese 
leaders saw the main danger in the surrounding environment posed by the Soviet Union. 
At first, China saw Soviet power as an immediate threat to its national security. Over 
time, it came to see the USSR progressively as more of a long-term threat, determined 
to use its growing military power and other sources of influence to encircle and pressure 
China into accepting a balance of influence in Asia dominated by the USSR and 
contrary to PRC interests. 
China's strategy against the Soviet threat was both bilateral and global. 
Bilaterally, China used a mix of military preparations and tactical political moves to 
keep the Soviets from attacking China, but without compromising China's basic 
security interests. Globally, China's strategy focused on developing-either implicitly 
or explicitly-an international united front designed to halt Soviet expanston and 
prevent the consolidation of Soviet dominance abroad.6 
During the period of 1976-1984, the Sino-Soviet conflict continued to be a major 
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factor in determining China's foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula. China's 
strategic goals in Northeast Asia in the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict were defined 
as follows: to prevent the establishment of Soviet hegemony on the Korean peninsula by 
keeping North Korea leaning toward the PRC; to prevent war on the Korean peninsula; 
and to counterbalance Soviet influence and expansion in Asia in cooperation with the 
U.S. and Japan. 7 
As the most important international counterweight to Soviet power, the United 
States loomed large in Chinese calculations. Thus, the PRC started the process of Sino-
American normalization. Finally diplomatic relations between China and America were 
established on January 1, 1979 by China's enhanced interest in pragmatic economic 
modernization, which emphasized the importance of technical and financial help from 
the West and access to Western markets. 8 
A shift in Beijing's policy toward Korea had become discernible as a result of 
signing a treaty of peace and friendship between China and Japan on August 12, 1978, 
the normalization of relations between the PRC and the US in 1979, and Beijing's 
earnest quest for economic modernization at home. 
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Inasmuch as the PRC leaders saw a peaceful international environment as crucial 
for China's modernization efforts, Beijing moderated its military and economic support 
for the DPRK. For example, Beijing cautiously provided North Korea with crude oil, 
fighter aircraft, and tanks, expressing fears that excessive military strength might 
prompt North Korea to make war. Beijing also encouraged the DPRK to hold dialogue 
with the South, and supported measures to lower tension on the Korean peninsula. Ever 
since the late 1970s, Beijing's perception of the ROK had also undergone significant 
modification. As the PRC improved its relations with the US and Japan, Beijing's 
hostility toward the ROK also decreased. Not only did the Chinese cease to see the 
ROK as an enemy, but also they began to recognize the advantages of economic ties 
with South Korea-as a valuable trading partner and as a source of capital and high 
technology.9 
China's Policy toward North Korea 
Beginning in late 1978, and particularly after China's rapprochement with Japan 
and the United States, the chief thrust of Chinese foreign policy stood in remarkable 
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contrast to that of North Korea. Thus, it became. more difficult for Beijing and 
Pyongyang to harmonize their respective policy priorities. At the official policy 
statement level, China unquestionably continued to support North Korea's three major 
national priorities: national security, economic survival, and reunification policy. Yet, at 
the actual policy level, Beijing began to signal a change in its approach toward South 
Korea. 
The highlight of Sino-North Korean relations in the last two years of the 1970s 
was Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping's visits to North Korea in May and September 
1978 respectively. When Chairman and Premier Hua Geofeng visited Pyongyang, he 
clearly stated that China supported North Korea's stand on the Korean issue. 10 Vice 
Premier Deng Xiaoping, in his visit to Pyongyang in September 1978, reiterated Hua's 
statement of Chinese support for North Korea's unification formula." Deng made it 
clear that Beijing had no intention to improve political relations with Seoul at the 
present time. Deng told a news conference in Tokyo in October 1978 that "withdrawal 
of US ground forces from the Korean peninsula is a necessary condition for the peaceful 
and independent unification of the peninsula." 12 Deng endorsed Kim Il Sung's demand 
for the complete pullout of US troops from South Korea. Therefore, officially, China 
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showed that there was no basic change in her support for North Korea's foreign policy 
ISSUeS. 
But there were some signals of a softening on the part of China. Hua's and 
Deng's official visits to Pyongyang did not produce joint communiques. At his press 
conferences in Beijing and Tokyo, Deng said that he did not think serious tensions 
existed m the Korean peninsula. 13 This, m effect, indirectly denied Pyongyang's 
assertion that the US and South Korea were preparing for war and heightening tensions 
on the Korean peninsula. 
During his visit to Washington in late January 1979, Deng Xiaoping denied China 
could exercise meaningful influence over Pyongyang. Deng gave a three-part response 
to President Carter's urging that China play a more active role in defusing tensions on 
the peninsula: the United States did not have to worry about instability on the peninsula, 
since the North posed no military threat to the South; China was not able to exercise 
significant influence over decision-making in Pyongyang; and if China should attempt 
to use its limited influence with Pyongyang, Chinese-North Korean relations would 
deteriorate. 14 
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China's refusal to become more actively engaged in matters related to Korea 
reflected the three fundamental, if somewhat contradictory, Chinese policy objectives on 
the peninsula: the maintenance of close ties between leaders in Beijing and Pyongyang, 
thereby precluding major Soviet political inroads with the DPRK; the avoidance of 
serious instability or tension on the peninsula, thus reducing the possibility of renewed 
warfare that would again involve the United States and China on opposite sides of a 
major military conflict; and the encouragement of increased interaction between North 
and South Korea that would facilitate rather than complicate China's continuing efforts 
to regam sovereignty over Taiwan. 15 However, in the early 1980s, different 
opportunities and pressures, especially the hijacking of a Chinese aircraft to South 
Korea in May 1983 and the Rangoon bombing in October, persuaded the Chinese to 
assume a much more active stance in relation to Korea, although this role remained 
constrained by the extraordinary sensitivities of leaders in Pyongyang. 
Meanwhile, in the years between 1978 and 1981 there were a number of signs of 
growing strains between Beijing and Pyongyang. North Korea was unhappy with the 
foreign policy orientation of the Chinese leadership, the change in Chinese economic 
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policies, and the process of de-Maoification, all of which had serious implications for 
North Korean interests. In effect, China shocked and upset the North Koreans with a 
series of fast-moving policies. Alarmed by China's growing rapprochement with Japan 
in August 1978 and the United States in January 1979, Kim 11 Sung saw the Chinese 
policies as a betrayal of North Korea's interests. 
First, the signing ofthe Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty in August 1978. 
By signing the treaty, Japan had made a formal commitment to opposing "hegemony," 
thus abandoned its equidistant diplomacy in the Sino-Soviet dispute and tilted toward 
China. Therefore, Sino-Japanese friendship posed problems for North Korea, tom 
between the Soviets and China. Pyongyang was perplexed by the China-Japan peace 
treaty. The problem for Pyongyang was that it had a military alliance with both 
Moscow and Beijing, and both treaties demanded that Pyongyang did not engage in 
activities which were hostile to the co-signatory nation. This caused great headaches in 
the North Korean capital. 16 
Second, the normalization of Sino-American ties in January 1979 shocked North 
Korea. Pyongyang reacted coolly. In an early comment on China's normalization with 
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the United St;:ttes, North Korean media wondered why the US should not abrogate the 
security treaty with the ROK just as it had abrogated the security treaty with Taiwan. 
And why didn't the US withdraw its troops from South Korea just as it was 
withdrawing its troops from Taiwan? In October 1980 this charge was made even more 
directly. Kim Il sung warned: 
The socialist countries must make no unprincipled compromises with imperialism. 
They must not bargain with the imperialists on matters of principle or sell them the 
fundamental interests of revolution. They must not give up their anti-imperialist stance 
in order to improve their diplomatic relations with the imperialist countries nor must 
they sacrifice the interests of other countries in their own interests. 17 
Since Sino-American normalization, there were continuing signs of differences 
between Beijing and Pyongyang over the issues of Korean reunification and US troops 
withdrawal from South Korea. A Renmin Ribao editorial on September 9, 1979, North 
Korea's founding anmversary, significantly failed to call for the withdrawal of US 
troops from South Korea, an omission in stark contrast to Chinese practices on such 
occas10ns for many years. The Chinese Communist party newspaper also failed to 
include the usual criticism of South Korea, omitted the standard offer of Chinese 
"support" for Korean reunification, and noted only that unification would occur 
"eventually." Moreover, the editorial did not describe the Sino-North Korean relations 
55 
with the usual degree of warmth and there were no normal refer.ences to "revolutionary 
friendship" or "militant unity" between the two countries. The editorial also failed to 
characterize North Korean leadership as "wise," a formula that had consistently 
appeared in Chinese editorials since 1971. 18 
A Hong Kong journal that often reflected the views of Deng Xiaoping carried 
an article objecting to Kim Il Sung's grooming of his son, Kim Jong Il, as heir apparent. 
It claimed that this was a throwback to a feudal system rejected by history, that Kim Il 
Sung was following the feudalist monarchical system, and suggested that North Korea 
was going to be stuck in a stage of feudal socialism if it did not mend its ways. Implicit 
in this article was the suggestion that North Korea could only progress by imitating 
Deng Xiaoping's course of action-make widespread economic reforms and open up 
relations with the West. 19 
In December 1981, however, China began to improve relations with North Korea 
as a political and strategic necessity, i.e. to repair the strains that emerged following the 
Sino-American normalization m 1979 and to dissuade North Korea from taking a 
Moscow option. North Korea also opted to pursue close ties with China as the 
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Pyongyang regime must have thought it an urgent task to overcome the internal and 
external dilemmas it faced. Internally, North Korea was confronted with economic 
difficulties since the early 1970's and with the problem of the leadership succession. 
Internationally, Pyongyang became increasingly isolated, while there was a growing 
pro-Seoul tendency in the international community. It was a particularly embarrassing 
situation for the North Korean regime when Seoul was selected as the venue for both 
the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics.20 The continued efforts by China to 
improve relations with North Korea were marked by a series of visits to Pyongyang by 
top Chinese leaders: Zhao Ziyang in December 1981, Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang 
in April 1982. 
In the spring of 1982, there was new development in China's policy toward North 
Korea. Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang made a secret trip to Pyongyang in April 1982. 
That the two most powerful men in the world's most populous country found it 
necessary to set aside five days to make the journey underscored the weight the tiny 
North Korea carried in Beijing's foreign policy calculus. The visit enabled Deng and 
Hu to meet Kim's son and successor-designate, Kim Jong Il. 21 During their visit, Deng 
and Hu expressed their willingness to recognize Kim Jong Il's political position. 22 In 
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effect, North Korea was trying to obtain Chinese blessing for the succession of Kim's 
son to the leadership of the North Korean party and government. 23 That is why Kim 11 
Sung went to China in September 1982. The most important items on the agenda that 
Kim brought to China were: Beijing's support for the hereditary succession of power 
through his son, Kim Jong 11; economic and military assistance from China; assurance 
of North Korea's place in the growmg Sino-American relations; and Pyongyang's 
concern about the slowly increasing Sino-South Korean contacts.24 
After Deng's visit, in an apparent move to have Pyongyang on her side in the 
Sino-Soviet rift, China supplied North Korea with a total of 20 A-5 fighter planes, the 
improved Chinese model of the MIG-21. Beijing cautiously provided North Korea with 
crude oil, AN-2 planes and T -62 tanks, expressing fears that excessive military strength 
might prompt North Korea to make adventurous moves. China extended economic aid 
amounting to $100 million to Pyongyang in August 1982.25 Finally, China took a much 
tougher line on the American presence in South Korea. All of this suggested that the 
Chinese was extremely keen to maintain North Korean support because of North 
Korea's strategic location. At the same time, however, China did not encourage Kim Il 
Sung or his successor to take any adventurous action on the Korean peninsula that could 
58 
lead to war with the United States at a time when China's principal preoccupations 
remained internal economic development and the external menace of Soviet 
expansiomsm. Beijing clearly had a much stronger interest than Pyongyang m 
maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula in order to devote all the resources to 
economic construction. Furthermore, despite Pyongyang's objections, China had 
shown a determination to establish unofficial ties with South Korea. China could not 
ignore the fact that it would benefit a great deal from relations with Seoul, both 
economically and strategically. 
China's Flexibility toward South Korea 
After the 3'd plenum of the 11 rh CCPCC in December 1978, China needed a 
peaceful, stable international environment to devote itself fully to the four 
modernizations and to accomplish political stability at home, and needed capital and 
technology from the outside, with which the modernization plan can be achieved. The 
open door policy required flexibility and pragmatism. Moreover, in the late 1970s Sino-
American and Sino-Japanese rapprochement forn1ed a new type of loose bipolar system 
111 the Northeast Asia. China's strong interest in Northeast Asian stability was 
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reinforced by its gesire to expand economic cooperation with America and Japan to 
promote modernization.26 The shift in domestic policy priorities was the main and 
fundamental reason behind Beijing's change of policy toward South Korea. However, 
these political-diplomatic shifts in Northeast Asia served as a catalyst for China's new 
South Korean policy. 
Ever since the early 1980s, China has adopted a considerably more flexible and 
conciliatory posture toward South Korea than it had in the past thirty years. And 
despite Pyongyang's strong objections, Beijing began to show a determination to start 
unofficial contacts with South Korea. Chinese economic and other non-political ties 
with South Korea reflected the Chinese leadership's willingness to separate economics 
from ideological and political considerations in pursuing a more pragmatic and 
independent foreign policy. 
The Chinese leaders saw the Korean peninsula as the most dangerous flash point 
in Northeast Asia. They recognized that renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula 
would place China in the strategic dilemma of either supporting North Korea, thereby 
jeopardizing Sino-American/Japanese relations, or abandoning North Korea totally to 
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Soviet influence. To forestall such a possibility, China began to pursue a more practical 
course in its relations with South Korea. The key element of Chinese new policy was 
the maintenance of the status quo with an easing of tension on the Korean peninsula. 
On the one hand, China continued to maintain its long-established friendly relations 
with North Korea, while on the other hand, China had to develop friendly, cooperative 
relations with South Korea. 
Beijing cautiously eased its hard-line attitude toward Seoul. According to Chu 
Sung-po's article,27 Beijing's Foreign Minister Huang Hua in his speech on January 25, 
1980, "The Situation and Policies in Foreign Affairs in the 1980s and Future Tasks," 
viewed Beijing's policy toward South Korea as "Guanmen bushangsuo" (the door is 
closed, but not locked). Huang Hua revealed the regime's basic principles for dealings 
with the Korean peninsula in his 1980 report which said that: "first, the unification of 
North and South Korea must be accomplished through peaceful means, out of the free 
will of both sides and without outside intervention. Beijing would support North 
Korea's unification proposal, but would not approve and support North Korea's use of 
force for that purpose. As for the question of the US military presence in South Korea, 
Beijing had made it clear where it stood while expressmg its understanding of the 
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American position. Second, China shared the viewpoint with the United States and 
Japan that stability on the Korean peninsula would help stabilize the situation in 
Northeast Asia. While maintaining friendly relations with North Korea, Beijing would 
also keep a close watch on the Soviet Union's influence there and continuously consult 
the United States and Japan so that it can readjust its policy toward North Korea. Third, 
Beijing would strengthen its contacts and exchanges with North Korea m order to 
neutralize Soviet influence. While trying to win further sympathy and understanding of 
the Chinese position from the people of North Korea, Beijing would try to enhance the 
strength of pro-Beijing elements there because this would not only favor improved 
mutual friendship but would also tend to weaken the putschist tendency of pro-Soviet 
elements in North Korea. Fourth, whereas North Korea has a 'Soviet card' in its hand, 
Beijing has a 'South Korea card.' IfNorth Korea were to lean further to the side of the 
Soviet Union, China would cut off all kinds of assistance and turn to the side of South 
Korea. The door is ready to open at any moment to accommodate South Korea."28 It 
was evident that China's major policy toward the Korean peninsula was mainly to check 
Soviet expansion, win U.S. sympathy, bring South and North Korea for peace talks, and 
ease the tension in the Korean peninsula as a whole. 
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The changes evident in Chinese policy reflected the confluence of four factors: 
South Korea's steadily widening advantage over North Korea m the long-term 
economtc competition, t.e., South Korea's economic superiority; South Korea's 
increasing international visibility that North Korea has been unable to stymie or reverse; 
China's need to absorb technology and investment from South Korea; and China's 
policy to separate politics and economics in its foreign policy in order to improve ties 
with South Korea. These developments constituted a significant shift in the political 
and economic environment that China's leaders confront in Northeast Asia, providing 
Beijing with new incentives and opportunities for a more differentiated policy toward 
the Korean peninsula. 29 
In a very brief period, the Chinese shifted from a position that would not 
countenance any ties at all with South Korea to an increasingly active, non-
governmental relationship. Since 1981, Beij ing' s diplomats have been allowed to make 
contact with their South Korean counterparts at diplomatic gatherings in third countries. 
Both China and South Korea began to participate regularly in international sports games 
m third countries. The Chinese government permitted South Koreans in mainland 
China to visit their families or relatives and granted entry visas to people who hold 
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South Korean passports, to participate in meetings of international organizations held in 
Beijing and other Chinese cities. 
The First Official Contact and a Surprising Thaw in Beijing-Seoul Ties. 
There were no official contacts except for the ones from early 1981 on, m 
which diplomatic personnel of China and South Korea exchanged greetings at 
international gatherings. But, on May 5, 1983, a dramatic breakthrough in Beijing-
Seoul relations unexpectedly occurred when a Civil Aviation Administration of China 
(CAAC) plane with 105 people aboard was hijacked by six armed Chinese youth during 
a flight from the Manchurian city of Shenyang to Shanghai and forced to land in 
Chunchon, South Korea. 30 The hijackers were taken into custody by South Korean 
authorities. The arrival of a CAAC plane from China certainly startled Seoul, but 
almost right away the South Korean leaders realized that this unexpected event had 
provided them with a long-expected opportunity in approaching Beijing. As a result, 
Seoul decided to use the incident to knock on China's "closed but unlocked door." 
Beijing hardly hesitated. Shen Tu, director-general of CAAC and also a 
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memb~r of the CCP Central Committee, issued a statement in Beijing immediately, 
asking to be allowed to visit Seoul to discuss repatriating the aircraft, its cargo and 
passengers m accordance with related articles of international and civil aviation 
conventions. When Shen Tu arrived in Seoul on May 7 as the head of a thirty-three-
member official delegation, he saw plenty of evidence of South Korea's goodwill. At 
Kimpo Airport, he was welcomed by a group of high ranking South Korean officials, 
including the Assistant Foreign Minister. Talks between Shen and South Koreans 
started immediately, and the two sides addressed each other's country by its official title, 
using the term "Republic of Korea" for South Korea and the "People's Republic of 
China" for China for the first time since 1949. The two sides signed a nine-point 
memorandum on May 10. China signed the document in the name of the Civil Aviation 
Administration of the People's Republic of China, a gesture that was seen as Beijing's 
indirect recognition of the South Korean government. The accord provided a basis for 
further close cooperation between the two countries in dealing with similar emergencies 
in future. 31 
As a consequence of the hijacking incident, the covert inter-governmental 
negotiation between China and South Korea clearly demonstrated that, although Beijing 
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could not officially recognize South Korea, it implicitly ackno.wledged the existence of 
South Korea on the Korean peninsula. This incident led China to determine to start 
informal relations with South Korea and paved the way for more contacts of an informal 
nature between Beijing and Seoul. Since then, China had changed from a position that 
would not countenance any ties at all with South Korea to an increasingly active, non-
governmental relationship. 
The hijacking incident undoubtedly gave Beijing a pretext to change its South 
Korean policy and thus to develop direct contacts openly. Three months after the 
incident, China issued a visa for the first time to a South Korean official to attend a UN-
sponsored seminar (August 14-September 1) on fisheries in Wuxi, China. 32 China also 
allowed delegates from Seoul to take part in the International Telecommunications 
Union's seminar in Shanghai in October 1983. Later, two more South Korean officials 
attended the International Maritime Organization's training activity. 33 More important, 
m June 1983, it was revealed that South Korea, China, and Japan reached a final 
agreement on a new air route linking Fukue in Japan and Shanghai in China through the 
Korean Air Defense Identification Zone beginning August 4, 1983. The opening of the 
new air route eventually enabled flight control in Taegu, South Korea to communicate 
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directly with its counterpart in Shanghai.34 
In addition, in March 1984, a South Korean tennis team was allowed to compete 
in the Davis Cup competition in Kunming, China. This was the first time since the 
Korean War that China invited a ROK sports team to attend international games on its 
territory. 35 Reciprocally, in mid-April, 1984, the Chinese basketball team went to Seoul 
to compete in the Eighth Asian Junior Basketball Championships. In the same month, 
PRC swimmers attended the Second Asian Swimming Championships in Seoul, and in 
October a ROK women's basketball team participated in the Ninth Asian Women's 
Basketball Championships in Shanghai. Ten South Korean reporters were also allowed 
to accompany the team. What is more, for the convenience of news reports, for the first 
time the Chinese approved the setting up of a direct telephone line between Shanghai and 
Seoul. 36 In September 1984, a 12-member Chinese delegation, including a member of 
the International Olympic Committee and a vice-mayor of Beijing, visited Seoul to 
attend a general meeting of the Olympic Council of Asia. They successfully lobbied for 
the right to host the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing.37 
After the hijacking incident in May 1983, as mentioned above, there were many 
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stgns of change m Sino-South Korean relations. More important, the new "sports 
diplomacy" between China and South Korea culminated eventually in Beijing's decision 
to participate in Seoul's Asian Games in September 1986 and Seoul's Olympic Games in 
September 1988.38 In other words, China's policy toward South Korea began to change 
from a position of "no contact" to a policy of "Guanmen Bushangsuo." This marked a 
watershed in relations between Beijing and Seoul. Thus, this hijacking incident was a 
contributing factor that made China gradually change policy toward Korea, and that the 
hijacking incident served as a catalyst for further contacts between China and South 
Korea. 
The Cautious Chinese Reaction 
Right after the hijacking incident, China was still sensitive to North Korea's 
reaction to any move they made regarding South Korea. In a deliberate move to assuage 
North Korean apprehensions of a possible Sino-South Korean rapprochement, China 
dispatched its foreign minister, Wu Xueqian, to Pyongyang. Wu publicly reaffirmed 
Beijing's long-standing opposition to any "two-Koreas" formula as well as China's 
solidarity with and security commitments to North Korea. 39 It was indirectly reported 
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that South Korea had been asked by Beijing to keep the reconciliatiqn process between 
the two sides discreet, for fear of provoking Pyongyang.40 
Meanwhile, even though Beijing officially condemned nepotism in its own ruling 
ranks, China invited Kim Jong 11 to visit China in June 1983 in order to keep North 
Korea within Beijing's orbit and wanted to make sure that Kim Jong 11, who was born in 
Siberia and educated there in his early years, did not turn toward the Soviet Union. 41 
Therefore, the Chinese accorded a very special attention to Kim Jong Il's visit.42 Not a 
head of the state, Kim Jong Il received more high level attention from the Chinese 
leadership than any foreign dignitaries received in many years. It indicated that China 
endorsed the junior Kim as official heir designate. 
Nevertheless, after the hijacking incident, the unprecedented official contact 
between Beijing and Seoul paved the way for further contacts m vanous athletic, 
scientific, and economic contexts. 
North Korea's Terrorism: the Rangoon Bombing 
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On October 9, 1983, North Korean agents in Rangoon attempted to assassinate 
South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan during his state visit to Burma. Chun escaped 
but seventeen of his entourage, including four cabinet ministers, died. 43 On November 
4, 1983, Burmese authorities released its investigation which found that three North 
Korean army officers were involved in the bombing. Rangoon accused Pyongyang of 
engineering the incident and severed diplomatic relations with the DPRK.44 
The Rangoon bombing apparently shocked Chinese leaders and baffled 
Beijing's endeavor to promote a more peaceful and stable environment on the Korean 
peninsula. Chinese leaders may well have felt betrayed and come to distrust the 
Pyongyang authorities, because, ironically, the bombing incident occurred only a day 
after China notified the U.S. embassy in Beijing that North Korea was ready to 
participate in tripartite talks with Washington and Seoul.45 North Korean actions flew 
in the face of Beijing's repeated reassurances to the United States and Japan that North 
Korean intentions were entirely peaceful and oriented toward economic construction, 
not renewed conflict. North Korea broke a promise given to China that it would not use 
force against South Korea except in self-defense.46 
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The incident made Chinese leaders more concerned that North Korea's aggressive 
actions could start a major conflict involving China and other major powers m 
Northeast Asia that would destroy China's prospects for substantial economic 
development in the future. 47 As a result, the bombing persuaded Beijing that a "do 
nothing" Chinese posture in relation to the peninsula would run very severe risks in the 
relation to China's need for regional stability and hopes for achieving a breakthrough in 
coordinating the reunification strategies of the two states. 
Chinese leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping, privately expressed their disgust at 
North Korea's involvement in the bombing. During his visit to Japan in late 1983, the 
CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang stated that China was against all kinds of 
terrorism.48 Hu added that "China is genuinely and unswervingly in favor of enduring 
stability on the Korean peninsula and holds that whatever actions likely to aggravate 
tension there, no matter where they are from, should be avoided"-as close to a 
dissociation from North Korean actions as Beijing could Issue under the 
circumstances.49 Beijing's subsequent public comments to Pyongyang warned of 
extremely severe political consequences for Sino-North Korean relations ifNorth Korea 
should act again in a manner grossly contrary to its repeated reassurances of peaceful 
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intent. 
Pyongyang was firmly resolved to prevent contacts between China and South 
Korea at any level, but the Rangoon bombing incident set in motion political 
consequences very different from those that Pyongyang had anticipated. The world had 
not only strongly denounced the North Korean action but also imposed sanctions on 
Pyongyang.50 The international opprobrium made Pyongyang even more dependent on 
political and economic support from Beijing for alleviating international sanctions and 
isolation and increased China's leverage over North Korea. The incident also cost 
North Korea considerably in its global competition with South Korea. 
As a consequence, Beijing seemed to have decided not to allow North Korea a 
singular place in China's Korea policy, and to pursue unofficial relations with Seoul, 
regardless of Pyongyang's objections. After the Rangoon bombing, many unofficial 
activities in Sino-South Korean relations accelerated dramatically in diverse athletic, 
scientific, and economic areas, indicating a tacit means by which Beijing sought to 
punish Pyongyang for its actions. Chinese relations with South and North were no 
longer the same following the incident. The unofficial ties m Sino-South Korean 
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relations represented a <;loor increasingly aJar. Therefore, the Rangoon bombing 
incident contributed to China's decision to shift from a One-Korea policy to a Two-
Korea policy. 
China's Role as an Intermediary 
China masterfully turned the Rangoon bombing incident to its own advantage to 
increase its influence over Pyongyang and emerge as North Korea's principal 
intermediary vis-a-vis the West. 51 During Zhao Ziyang's visit to the United States in 
January 1984, the Chinese premier informed President Reagan of North Korea's 
proposal for tripartite negotiations prior to Pyongyang's public disclosure of the offer. 52 
Regardless of the problematic nature of the tripartite offer, the call for renewed 
negotiations was deemed an obvious plus by the Chinese. 
Beijing repeatedly made clear that it regarded the resumption of North-South 
contacts as a major breakthrough. First, it enabled the Chinese to more openly explore 
unofficial relations with South Korea. For example, in November 1984 interview with 
visiting Japanese correspondents, Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang asserted that the 
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further development of Sino-South Korean ties (in particular direct economtc ties) 
would "depend on how things develop between South and North Korea."53 
Second, China was able to use North Korea's clear commitment to a confederate 
arrangement with South Korea to link their own calls for a "one country, two systems" 
approach to the unification of Korea. For example, when, in September 1984, the 
British and Chinese governments reached agreement over Hong Kong under the unique 
arrangement of "one country, two systems," it was reported that Chinese leaders 
admitted that China did not completely support some of the paths that North Korea had 
taken. They had urged North Korea to accept a similar formula, in effect a Chinese 
version of the North Korean "confederated state" formula, which would "respect" the 
existing systems of the North and the South. China's leaders have already suggested 
their principle of "one country, two systems" could also apply to the Korean peninsula's 
two systems. 54 In February 1985, Deng Xiaoping asserted publicly for the first time 
that the "one country, two systems" concept was "the way to solve" both the Chinese 
and Korean questions. 55 
Third, the onset of negotiations on the peninsula facilitated China's pursuit of 
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regional stability--one of the most important items on the Chinese political agenda. 
Since the time of the tssmng of the tripartite proposal, the Chinese have generally 
asserted that the situation on the peninsula has become less tense. 56 Although China 
voiced occasional criticisms of the mmual "Team Spirit" exercises between US and 
South Korean forces, these criticisms were generally low-key, and were no longer 
accompanied by biting attacks on the legitimacy of the presence of US forces. For 
example, Vice-Premier Wan Li stated that "we hope that South Korean and American 
troops stationed in South Korea will not launch military actions. "57 Thus, China tacitly 
acknowledged that they would not call for the withdrawal of US forces on the peninsula. 
By implication, the Chinese recognized that US forces remained a stabilizing element 
on the Korean peninsula, to which China no longer took strenuous exception. 
It was also reported that the Chinese looked positively on military cooperation 
between the US, South Korea, and Japan as long as it provided a deterrent against the 
Soviet Union in East Asia.58 
China repeatedly depicted their role in defusing tensions as modest, limited, and 
indirect. As stated by Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian in April 16, 1984: 
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The present problem is to encourage the parties involved in the tension on 
the Korean peninsula to enter into talks about ways in which tension can be 
relaxed there ... North and South Korea are parties directly involved in the 
tension ... as is the US, which stations troops there. We are willing to help from 
the sidelines to encourage both the North and South Koreans to enter into talks for 
peaceful reunification and to discuss ways to relax tensions in Northeast Asia. In 
short, we are willing to do whatever is in our capability. But we cannot say that 
China can play a prominent role. China supported North Korea's proposal for 
tripartite talks and is willing to do something from the sidelines which is 
conducive to the peaceful reunification of Korea and to the relaxation of tensions 
in Northeast Asia.59 
Regardless of the understated quality of China's self-defined mandate to reduce 
tensions, China's role toward Korea was notably changing. The Chinese repeatedly 
sought to separate the issue of the US military presence on the peninsula from forward 
movement in the North-South dialogue. And the Chinese went beyond their repeated 
assurances about North Korean lack of aggressive intentions by setting explicit limits to 
China's prospective involvement in the event of renewed hostilities. In a meeting with 
a delegation from the Japan Socialist Party in June 1984, Zhang Xiangshan, an advisor 
to the CCP International Liaison Department, stated that "if the DPRK initiates war 
against South Korea, we cannot support it." He added that "we are most worried about 
another war in Korea."60 Zhang's statement explicitly sought to disassociate China 
from any renewed hostilities initiated by North Korea. It indicated China's role to 
dissuade North Korea from undertaking further actions to destabilize conditions on the 
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Korean peninsula. 
Sino-South Korean Economic Relations 
One of the most explicit manifestations of Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic foreign 
policy was the significant shift in Beijing's position vis-a-vis Seoul from a "non-policy" 
to "economic diplomacy." Such a transformation "from enemies to partners" had 
important implications for the regional stability in East Asia as well as for the security 
of the Korean peninsula. 
In the Third Plenum of the 11th CCPCC in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping and 
his reform-oriented pragmatists adopted a bold open door policy aimed at attracting 
foreign technology and capital to speed up the four modemizations. This open door 
policy, which was called by Deng Xiaoping as China's "Second Revolution,"61 laid an 
appropriate theoretical base for relations between the two countries resulting m the 
growing integration of economic relations between China and South Korea in East Asia. 
After the Third Plenum, Deng continued to strengthen his power base in the most 
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important decision-making organizations of the CCP. Vice Premier Zhao Ziyang 
replaced Hua Guofeng as Premier of the State Council in September 1980. At the Sixth 
Plenum in June 1981 Hu Yaobang replaced Hua Guofeng as CCP Chairman and Deng 
Xiaoping took over Hua's powerful chairmanship of the Central Military Commission 
of the CCP. The leadership of Deng-Hu-Zhao reflected not only the open-mindedness 
of China's government but also the growing professionalism of foreign policy-making 
processes in Beijing and elevation of pragmatism and open door policies to the principal 
agenda of the four modernizations. Also the pragmatic reformists' victories laid the 
foundation for cooperation between China and South Korea during the 1980s. 
Deng Xiaoping's much-vaunted commitment to economic pragmatism laid the 
basis of a new order of economic relations with South Korea. Sino-South Korean 
economic relations benefited from many factors in companson with China's other 
economic partners. Several factors contributed to the success of trade between the two 
countries: Economic complementarity, geographic proximity and the consequent ease of 
sea-borne commerce, linguistic complementarity, historical familiarity with local 
conditions, and the South Korean focus on Government-Business coordination in the 
industrial sector. 
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China studied South Korea's successful economic strategies-such as the 
government's efficient intervention in economic affairs, utilization of foreign capital 
and technology, enterprise merger and reorganization, encouragement for study abroad, 
and labor force exportation. On September 7, 1978, an official ofthe New China News 
Agency said that the remarkable economic success of South Korea was worthy of 
attention. Subsequently, on December 18, 1978, PRC Minister of Foreign Trade Li 
Qiang mentioned in an interview in Hong Kong that "China may have to consider 
having trade with South Korea."62 China was determined to know about and learn from 
South Korea. As early as late 1978 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
established a small research group under its Institute of World Economics and Politics 
to study the developmental model of South Korea's economy. While, out of its concern 
for Pyongyang, Beijing continued to avoid visible contacts with Seoul, indirect trade 
was allowed beginning in 1979. China's initial goal was directed toward becoming 
another East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong) by following the path of South Korea. China even copied 
South Korea's targets of economic development: Deng Xiaoping's projection of 
reaching the per capita gross national product of one thousand US dollars by the year 
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2000 was allegedly molded after the former South Korean President Park, Chung Hee's 
figure by 1980.63 
The Chinese government was most interested in establishing special trading 
zones, along the lines of the successful free economic zones in South Korea. In doing 
this, China offered greater autonomy and incentives to managers; she decentralized 
management of foreign trade, established "Special Economic Zones" (SEZs) on the 
coast to attract foreign capital investment.64 
China's economic modernization primarily focused on the attraction of direct 
foreign investment under the terms of the Joint Venture Law, giving high priority to 
light industry and relaxing restrictions on individual entrepreneurs. At the Second 
Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in July 1979, China adopted the law on 
Joint Ventures and Foreign Investment in order to absorb foreign investments and 
expand international economic cooperation and technological exchange on the basis of 
equality and mutual benefit.65 
Meanwhile, China's favorable evaluation of South Korea's economic 
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advancement served as a basis for indirect trade between the two countries; the volume 
increased from $19 million in 1979 to $188 million in 1980 and $280 million in 1981. 
Even though the latter amount constituted a meager share (0.34 percent) of China's total 
foreign trade, it was more than half the estimated volume ($531 million) of Chinese-
North Korean trade. In view of North Korean sensitivities, the Chinese adopted a 
policy of separating economic from diplomatic issues. 
Although indirect trade started m 1979, neither Chinese nor South Korean 
officials publicly referred to it. In an effort to conceal its commercial contracts, the 
Chinese frequently removed trademarks from goods imported from South Korea. It was 
reported that third-country vessels, sometimes manned and owned by South Koreans 
but bearing flags of third countries, were required to camouflage their destinations 
through the use of two bills of lading, one of which was destroyed halfway through the 
journey. Ships from China were required to call on ports in Japan before proceeding to 
South Korean harbors. At times, however, the Chinese permitted the direct shipment of 
goods (such as coal) between China and South Korea.66 
Another development occurred on April 11, 1980 when South Korea and the 
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US agreed to grant each other traffic rights, _ during a three-day bilateral aviation 
conference held in Washington. South Korea authorized US commercial aircraft to fly 
to China via Seoul; South Korea was thus able to send goods directly to China without 
making U-tums in between destinations.67 The trade between China and South Korea 
could therefore no longer be considered as any kind of secret But such failures in 
maintaining secrecy typically resulted in complaints to China from North Korea. 
Pyongyang protested about the development of a sizable trade between China and South 
Korea in 1980 and 1981, and this was undoubtedly one of the factors involved in the 
sharp fall in trade from $280 million in 1981 to $139 million in 1982. 
In an attempt to strain Beijing-Pyongyang relations, the Soviet newspaper 
lzvestia reported in March 1981 that China had betrayed North Korea's interests by 
promoting trade with South Korea on an official basis.68 The Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Trade issued a statement categorically denying the report and reaffirming 
China's disapproval of any "two Koreas" machinations and its non-recognition of the 
South Korean authorities. The Chinese countercharged that the Soviet Union was 
flirting with the South Korean regime, abetting the plot to create "two Koreas" and 
inviting South Korean government ministers, economic delegations, scholars, and 
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sportsmen as honored_ guests to Moscow.69 The trade issue was presumably high on the 
agenda of Premier Zhao Ziyang's discussions with Kim Il Sung and Premier Li Jong Ok 
in December 1981. In public statements made in Pyongyang, Zhao emphasized China's 
rejection of the "two-Korea" policy pursued by the United States and South Korea. 70 
Although South Korea's total imports increased annually from 1980 to 1984, 
exports to China suffered serious setbacks between 1981 and 1983. Two factors 
explained the setback of 1981-83. First, between 1981 and 1982 China rigorously 
sought to reduce imports to cool down its overheated economy, and second, between 
1982 and 1983, despite the loosening of import controls, China restrained itself due to 
North Korea's 1982 complaint over Sino-South Korean economic contacts. 71 
Especially after Zhao' s visit to Pyongyang in December 1981 and Kim Il Sung's visit to 
Beijing in September 1982, indirect trade between China and South Korea declined 
appreciably-$ 139 million in 1982 and $ 120 million in 1983. This downward trend 
was not only a result of pressure from North Korea and the Soviet Union but was also 
an extension of China's economic retrenchment policy, which scaled down its 
excessively ambitious Ten-Year Economic Plan (1976-1985) and imposed restrictions 
on foreign imports. 72 
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Due to the complaint from Pyongyang, Beijing detained fourteen merchant ships 
that carried South Korean goods in April 1982. But it also announced a ban on trade 
with South Korea, a move that indirectly acknowledged its trade with the country.73 
This set-back in economic relations between China and South Korea did not last long; 
exports to South Korea were temporarily reduced because of the pressures from 
conservative forces within the CCP, but the declared suspensions were never made 
permanent. As long as China's modernization had a high priority on the national 
agenda, they needed South Korea more than South Korea needed them. 
In 1984, the amount of China's trade with South Korea climbed to $434 million, 
approaching that of its trade with North Korea ($498 million). This trend reflected 
China's decision to strengthen its open-door policy, enunciated at the Third Plenum of 
the Twelfth Central Committee in October 1984. Although China continued to affect 
official ignorance of its trade with South Korea, it was undeniable that from December 
1978 the value of trade between Beijing and Seoul rose at a phenomenal rate, step by 
step with an unmistakable political thaw in Beijing-Seoul relations. 
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Conclusion 
After Mao Zedong's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping came to power at the Third 
Plenum of the 11th CCPCC in December 1978 and announced a historic project of 
economic reform at the Third Plenum. Deng Xiaoping and a small group of reform-
oriented pragmatists regarded the "Four Modemizations" program and "Open Door" 
policy as the most important objectives of state work. In other words, the top priority 
of Chinese leaders was to promote successful economic modernization. To accomplish 
its "Four Modernizations" program, China needed peace and stability on the Korean 
peninsula. Under the influence of the "Open Door" policy, Beijing started to readjust its 
foreign policy toward the Korean Peninsula. That is, the Third Plenum's decision gave 
a new and crucial impetus to South Korea's contacts with China. 
Beginning in late 1978, and particularly after China's rapprochement with Japan 
and the United States, the chief thrust of Chinese foreign policy stood in remarkable 
contrast to that of North Korea. Thus, it became more difficult for Beijing and 
Pyongyang to harmonize their respective policy priorities. At the official policy 
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statement level, China unquestionably continued to support North Korea because of 
North Korea's strategic location. At the same time, however, China did not encourage 
Kim Il Sung to take any adventurous action on the Korean peninsula that could lead to 
war with the United States at a time when China's principal preoccupations remained 
internal economic development and the external menace of Soviet expansionism. 
Furthermore, despite Pyongyang's displeasure and objections, China began to show a 
determination to establish unofficial ties with South Korea. China could not ignore the 
fact that it would benefit a great deal from relations with South Korea, both 
economically and strategically. 
After the 3'd plenum in December 1978, China needed a peaceful, stable 
international environment to accomplish the Four Modernizations and political stability 
at home, and needed capital and technology from the outside; with which the 
modernization plan can be achieved. The open door policy required flexibility and 
pragmatism. Moreover, m the late 1970s Sino-American and Sino-Japanese 
rapprochement formed a new type of loose bipolar system in the Northeast Asia. 
China's strong interest in Northeast Asian stability was reinforced by its desire to 
expand economic cooperation with America and Japan to promote modernization. The 
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shift m domestic policy priorities was the mam and fundamental reason behind 
Beijing's change of policy toward South Korea. However, these political-diplomatic 
shifts in Northeast Asia served as a catalyst for China's new South Korean policy. 
The changes evident in Chinese policy reflected the confluence of four factors: 
first, South Korea's economic superiority; second, South Korea's increasing 
international visibility that North Korea has been unable to stymie or reverse; third, 
China's need to absorb technology and investment from South Korea; fourth, China's 
policy to separate politics and economics in its foreign policy in order to improve ties 
with South Korea. These developments constituted a significant shift in the political 
and economic environment that China's leaders confront in Northeast Asia, providing 
Beijing with new incentives and opportunities for a more differentiated policy toward 
the Korean peninsula. 
The 1983 hijacking incident clearly gave Beijing an excuse to modify its South 
Korean policy and thus to develop direct contacts overtly. As a consequence of the 
hijacking of a Chinese jetliner, the inter-governmental negotiation between China and 
South Korea clearly demonstrated that, although Beijing could not formally recognize 
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South Korea, it tacitly acknowledged the existence of South Korea on the Ko_rean 
peninsula. This incident led China to decide to inaugurate unofficial ties with South 
Korea and paved the way for further contacts of an unofficial nature between Beijing 
and Seoul. Since then, Beijing-Seoul relations had improved greatly at non-
governmental levels. Thus, this hijacking incident was a contributing factor that made 
China gradually change policy toward Korea, and that the hijacking incident served as a 
catalyst for South Korea's contacts with China. 
The Rangoon bombing apparently shocked Chinese leaders and frustrated 
Beijing's effort in promoting a more peaceful and stable environment on the Korean 
peninsula. The incident made Chinese leaders more concerned that North Korea's 
aggressive actions could start a major conflict involving China and other major powers 
in Northeast Asia that would destroy China's prospects for substantial economic 
development in the future. As a consequence, Beijing decided not to allow North Korea 
a singular place in China's Korea policy, and to pursue unofficial relations with Seoul, 
regardless of Pyongyang's displeasure. After the Rangoon bombing, many unofficial 
activities in Sino-South Korean relations accelerated dramatically in various athletic, 
scientific, and economic areas, indicating a tacit means by which Beijing sought to 
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punish Pyongyang for its actions. Chinese relations with South and North were no 
longer the same following the incident. The unofficial ties m Sino-South Korean 
relations represented a door increasingly aJar. Therefore, the Rangoon bombing 
incident contributed to China's decision to shift from a One-Korea policy to a Two-
Korea policy. 
One of the most explicit manifestations of China's pragmatic foreign policy was 
the remarkable change in Beijing's position toward Seoul from a "non-policy" to 
"economic diplomacy." China's economic pragmatism put the basis of a new order of 
economic relations with South Korea. Meanwhile, China's favorable evaluation of 
South Korea's economic advancement served as a basis for indirect trade between the 
two countries. In 1984, the amount of China's trade with South Korea climbed to $434 
million from $19 million in 1979. This trend reflected China's decision to strengthen its 
open-door policy. Although China continued to affect official ignorance of its trade 
with South Korea, it was undeniable that from December 1978 the value of trade 
between Beijing and Seoul rose at a phenomenal rate, step by step with an unmistakable 
political thaw in Beijing-Seoul relations. 
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Since China's leaders saw a peaceful and stable environment on the Korean 
peninsula as crucial for China's modernization efforts, Beij ing' s perception of the RO K 
had undergone significant modification. As the PRC improved its relations with the 
U.S. and Japan, Beijing's hostility toward the ROK also decreased. Not only did the 
Chinese cease to see the ROK as an enemy, but also they began to recognize the 
advantages of economic ties with South Korea-as a valuable trading partner and as a 
source of capital and high technology. On balance, China could not ignore the fact that 
South Korea was an emerging power in East Asia. Beijing had a strong security interest 
in the Korean peninsula. China had a vital, long-term interest in positive relations with 
the capitalist states. China's ambitious economic agenda for the 1980s could not be 
accomplished without stable and moderately amicable ties with its non-communist 
neighbors, including the ROK. Therefore, I argue that The Third Plenum's decision in 
December 1978 and political-diplomatic shifts in Northeast Asia in late 1970s served as 
a catalyst for China's new South Korean policy, and that Deng's pragmatism and open 
door policy made China gradually change to "Two Koreas" policy. 
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Chapter 3:. De Facto "Two Koreas" Policy, 1985-1988 
During the period of 1985-1988, intemational situation surrounding the Korean 
Peninsula was changing rapidly. Relations between Beijing and Moscow were 
improving drastically after 1985. Sino-Soviet Detente greatly lessened tensions on the 
Korean peninsula and allowed the Chinese leaders the freedom to pursue a de facto 
"Two Koreas" policy. In March, 1985, the Chinese navy torpedo boat incident occurred. 
Through the Chinese torpedo boat incident, Seoul and Beijing, for the second time in 
less than two years, engaged in official negotiations. This incident provided both China 
and South Korea with an opportunity to develop new relations. 
China's l31h National Pmty Congress in October 1987 was a victory for reformists. 
This signified that China would continue to take a pragmatic and positive attitude 
toward South Korea. Meanwhile, China was supremely embarrassed by the bombing of 
Korean Air (KAL) flight 858 by North Korean terrorists, in November, 1987. This 
incident made Beijing leaders more concemed that North Korea's aggressive action 
could start a major conflict involving Beijing and the United States in Nmtheast Asia 
that would destroy China's economic development in the future. 
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Relations between China and South Korea in nonpolitical fields were improving 
rapidly. The most visible and dramatic breakthrough in Chinese relations with South 
Korea was China's participation in the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic 
Games in Seoul despite North Korea's boycott. These two Games played an important 
role in promoting China's positive perception of South Korea. After these two Games, 
many Chinese and South Korean businessmen and athletes visited Seoul and Beijing 
respectively. Bilateral trade also increased at a phenomenal rate. Moreover, in 1988, 
the establishment of permanent trade office in Seoul, representing Shandong Province in 
China, was an important breakthrough toward normalization between China and South 
Korea. 
What caused China to go ahead toward a de facto "Two Koreas" policy? To 
analyze the reasons why China changed to a de facto "Two Koreas" policy during the 
period of 1985-1988, in this Chapter I will address the following issues: Sino-Soviet 
Detente, Chinese Torpedo Boat Incident, Seoul Asian Games, Changes of Chinese 
Political Leadership, China's Policy toward North Korea, China's Response to North 
Korea's Terrorism, Seoul Olympics, and China's Economic Diplomacy with South 
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Korea. 
Sino-Soviet Detente 
Relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union 
have been of crucial importance to the prospects for peace and stability in East Asia, 
especially on the Korean peninsula. Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, drastic 
shifts in the Sino-Soviet relationship (e.g., the formation of a Sino-Soviet alliance in 
1950, the split between the two countries from 1960 to mid-1980s) have affected not 
only the interests of the two countries, but also the global power structure. 
There was no real breakthrough in Sino-Soviet negotiations until after the 
emergence of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union in March 1985. The Chinese insisted on the Soviet fulfillment of the 
removal of "Three Obstacles" as prerequisite for normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, 
because the Soviet Union refused to discuss "Three Obstacles," to avoid Chinese 
demand for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, reduction of the forces 
stationed along the Chinese border and withdrawal from Mongolia, and withdrawal 
from Cambodia. 1 
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With regard to Sino-Soviet relations, Mr. Gorbachev made his famous 
"Vladivostok speech" on July 28, 1986. Though Mr. Gorbachev avoided the Cambodia 
issue in his speech, he said the Soviet Union was prepared to withdraw part of its forces 
from Afghanistan, reduce the size of the force stationed along the Chinese border, and 
withdraw from Mongolia.2 These were concessions of considerable importance. 
Clearly, Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech signaled Moscow's new approach to China. 
In addition, Gorbachev activated the Soviet presence in the Asia-Pacific region by 
reducing tensions and resolving conflicts through improving relations with all the 
countries, including South Korea. This was clearly spelled out in his Vladivostok 
speech.3 
Although China remained dissatisfied on the Cambodian issue, Chinese leaders 
welcomed Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech. Deng Xiaoping reacted positively 
remarking: "I myself will be ready to meet him" provided the Soviet Union intended to 
remove the "Three Obstacles."4 In an interview with Mike Wallace of CBS in 
September 1986, Deng Xiaoping stated that he would be ready to meet Gorbachev if the 
Soviet Union would persuade Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Cambodia. 5 At the 
99 
l31h CCP congress, which met in late October, 1987, the party reordered China's foreign 
policy in three important ways: it reaffirmed China's "independent foreign policy"; it 
restated the five principles of "peaceful coexistence" as the guide for China's relations 
with all countries, including the Soviet Union; and it put an end to the long-standing 
campaign against Soviet "hegemonism."6 
From 1987, Sino-Soviet relations began to improve significantly. In May 1989, 
as the Soviet Union was able to satisfy virtually all of China's demands on removing 
"Three Obstacles" to normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, the state was set for a 
Sino-Soviet summit meeting for the first time since 1959 when Mao Zedong and Nikita 
Khrushchev met in Beijing. 
What were the implications of the Sino-Soviet rapprochement for the Korean 
peninsula? It was clear that both China and the Soviet Union desired the reduction of 
tension m the Asia-Pacific regton, including the Korean peninsula. In order to 
implement domestic reforms and economic development, Beijing and Moscow needed a 
peaceful intemational environment in the Northeast Asia for a considerable period of 
time. Neither China nor the Soviet Union wanted to be dragged into a major conflict on 
100 
the Korean peninsula which might be triggered by North Korea's military adventurism, 
for such a conflict could have a devastating impact on their economic reforms and 
development programs. It was therefore not unrealistic to expect that both Beijing and 
Moscow would exert pressure on North Korea to restrain Pyongyang from embarking 
on a dangerous military venture toward South Korea.7 
Sino-Soviet detente meant that Beijing and Moscow ceased their competition over 
Pyongyang. As the result of the Sino-Soviet rapprochement, neither China nor the 
Soviet Union provided economic or military assistance to North Korea purely to counter 
the other's influence. At the time of Sino-Soviet split, North Korea was always able to 
play the "China card" against the Soviet Union and the "Soviet card" against China. 
Such maneuvering was significantly reduced as a result of the Sino-Soviet 
rapprochement. At the time of Sino-Soviet detente, North Korea had little leverage, and 
found itself with less room for maneuver to prevent China from developing her relations 
with South Korea than at any time since the Korean War.8 
At the time of Sino-Soviet detente, the economic and political refom1s in China 
and the Soviet Union and their open door policy were under way and the two 
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communist giants participated actively m the regional economic cooperative 
organizations. But North Korea did not follow the path of reform and open door policy. 
Therefore it had to endure further political isolation and economic stagnation. 
The Sino-Soviet rapprochement enhanced the successful implementation of South 
Korea's "Northern Policy" which sought to improve its relations with the communist 
bloc nations. Both China and the Soviet Union had expressed their desire to promote 
economic exchanges with South Korea.9 There was every indication that Chinese 
policy makers, especially Deng Xiaoping, had an accurate and realistic assessment of 
the momentous economic transformation that has been accomplished in South Korea, a 
transformation from which they hoped to learn as well as to turn to their advantage. 
They were equally aware that this transformation has had its impact on the 
configuration of power in Northeast Asia where South Korea was an important actor. 10 
In addition, in his speech at Krasnoyarsk in September 1988, Gorbachev spoke about 
the South Korean economy and desired South Korea to be helpful in alleviating his 
economic cnsis through direct investment, joint ventures, and trade.'' These 
developments clearly indicated that both China and the Soviet Union were pursuing a de 
facto "Two Koreas" policy. Both China and the Soviet Union began to take a more 
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positive approach toward South Korea and to view South Korea as a vital player in a 
new and more stable security structure for the Northeast Asian region based on 
economic cooperation rather than conflict. 
China had more stake in maintaining stability in the Korea peninsula than either 
the US or the USSR, and this was reflected in China's growing economic ties with 
South Korea. China became increasingly aware of South Korea's growing strategic and 
economic importance in Northeast Asia. The developing relations between China and 
South Korea could proceed without Chinese concern about North Korea. 12 
Sino-Soviet detente led to political isolation of North Korea from the rest of the 
world, allowing the Chinese leadership the freedom to pursue a de facto "Two Koreas" 
policy, and also led to competition between China and USSR regarding economic 
relations with South Korea. Therefore, Sino-Soviet detente served as a catalyst for 
China's new Korean policy, and Sino-Soviet detente was a contributing factor that made 
China gradually adjust from a "One Korea" policy to a de facto "Two Koreas" policy. 
Chinese Contacts with South Korea 
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The gradual improvement of relations between China and South Korea was 
ironically spuned ahead by sudden crises, such as the 1983 hijacking incident and the 
1985 torpedo boat incident. 13 On March 22, 1985, the Chinese navy torpedo boat 
incident occuned and it provided both South Korea and China with an opportunity to 
develop new relations. The Chinese navy torpedo boat, adrift in the Yellow Sea after a 
mutiny, was rescued by a South Korean fishing boat and towed by a South Korean 
Coast Guard vessel to the port of Kunsan on the west coast. The next morning, three 
Chinese naval ships intruded into South Korean territorial waters in search of the 
missing torpedo boat, but withdrew after being warned off by ships of the South Korean 
navy. The following day South Korea strongly protested the intrusion into its territorial 
waters through its consul general in Hong Kong, demanding an apology and an 
assurance against the recurrence of such behavior. The Foreign Ministry in Beijing 
issued a mild public statement, admitting that Chinese vessels had "inadvertently 
entered South Korean waters," but said that they had withdrawn as soon as they had 
realized their mistake. The statement appealed for South Korean cooperation m 
returning the ship and crew. 14 The Chinese reaction was unusually conciliatory and 
forthcoming. 
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Through this incident, Beijing and Seoul, for the second time in less than two 
years, engaged m official negotiations. Negotiations began between South Korean 
Consul General in Hong Kong and Xu Jiatun, a member of the CCP Central Committee 
and director of the Hong Kong office of Xinhua. 15 China was apparently prepared to 
ignore any objections from its ally, North Korea. 
The incident was resolved on 26 March. A memorandum addressed to the 
"Consul General of the Republic of Korea in Hong Kong" signed by the deputy director 
for diplomatic affairs of Xinhua's Hong Kong office and authorized by the foreign 
ministry in Beijing apologized for the intrusion, said that the PRC would make efforts to 
prevent future violations of South Korean territorial waters and would take the 
necessary action against those responsible. China referred to South Korea by its formal 
name once again. The memorandum "expressed appreciation for the decision of the 
Republic of Korea to return the torpedo boat and its crew at an early date." 16 
Moreover, China's readiness to deal visibly with South Korean consular 
officials m Hong Kong underscored the lengths to which Sino-South Korean 
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relationship had progressed since the hijacking of a Chinese civil airliner in May 1983. -
This torpedo incident, coupled with the hijacking incident signaled to China that it 
could expect South Korea to act in an even-handed manner in regard to Chinese 
interests and added to South Korea's image as a nation with firm resolve and 
sophisticated diplomatic skills. 17 This incident led to another dramatic step forward in 
Beijing-Seoul links. It also could be seen as indicating a de facto recognition of Seoul 
by Beijing. Hence, the torpedo boat incident was a contributing factor which induced 
China gradually to take a more positive attitude toward South Korea, and this incident 
served as a catalyst for China's new Korean policy. 
One month after the torpedo boat incident, China granted visas to two South 
Korean diplomats so as to enable them to attend a U.N.-sponsored seminar on the 
Palestine question in Beijing. 18 It was the first time China has granted visas to South 
Korean diplomats to visit China since 1949. In October, 1985, South Korean Prime 
Minister Rob, Shin Young exchanged greetings with Premier Zhao Ziyang at two UN-
related functions. This was the first time that the Prime Ministers of these two countries 
met. It is important that Zhao did not deliberately avoid or rebuff Roh. 19 
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Contacts between China and South Korea have increased at a remarkable pace 
since 1985. The proximity of the two countries, the complementarity of their 
economies, their easy access to each other through Hong Kong, and the participation of 
both in the proliferating network of Asian-Pacific organizations of all kinds have made 
this trend inevitable. 
The decline in North Korea's ability to prevent China from expanding contacts 
with South Korea could be explained in large part by the increasingly important roles 
played by China and South Korea in the world, in everything from trade to athletics. 
Beijing was no longer willing to refrain from useful international activities in order to 
avoid irritating North Korea. The North Koreans have been compelled to acquiesce in a 
level of contacts between China and South Korea, almost seeming to give their blessing 
to such contacts by appearing alongside South Koreans at meetings and sports events in 
China. 20 
Many contacts between China and South Korea continued. In April 1985, two 
other South Korean officials attended a Beij ing conference on women, population, and 
development sponsored by the UN Fund for Population Activities. South Korea sent 
107 
three persons representing Buddhist and Christian organizations to the World 
Conference on Religion and Peace held in Beijing in June 1986. The previous week 
five Chinese attended the third Asian Conference on Religion and Peace in Seoul. In 
1985, China and South Korea, for the first time since 1949, opened parcel post service 
between them via Hong Kong, supplementing the mail service that had been available 
for some time. During 1985 sport exchanges gathered momentum. The deputy Prime 
Minister of South Korea reported to the National Assembly that Korean athletes took 
part in 19 sports events in China during the year and that Chinese athletes had come to 
South Korea for 10 events. At the 17th Asian Weightlifting Championships in Hangzhou, 
in April 1985, won by China, South Korea placed second and North Korea placed 
fourth. South Korean divers took part in the 4t" World Cup International Diving 
Championship in Shanghai, and a Chinese men's handball team competed m the 
preliminary round of the 11th World Men's Handball Championships in Seoul. 21 These 
growing sports exchanges increased the probability that China would compete in the 
1986 Asian Games in South Korea. 
The 1986 Seoul Asian Games and China's "Double Strategy" 
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In July 1984, China formally indicated that it would participate in the 1988 
Seoul Olympics. Lu Jindong, vice-president of the Chinese Olympic Committee, 
reportedly said, "We will no doubt attend the next Olympics in the Olympic spirit." On 
April 12, 1985, Beijing officially announced its intention to participate in the Seoul 
Asian Games. 22 But, North Korea tried to prevent China from participating in the 
Asian Games and adding to South Korea's prestige; nevertheless, China sent a 515-
member contingent to the Games. China also sent various delegations to Seoul to 
participate in the National Olympic Committee and the Olympic Council of Asia. 
Beijing's decision to participate in the Seoul Asian Games was a confirmation of what 
had been going on steadily since 1983-increasing rapport between China and South 
Korea. 
At last, the 10111 Asian Games operied at Seoul on September 20, 1986. South 
Korea diplomatically helped Beijing secure the right to host the 1990 Asian Games. 
The new relationship between China and South Korea was publicly demonstrated at the 
Games by the slogan "See you in Beijing 1990."23 
No doubt, China, through "sports diplomacy" in the Seoul Asian Games has 
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made a contribution toward promoting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The 
Chinese participation in the Games set a precedent for future relations between China 
and South Korea in both the political and the sporting arenas. China began to use the 
official name of South Korea, "Han-kook," rather than "Nan-chaoxian." Thus South 
Korea was referred to as "Han-kook" in a qualifying round for the Seoul Olympic 
Volleyball Games in Beijing in June 1987.24 
Meanwhile, in order to assuage North Korean concerns and irritation over the 
Asian Games (Pyongyang boycotted the Seoul Asian Games), Chinese President Li 
Xiannian flew to North Korea for a four-day visit (October 3-7, 1986). Ironically, Li's 
visit coincided with the participation of Chinese athletes in the Asian Games being held 
in Seoul. Li' s Pyongyang trip was obviously aimed at offsetting the favorable publicity 
surrounding the Seoul Asian Games.25 The Beijing Review reported that Li Xiannian 
said that Sino-Korean friendship could withstand any kind oftrial and would develop in 
the future. "Our peoples will benefit and our friendship will contribute greatly to peace 
in Asia and the world," he added. But, regarding North Korean proposals to end 
military exercises by both sides during north-south talks, to hold tripartite talks between 
the military authorities of North and South Korea and of the US forces stationed in 
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South Korea, and to establish a peaceful nuclear-free zone in the Korean peninsula, Li 
only said that the US government and the South Korean authorities must respond 
"actively" to these proposals. 26 
Also, it was noteworthy that China's decision to send the 77 -year-old ailing 
conservative figurehead rather than Communist Party chief Hu Yaobang who was 
previously reported as having been invited was a deliberate snub to its longstanding ally, 
North Korea. China's decision to send Li, who revealed he had a heart ailment, marked 
Beijing's displeasure with Pyongyang over the cancellation earlier that year of an 
official trip to China by Kim Il Sung and with North Korea's increasingly closer 
relations with the Soviet Union. North Korea shelved the Kim's visit before it had been 
formally announced because Beijing refused to sign a joint communique condemning 
"U.S. imperialism" in Asia. 27 
Beijing repeatedly claimed that China and North Korea maintained excellent 
relations, and China continued to pretend close ties with North Korea in order to prevent 
North Korea leaning too far towards Moscow. Simultaneously, however, China 
continued its attempt to form new links with South Korea. That is to say; the Chinese 
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have adopted a "double strategy." In terms of government-to-government ties, China 
continued to deal exclusively with North Korea, enabling senior Chinese officials to 
maintain the public fiction that "there is no change whatsoever in our policy toward 
South Korea ... [and] there will be no change in the future."28 The Chinese continued to 
voice full support for North Korean overtures to the South-a necessary but essentially 
cost-free means of maintaining a credible political relationship with the North. In terms 
of actual practice, however, there was an increasing, if tacit, Chinese acceptance of the 
reality of South Korea-a divergence in actions and policies between China and North 
Korea that China cultivated and North Korea has been unable to prevent.29 
Shortly after the Asian Games concluded, politburo member Hu Qili told a 
visiting Japanese labor delegation: "The dispatch of the PRC sports delegation does not 
mean the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. We cannot 
say that our attitude toward Korea has changed." But the Asian Games went a long way 
toward proving that-and so did related visits by Beijing municipal officials to study 
how to go about the organization of the same sports festival in 1990. But the more 
tangible evidence lay in the two-way trade between China and South Korea, which grew 
to US$1, 161 million in 1985, $1,289 million in 1986. In particular, the volume of trade 
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between the two countries has grown by leaps and bounds since the Seoul Asian Games. 
Furthermore, since 1986, or the approximate time of China's participation in the Seoul 
Asian Games, businessmen noticed a gradual change in China's tolerance of open 
relations. By this time it was commonplace for South Korean vessels to call on Chinese 
ports. Later, China and South Korea inaugurated regular container ship services 
between Shanghai, Qingdao and Pusan. As much as 20 percent of the total China-South 
Korean trade began going through direct channels.30 Thus, the Asian Games clearly 
played an important role in fostering China's positive perception of South Korea and 
that the Asian Games was a contributing factor that made China gradually change from 
a One-Korea Policy to a Two-Korea Policy. 
The Changes of Chinese Political Leadership 
From the beginning, Deng Xiaoping viewed the economic reform program not 
only as a necessity for national well-being but as a survival kit for the Chinese 
Communist Party and a means of ensuring his own personal imprint on history. Deng 
and his chosen successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, used every opportunity to 
speed up changes in policy, personnel, and institutions in order to expand their political 
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coalition and cement its hold on power by the time of the 13th Party Congress in 1987. 
At the 5th Plenum of the 12th Central Committee m September 1985, the 
personnel and institutional issues at the conference were paramount. The conference 
format allowed for a turnover of Central Committee membership and a reorganization 
of senior power organs several years earlier than the norm. (The 13th Party Congress, 
according to the party constitution, was scheduled for 1987.) In 1955, Mao had used 
the conference of delegates, who exceeded in number the delegates to a normal congress, 
to stack the decks against several rivals. Deng and his proteges hoped to do the same in 
1985. More than one-half of the 12th congress Central Committee members were 
replaced. One outstanding feature of these changes was the mass retirement from senior 
party positions of prominent military figures, thus symbolizing the demilitarization of 
Chinese politics under Deng. 31 
More importantly, Deng Xiaoping promoted a group of well-educated and 
technically competent junior leaders as their replacements. The membership of the new 
politburo reflected the emphasis on economic reform spelled out by Deng Xiaoping. 
The proposal for China's 7th Five-Year Plan for 1986-90, approved by the national party 
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conference on 23 September 1985, was a victory for the reformists who have 
consolidated their power within the leadership of the CCP.32 
Suddenly, however, the Xinhua News Agency released the startling news of 
General Secretary Hu Yaobang's resignation on January 16, 1987.33 In effect, alarmed 
or threatened by Hu Yaobang's liberal orientation and radical reformism, a group of 
conservative senior leaders and military leaders persuaded Deng Xiaoping to demote his 
heir-apparent and to appoint Zhao Ziyang as Acting General Secretary. Thus, Hu was 
forced to hand in his resignation at an "enlarged meeting" of the CCP politburo on 
January 16, 1987. Hu Yaobang was denounced for his encouragement of "bourgeois 
liberalization" at the enlarged meeting. 34 
But during the US Secretary of State George Shultz's meeting with Deng 
Xiaoping on 3 March, 1987, Deng Xiaoping assured Shultz that the anti-bourgeois 
liberalization campaign was over, and that China would continue its economic reforms 
and open door policies to the outside world. Shultz also stated that China's economic 
refonns have worked, and that China would not abandon what has worked. He added 
that China was irrevocably launched on a course of modemization. 35 
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Furthermore, the opening of China's l3 1h National Party Congress on 25 October 
1987 was a victory for reformists. Acting party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang's report 
reaffirmed the policies of economic reform and opening up to the outside world, and 
outlined a more ambitious than expected program of political reform. This indicated 
that the importance of the open door policy and China's need for continued access to 
foreign technology and capital were apparently accepted by conservatives as well as 
reformers.36 
In particular, this signified that China would continue to take a pragmatic and 
positive attitude toward South Korea. For example, when Deng Xiaoping met a 
Japanese politician on June 4, 1987, Deng Xiaoping said that China was paymg 
attention to "stable and peaceful environment on the Korean Peninsula," and that China 
would not support a North Korean invasion into South Korea. Deng Xiaoping added 
that Beijing was also pursumg a better relationship with Seoul because it would 
contribute to promoting world peace. 37 Deng's remarks clearly meant that China was 
pursumg a "Two Koreas" policy and adopted a "double strategy" on the Korean 
peninsula. Hence, we .can conclude that the victory of the reformists in the process of 
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pursuing economic reforms and open door policies was another important factor in the 
more pragmatic attitude China took toward South Korea. 
China's Policy toward North Korea 
China's domestic economic plans in the 1980s suggested a more passive 
security orientation. As the threat from Moscow began to wane, Beijing's foreign 
policy has been less preoccupied with China's security problems. At a time of Sino-
Soviet rapprochement, the leverage that North Korea once had on its communist patrons, 
playing the Soviet Union off against China to maximize their support, was declining. 
As a consequence, China's policy toward North Korea since the 1986 Seoul Asian 
Games has exhibited the long-term objective of maintaining Chinese influence through 
a combination of"carrots and sticks." 
The most remarkable change in China's policy toward North Korea concerned 
the economic sector. In economic terms, China's relations with North Korea have 
become truly insignificant. Moreover, because of its own domestic economic needs and 
priorities, China faced. difficulties to render satisfactory aid to North Korea. Until the 
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early 1980s, China had tried very hard to offer its economic and technical assistance to 
North Korea. Since 1985, however, the situation began to change. China has become 
less and less forthcoming in supporting North Korea's economic difficulties. In January 
1985, in his conversation with visiting North Korean Vice-Premier Kong Chin-Tae, 
Secretary General Hu Yaobang made it clear for the first time that the PRC would 
continue to render international assistance to North Korea within our ability. This 
indicated for the first time publicly that China would not extend additional economic 
assistance to North Korea. 38 
Between 1986 and 1988, there were plenty of signs that China was reluctant to 
make any new economic commitments to North Korea beyond its ability. In 1987, 
Beijing-Pyongyang negotiations on China's use of the North Korean port of Chongjin 
for a transport channel between three northeastern Chinese provinces and Japan was 
suspended.39 When Kim Il Sung visited Beijing on May 21-25, 1987, Deng Xiaoping 
turned down Kim Il Sung's request for crude oil supply. China decided to shift the 
character of its oil supply to North Korea from virtual aid to trade and not to increase 
the volume of its oil supply because North Korea had failed to pay back its existing 
crude oil debt to China.40 In January 1988, China also decided to further reduce its 
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arms supplies and cut electricity supplies to North Korea, and virtually ignored the fact 
that "North Korea is very unhappy with these unilateral decisions made by China."41 
China began to adopt an increasingly hard-line policy in terms of its economic ties with 
North Korea and insist on balanced trade, repayment of North Korea's debt, and cash 
payments in all bilateral transactions. 
During Kim Il Sung's visit to China m 1987, instead of promising any 
additional aid, Deng Xiaoping suggested that Kim Il Sung should make an inspection of 
Shenzhen, China's most successful Special Economic Zone (SEZ). Apparently, Deng 
Xiaoping hinted to Kim Il Sung that China was not ready to increase its dwindling 
economic assistance and North Korea should institute similar economic reforms and 
open door policy to cope with its worsening economic conditions.42 
The Chinese leadership attempted to convmce Kim Il Sung that China's 
relations with South Korea would also benefit North Korea. The Chinese leaders also 
offered some real "carrots" to Kim Il Sung. Among them, one of the most important 
items was Beijing's continuing effort to help North Korea establish contacts with the 
United States. In fact, Pyongyang has strongly desired contact with the United States 
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and ultimately to trade with the West. China was in a position to help "broker" an 
opening to the West-a role that was critical to North Korea given its past track record, 
its dismal economic prospects, and the widespread suspicions in the West of North 
Korean intentions. China was instrumental in initiating North Korea-US rapprochement 
to discourage North Korean designs on the Korean peninsula, and Kim was asked to 
consider the cross-recognition option.43 With China's help, on March 9, 1987, the 
United States finally informed the North Koreans that it was prepared to take some 
steps to improve ties if North Korea resumed talks with South Korea. The US 
Department of State also authorized American diplomats to talk with North Korean 
diplomats when they met at diplomatic receptions and in neutral areas.44 China tried 
very hard to bridge Pyongyang's efforts to have direct negotiations with Washington. 
Deng Xiaoping, in a meeting with a Japanese political leader on June 4, 1987, made it 
clear for the first time that China had asked the U.S. to contact North Korea. 45 
Meanwhile, the Chinese have used the leverage through "sticks" over North 
Korea. If North Korea moved too far toward the Soviet Union, the Chinese were 
perfectly capable of adjusting both the speed and scope of their opening to South Korea. 
This was something the North Koreans understood and, given their inherently 
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disadvantageous position relative to Beijing, wanted to prevent. For this reason, the_ 
Chinese were not overly concerned by the improvement m Soviet-North Korea 
relations.46 
China's policy toward North Korea has been characterized by a mixture of 
"carrots" and "sticks" policy. That is to say, China's leverage through a combination of 
"carrots" and "sticks" over North Korea indicated that China has apparently adopted a 
"playing double" strategy on the Korean Peninsula, attempting to exercise a positive 
influence over North Korea and to maintain a friendly relationship with North Korea, 
and developing extensive economic and unofficial ties with South Korea. 
China's Response to North Korea's Terrorism 
Since Deng Xiaoping began to pursue economic reforms and open door policies 
in 1978, Beijing has had a stronger interest than Pyongyang in maintaining peace and 
stability on the Korean Peninsula. China recognized unqualifiedly that the resumption 
of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula would seriously threaten its interest in 
maintaining a peaceful and stable international environment in Northeast Asia and in 
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pursing economic reforms and open door policies, and that renewed warfare on the 
Korean Peninsula would again involve China and the United States on opposite sides of 
a major military conflict. Thus, the Chinese have given clear indications to Pyongyang 
that Beijing would oppose any North Korean use of force against South Korea. 47 
China was supremely embarrassed, however, by the bombing of Korean Air 
(KAL) flight 858 by North Korean terrorists, killing all 115 people aboard in midair 
near Burma on November 29, 1987.48 This incident made Beijing leaders more 
concerned that North Korea's aggressive action could start a major conflict involving 
Beijing and the United States in Northeast Asia that would destroy China's economic 
development in the future. 49 
China, concerned over South Korea's threat to retaliate against North Korea for 
sabotaging a Korean Air jetliner, urged both sides to remain calm. In its first reaction to 
a North Korean agent's confession that Pyongyang ordered the jet blown up, the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry took an unusually conciliatory tone and refused comment on 
the charges, departing from often unquestioning support for North Korea. 50 When 
asked to comment on. the allegations that Kim 11 Sung's son and heir apparent, Kim 
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Jong Il was responsible for the explosion, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman 
said: "Both North and South Korea have issued their respective statements on this 
incident and we are not going to make any comments on this. But we hope the situation 
on the Korean Peninsula will become relaxed and stabilized and will not be further 
intensified as result of the incident. 51 
China was disillusioned at North Korea's terrorism. In January 1988, China 
had promised the United States it would not send support troops to North Korea, even if 
North Korean forces marched into South Korea. 52 Furthermore, China did not support 
Pyongyang's denials that it was responsible for sabotaging the KAL jet, nor did China 
refute allegations by Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo that North Korea was responsible. 
In an official statement released by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chinese 
government made it clear that "China has always opposed international terrorist 
activities in any form." Beijing's attitude in the incident clearly suggested that China 
was irritated at what it saw as "dangerous and senseless" political adventurism.53 
Thus, China declined to criticize Washington and Tokyo for imposing sanctions 
against North Korea for the bombing of a South Korean airliner. In reality, China was 
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not in a position to offer objections to Western sanctions against North Korea. Asked to 
comment on the sanctions, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said: "We hope that 
all the parties concerned will take more actions which are conducive to the relaxation of 
the situation in the Korean peninsula."54 
China had long played an active role in attempting to moderate North Korea's 
positions, promoting contacts between Pyongyang and Washington and inter-Korean 
dialogue. But all China's efforts were in vain. When the bombing incident was 
discussed at the UN Security Council in 1988, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry declined to criticize Washington's decision to rescind its earlier decision to 
permit contacts between American and North Korean diplomats. The United States 
banned its diplomatic contacts with North Korea, and moreover, it added North Korea to 
the list of "terrorist nations." Tokyo also limited contacts with Pyongyang. 55 
Chinese leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping, must have been disgusted at Kim 
Jong Il's involvement in the bombing of KAL jet like the Rangoon bombing. In fact, 
Kim Jong Il was far from popular with Chinese leaders who looked askance at his 
bizarre behavior and what has been derisively referred to as "hereditary socialism." 
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China regarded with distaste Kim 11 Sung's efforts to transfer power to his son, Kim 
Jong 11, disparaging the North Korean succession arrangements as an attempt to create 
the world's first "socialist monarchy." Moreover, Beijing has criticized the "individual 
worship" surrounding North Korean President Kim 11 Sung since this incident."56 
This bombing incident profoundly unsettled the Chinese and led China to 
review her approach to the Korean Peninsula. China increasingly moved far away from 
its traditional policies vis-a-vis North Korea and therefore reacted strongly to the North 
Korean terrorist action. In addition, at that time, China agreed to take part in the 
Summer Olympics in Seoul despite Pyongyang's objections. 
The 1988 Seoul Olympics 
The games of the 24'h Olympiad, held in Seoul from September 17 to October 2, 
1988, provided the first opportunity in 12 years for world-class athletes from both 
communist and non-communist countries to compete in the Olympic games.57 Also the 
Games have provided unofficial but increasingly lucrative trade and expanding contacts 
to both China and South Korea. This development greatly reduced Pyongyang's 
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leverage in its efforts to keep diplomatic distance between China and South Korea. 
North Korea's position on eo-hosting the Olympics was supported by both 
China and the Soviet Union, and in fact caused the delay of the two countries in 
announcing their participation. But, at last, three days after the Soviet Union announced 
that it would send a large delegation to the Seoul Olympics and two days after North 
Korea decided to boycott the Games, on January 14, 1988, China officially accepted 
invitation to the Olympics. The Chinese were encouraged to learn that the Soviets 
planned to send a sizable Olympic delegation to Seoul for the Games and intended to 
utilize the world athletic meetings there for some consular-level discussions with South 
Korea's government. The Chinese, then, felt free to send their athletic team direct to 
Seoul on CAAC (China's national airline) with great public fanfare. 58 
As the 24111 Seoul Olympics had attracted the world's attention to South Korea, 
Beijing did not forget its political ally, North Korea. In answer to a reporter's query on 
whether China's participation in the Seoul Olympics violated Chinese position on the 
Korean Peninsula, the PRC State Physical Culture and Sports Commission Chairman Li 
Menghua insisted: "The decision is perfectly consistent with China's position. We 
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---------------------------------------------------- -
consistently support the DPRK's just position on the independent, peaceful reunification 
of the motherland. This position will not change under whatever conditions. "59 
To prove this "consistency," in March 1988, Beijing decided to send its new 
Premier Li Peng to visit North Korea in April. New Chinese premiers have usually 
made their first trip to North Korea, a staunch ally since the 1950's. But, surprisingly, 
in early April, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that instead of 
Premier Li Peng, China had decided to send a lower-level delegation to North Korea, 
·headed by Tianjin Mayor and a Politburo member Li Ruihuan. On the other hand, 
Chinese Premier Li Peng broke with tradition by scheduling his first foreign trip to 
Pakistan.60 It seemed that Sino-North Korean relationship was more strained than was 
apparent to the outside world. In the light of a series of Chinese decisions concerning 
the Korean Peninsula, including increasingly open and direct trade with South Korea, 
the decision to participate in the Seoul Olympics, and not defending North Korea in the 
KAL bombing incident, it was clear that the differences between China and North 
Korea were quite serious and unsettling. 
Still, China needed a stable and peaceful international environment on the 
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Korean Peninsula to successfully carry out its economic modernization and open door 
policy. Therefore, China was seeking to prevent any unfortunate act by Pyongyang 
which has suffered a major diplomatic upset after most communist nations agreed to 
participate in the Seoul Games. Because of these points, a trip to North Korea by a 
high-level Chinese delegation had been planned to precede the Seoul Olympic Games 
beginning in September. In June 1988, Beijing announced that the delegation, headed 
by Chinese President Yang Shangkun, would attend the celebrations of the 401h 
anniversary of the founding of the DPRK in September. Once again, as in the case of 
the 1986 Asian Games, while a Chinese President was being entertained in Pyongyang, 
a huge Chinese sports delegation arrived in Seoul.61 This suggested that China has 
cunningly pursued a "double strategy" on the Korean peninsula. 
Although Yang Shangkun, du-ring his stay in Pyongyang, repeatedly 
emphasized that "China and [North] Korea are two countries are as mutually dependent 
as lips and teeth," and "the Chinese and [North] Korean people are carrying on and 
developing their friendship under new historical conditions,"62 there was considerable 
evidence that the Sino-North Korean relationship was unsatisfactory. Clearly, growing 
differences on many .specific domestic and foreign policy issues from both sides 
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adversely affected the Sino-North Korean relations. For example, the same day that 
Yang Shangkun departed for Pyongyang, Ta Kung Pao (a Hong Kong newspaper 
sympathetic to Beijing), published an article entitled, "It Is a Pity That Pyongyang Is 
Not Taking Part in the Olympic Games." Reflecting Beijing's view on Pyongyang's 
decision, it openly criticized North Korea's unreasonable position by insisting that the 
Olympic Games should be held jointly by the North and the South. The article stated: 
From Pyongyang's viewpoint, it seems that the DPRK has full reason to 
condemn the obstruction of the United States and South Korea because it holds a 
different opinion and position from them. However, from the angle of the 
international community, it is hard for other countries to support the viewpoint of 
North Korea on this issue. According to the needs of their own policies, the 
Soviet Union, the East European countries, and China will send large delegations 
to participate in the coming Olympic Games. South Korea also plans to take 
advantage of this opportunity to conduct new exchanges with these countries. 
This demonstrates the flexibility of South Korea's foreign policy after its 
economic development. In general this shows that South Korea is changing in 
keeping up with the main trend of the world. 
In conclusion, Ta Kung Pao 's article advised the North Korean leaders that 
The world situation in recent years has been developing very quickly, and 
the general tendency is detente. The Korean peninsula is no exception. Even 
though Pyongyang is not participating in the Olympic Games, this should not 
affect the efforts of the people on both sides to seek peaceful reunification in the 
future. Anyhow, detente represents the common wish ofthe people.63 
Meanwhile, in. the mid-1980s, the expression of Chinese nationalism provided 
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the first key to understanding the Chinese foreign policy. Deng Xiaoping and the 
reformers revealed their pride in China's national heritage and their dedication to 
making China a major actor in world affairs. 64 Therefore, China had strong motivations 
to participate in the Seoul Olympics. For the first time in modem Chinese history, 
Chinese athletes won 15 gold medals at the 23'd Summer Olympics in Los Angeles in 
1984-a major breakthrough for a country that had been denied the right to participate 
in the Olympics for 35 years.65 The Chinese people took extraordinary pride in their 
achievements in the Olympics. In terms of historical viewpoint, ever since the Opium 
Wars of 1839-1842, the Chinese people had been called "sick man of East Asia" 
(dongya bingfu in Chinese)-a name that many Chinese believed to be extremely 
humiliating and insulting. Therefore, to the Chinese leaders, the 1984 Olympics and the 
1986 Asian Games were successful enough to boost the morale of the Chinese people. 
The 1988 Seoul Olympics were surely another important occasion for China not only to 
assert its prowess in international sports, but to promote national self-respect and self-
confidence among the Chinese people-an important psychological prerequisite for 
achieving the country's modernization programs. 
There were substantial non-political exchanges between China and South Korea. 
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For example, as the time of the Seoul Olympics drew closer, Beijing permitted Korean _ 
Airlines to fly over Chinese territory on their way to destinations in Pakistan and India. 
The two countries subsequently agreed to start tourist exchanges, making the special 
ferry between Weihai and Inchon a regular service. It was also reported that the South 
Korean Electric Telecommunication Corporation signed contracts in September 1988, 
with the China Asia Satellite Telecommunications Company Ltd. for the lease of three 
transponders on AsiaSat 1 which was to be launched in 1990 using China's Long March 
3 Rocket, from the Xichang Launch Site in Sichuan province in southwestern China.66 
The Seoul Olympics provided a convenient excuse for Beijing to come into 
direct contact with Seoul through the Chinese Olympics office in Seoul. It gave Beijing 
a valuable opportunity to begin face-to-face discussions with Seoul regarding a wide 
range of issues. Prior to, during, and after the Olympics, the Chinese and South Korean 
officials had a senes of meetings m Seoul. The Chinese representatives began 
discussions with South Korea's KOTRA (Korea Trade Promotion Corporation) for 
establishing permanent Chinese trade missions, in South Korea, representing several 
Chinese provinces. Also during these meetings, China agreed to arrange for a number 
of key South Korean governmental leaders to visit Beijing, including Moon Hi Gab 
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(economic chief of staff for South Korean President), Lee Sun Ki (president of 
KOTRA), and Lee Kyu Sung (minister of finance). With these steps, China had decided 
to ignore North Korea's veto power over their policy toward the Korean peninsula.67 
It was clear that China was considerably confident of its ability to maintain its 
relations with the two Koreas in pursuing "double strategy." Obviously, the 1988 Seoul 
Olympic Games played a practical and useful role in promoting face-to-face contact and 
direct trade between China and South Korea. Also China's participation in the Olympic 
Games was indicative of a de facto recognition of South Korea by China. After the 
Olympic Games, China took a more positive and active approach toward South Korea. 
Hence, we can conclude that the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was a contributing factor 
that made China gradually change to a "Two Koreas" policy. 
China's Economic Diplomacy with South Korea: Across the Yellow Sea 
One of the most dramatic developments in Northeast Asia during the 1980s was 
the burgeoning trade between China and South Korea. Trade began on an informal, 
almost secretive basis with most transactions routed through Hong Kong, but within a 
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few short years it was being conducted openly with Korean ships carrying cargo directly 
from South Korea to ports in northern China. 
According to Jae Ho Chung's analysis, three perspectives can be offered to 
comprehend China's decision to initiate and maintain economic cooperation with South 
Korea: (1) a "learning model" that focuses upon China's determination to correct past 
mistakes of "putting politics in command" and "self-reliance"; (2) a "cultural model" 
that stresses China's reassertion of Sinocentric nationalism that is now directed toward 
the goal of economic modernization; and (3) an "emulation model" that emphasizes 
China's envy for its East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) and its zeal to follow their paths of success.68 
The Learning Model: Socialist regimes were, at least initially, designed to bring 
about transformation. One of the most fundamental goals of such transformation was 
the creation of a system of production and distribution oriented toward meeting the 
basic needs of the majority of the population. 69 China was no better, and worse, than 
other socialist states. The extreme politicization and the omnipresence of ideological 
standards in the making and implementation of economic policy were compounded by 
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succ.essive phases of movements and campaigns to generate serious economic crises for 
the nation as a whole. China's new leadership after the death of Mao and the arrest of 
the Gang of Four was highly aware of the scale of the crisis it was facing. Its remedy 
was two-fold: restructure the economy through reform and open to the outside world in 
search of capital and technology. Various radical measures were introduced to reduce 
the scope of state planning, and to revive local initiatives and enterprise and individual 
entrepreneurship in both rural and urban areas. China has become increasingly 
receptive to a variety of patterns of international exchange. 70 
In short, China's reaching out to the outside world was an inevitable consequence 
of the painful realization on the part of the new leadership of the limitations of the 
Maoist model of economic development based on politics in command and self-reliance. 
Once the Chinese leadership was freed from the constraints imposed by the "flawless" 
Maoism and rewarded by the growing contacts with the outside world, there was no 
return to the old system of autarky. Through engaging in trade and allowing foreign 
investment, China was able to alleviate the problems of capital shortage and 
technological backwardness which were so detrimental to its domestic development 
programs. Initial success in turn reinforced the leadership's confidence in the path of 
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development it had chosen. Consequently, China approached almost any country, with 
which it considered beneficial to do business, whether it was South Korea, Israel, or 
South Africa. It is in this context that the initiation of Sino-South Korea economic 
rapprochement was made possible. 71 
The Cultural Model: Nationalism is a cultural phenomenon, a state of mind, 
and a "group consciousness that serves to hold together the largest groupings of people 
that have ever formed."72 Such a feeling of identification or loyalty is considered 
crucial to political integration and nation-building. Nationalism as a "we-feeling" 
against "they" also has a sense of self-esteem. Low self-esteem of a nation provides it 
with a great incentive to change the status quo. In short, nationalism as the gauge of a 
nation's self-esteem constitutes an important instrument in facilitating changes in its 
foreign policy. China has long been knoW!l for its obstinate insistence on its place as a 
"middle kingdom" or the "center of the world." China's Sinocentric view of the world 
was not simply a symbolic image of its own but it was consistently manifested in its 
foreign policy behavior. When the middle kingdom was constantly harassed by 
imperial powers and eventually degraded into a state of semi-colony in the first half of 
the twentieth century, China's self-esteem reached its nadir. The painful humiliations 
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imposed on China by the outside world in general and imperial powers in particular_ 
help explain why the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China has by and large 
been more of a nationalistic reaction to these memories than a communist manifestation 
of an ideological commitment, as testified by its obsession with the principle of self-
reliance in building its economy, its pretentious posture as a tutelary state in the Third 
World, and its intentional aloofness from various forms of international exchange. It 
was only when the post-Mao leadership articulated the nationalistic goal of economic 
advancement in terms of promoting cooperation with the outside world that the tricky 
dilemma between autonomy and dependence was at least partly resolved. 73 
The Emulation Model: While the learning and cultural models explain how China 
came to value various forms of international economic exchange as a crucial means to 
reform its domestic economy as well as to enhance its national self-esteem, the 
emulation model explicates how South Korea was chosen as one of China's important 
partners of economic cooperation. "Diffusion" comes before emulation. Diffusion, 
defined as the spread of behaviors, attitudes, and information within and between 
societies, IS an increasingly crucial factor of the present world that gets smaller 
everyday due to the fast advances m transportation and communication teclmology. 
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Once diffusion of information occurs, it is up to the individual, the group, or even the 
nation-state to decide whether or not and how to emulate the successful (or useful) 
behavior. 74 
China's decision to cooperate with South Korea can be explained by the 
emulation model. The success of the East Asian NICs in their quest for economic 
advancement was remarkable enough to attract the attention of China's post-Mao 
leadership. As one analyst pointed out, "The economic success of East Asia derived 
from its open economic policy has influenced many nations to rethink how they ought 
to go about achieving economic development.. .Nowhere is the resulting change in 
thinking more apparent than in China."75 Among the four East Asian NICs, South 
Korea may have been a useful model China considered worth emulating. As the 
emulation model assumes, emulation requires close contacts and communications for 
the speedy relay of information and experiences. Once China decided on emulating 
South Korea, bilateral contacts grew. 76 
China looked on South Korea as an increasingly attractive economic partner for 
a variety of reasons. . As part of its Northern Policy, South Korea was eager to 
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accommodate China's economic preferences to the extent of sacrificing its own short-
term financial interests; China indeed enjoyed a lion's share (85.2 percent) of South 
Korea's total trade with socialist countries during 1989. Even though the volume of 
trade between the two countries fluctuated widely from 1979 to 1988, South Korea's 
imports from China via Hong Kong registered a steady increase, suggesting that South 
Korea had an underlying political purpose for continuing to purchase Chinese goods 
even when the Chinese were unable or unwilling to reciprocate. 77 
China found the intermediate technology of South Korea more suitable to their 
practical needs than the expensive high-technology of the United States, Japan, and 
Western Europe. Therefore, China was eager to learn the intermediate technologies in 
which South Korea has become so proficient. Even though China has always preferred 
to import original technology, its managerial teams have not always been competent to 
handle the final processing of the semi-finished products it purchased. China continued 
to import some consumer goods, but wished to move toward the import of parts and 
components which would be assembled into finished goods at domestic factories. Thus, 
China has sent technicians to South Korea to learn how best to assimilate some of the 
sophisticated Japanese steel production technology it imported. South Koreans, of 
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course, have mastered these intermediate technology processes and have become skilled 
at making production quicker and more efficient. China hoped its industrial leaders 
would learn from South Korea and therefore was especially eager to encourage joint 
ventures with South Korean firms. 78 
China felt more comfortable with the sociable and outgoing South Koreans than 
with the Japanese, who were still under close scrutiny because of their past colonial 
ambitions and who frequently assumed airs of economic superiority.79 China feared its 
own increasing dependence on Japanese technology and capital and was also concerned 
by the huge imbalance in Sino-Japanese trade. From 1985 onwards China started to 
express dissatisfaction at the mounting trade deficit with Japan.80 Moreover, China 
found that Japan was only interested in exporting industrial products and consumer 
goods to China and in importing resources and raw materials from China, but it was not 
active in technology transfers and its investment in China was very small. In addition, 
Chinese leaders began to take a more critical view of the increase in the Japanese 
defense budget as well as Japan's closer business links with Taiwan. 81 Therefore, 
China viewed South Korea m a more favorable aspect as a trade partner for 
modernization. 
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The geographic proximity between China and South Korea reduced 
transportation costs and made the two-way trade convenient, allowing the use of small 
vessels, which were able to enter shallow harbors at both ends of the transaction. South 
Korea was particularly well situated to assist China's developmental plans, which 
focused on its coastal regions such as Shandong Province and northeastern provinces 
such as Liaoning Province. Direct shipping from the Chinese Eastern seaboard to South 
Korea's port cities had the capacity to make traffic relatively fast and predictable. As 
ferry service, air flights and communications improved between South Korean cities 
and the major ports in Shandong and Liaoning Provinces, one could imagine a future of 
bustling activity, a network of trade links and the reinforcing economic momentum 
which could be generated around the Bohai Gulf area. 82 Meanwhile, to avoid direct 
political confrontation between Beijing and Pyongyang, a convenientface-saving device 
was adopted: decentralizing economic decision-making authority to the provincial 
governments, coupled with enterprise autonomy. The South Koreans devised the 
Yellow Sea Development Project, which called for utilizing their southwestern coastal 
areas as an outlet for economic cooperation with China. 83 
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Their traditional culture affinities reduced barriers to communications. Many 
South Koreans can read Chinese characters. An increasing number of South Koreans 
are able to speak Mandarin. Moreover, sizable groups of ethnic Koreans (about two 
million) live in such cities as Harbin, Jilin and Shenyang in China. China made use of 
the highly educated and professionally competent Koreans residing in China who were 
ready to interact with their South Korean counterparts. These bilingual, bicultural 
citizens have already proven to be an indispensable asset in smoothing Chinese 
correspondence with South Korean businessmen.84 
Complementarity between the Chinese and South Korean economies made the 
two countries natural trading partners. China has exported large quantities of natural 
resources, raw material, and food products; it became South Korea's main supplier of 
maize in 1985 and it also has exported feed grains, raw cotton, and vegetables. In return, 
South Korea exported primarily electrical goods including television sets and 
refrigerators. This pattern reflected the fact that China had few products other than 
natural resources or food that it could sell on the international market. The success of 
agricultural reforn1 in China during the 1980s led to surpluses in a number of crops and 
these were the products being exported. Both governments seemed satisfied with this 
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pattern of trade. South Korea was a resource-poor country that viewed China as a 
source of natural resources and agricultural products, and as a growing market for its 
manufactured goods. China, on the other hand, has pushed its primary exports and 
imported large quantities of manufactured products from South Korea. Furthermore, 
the most important complementarity was that China was a tabor-abundant, low-wage 
country whereas South Korea was increasingly a medium- to high-wage country with an 
abundance of skilled labor and a growing shortage of semi-skilled labor.85 Thus, the 
benefits accruing from increased economic exchange were mutual. 
Sino-Soviet Detente in the mid-1980s and the reconciliation between China and 
the Soviet Union as indicated by the Deng-Gorbachev summit meeting in May 1989 
removed a thorny political impediment to Sino-South Korean economic cooperation.86 
As Pyongyang's relationship with Moscow in the mid-1980s visibly improved, 
Beijing was either willing to use the South Korean card or found more room to actively 
deal with South Korea m economic terms. Especially this factor facilitated the 
transition of Sino-South Korean economic cooperation from an experimental phase to 
an expansion phase. 87 
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At the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee in October 1984, the 
CCP adopted accelerated and comprehensive reform policies of the nation's economic 
structure and institutions and decided to strengthen its open-door policy. Reforms 
undertaken in 1984 were basically an attempt to further decentralization. The focus was 
on foreign trade enterprises and companies. According to the State Council, "the 
foreign-trade enterprises would conduct independently the import or export business, 
keeping their own accounts and assuming responsibilities for their own profits and 
losses." And an agency system for foreign trade was introduced, which theoretically 
allowed every economic unit m China to take part in foreign trade through an 
established agent, and removed any administratively defined specialization or monopoly 
in foreign trade.88 
Consequently, since the Third Plenum in 1984, the amount of China's trade with 
South Korea rapidly increased. In 1985, it grew to $1,161 million by leaps and bounds 
as compared with $434 million in 1984. Growth also occurred when the Chinese 
attended the Asian Games (1986) and the Summer Olympic Games (1988) in Seoul, 
which North Korea boycotted. In 1986, it grew to $1,289 million, in 1987, $1,679 
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million, and in 1988, $3,087 million. There was no doubt that the 1988 Seoul Olympic 
Games provided a very convenient opportunity for China to expand its economic 
cooperation with South Korea and for South Korea to bring China closer away from its 
northern counterpart. The positive effect of the event was clearly shown in the almost 
doubling of the bilateral trade from 1987 to 1988.89 
Trade has so far been the most important area of bilateral interactions between 
South Korea and China. South Korea-China trade has already reached a point where 
any reverse direction was clearly not in the interest of either party and the mutual 
benefit was highly appreciated. The proportion of South Korea-China trade in China's 
total trade has risen from 0.06 percent in 1979 to 0.3 in 1983, to 2.2 in 1986, and to 3.8 
in 1988; and that in South Korea's total trade was 0.05 percent in 1979, 0.3 in 1983, 2.0 
in 1986, and 2.7 in 1988. In comparative terms, South Korea became China's eighth 
largest trade partner in 1989.90 
On various occasions during the formulative year of 1988, PRC authorities 
have let it be known that the official position in China was to allow more direct ties to 
ensure that China remained attractive to South Korean investors. On 4 November 1988, 
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Chu Baotai, deputy director of the Foreign Investment Bureau of China's Minis_try of 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, said, "So long as the two sides intend to 
develop economic and trade ties, it Is necessary and natural for them to set up 
representative offices." Rong Yiren, chairman of the China International Trade and 
Investment Corporation (CITIC) told reporters in Beijing in November 1988, "We 
prefer direct exchanges, including trade and investment." Rong, who was also a vice-
chairman of the standing committee of the National People's Congress, said CITIC had 
company-to-company relations with South Korean firms. 91 The Chinese government 
decided to make public its covert economic ties with South Korea: The Chinese side 
welcomed South Korean businessmen to invest in China. South Korean businessmen 
were given the same preferential treatment as businessmen from other countries.92 This 
showed Beijing's multidirectional open door policy, which was flexible as well as active, 
without any discrimination against South Korea. 
The most fruitful development in the trend toward greater ease in trade, travel, 
marketing and investment research was the establishment of permanent trade offices by 
South Koreans and Chinese in each other's country. The PRC extended permission for 
provincial and city officials to begin these permanent, semi-diplomatic facilities while it 
145 
continued to resist any idea of a nation-wide representative office. Consequently, China 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) Shandong sub-council and a 
private delegation from South Korea had signed a memorandum in June 1988 on 
developing sea freight links and setting up non-official representative offices. The first 
such PRC office, representing Shandong Province, was opened in Seoul in 1988. This 
greatly benefited the economic development of the two countries. The Chinese were 
now prepared to forgo the cumbersome, inefficient methods of clandestine negotiations 
and indirect trade and conduct open, direct commercial transactions with South Korea. 
Thus, by 1988 "the economic exchange between the PRC and the ROK traveled the 
route from being a closed secret, then an open secret, and finally no secret 
whatsoever. "93 
Conclusion 
During the period of 1985-1988, China sought to lower tensions on the Korean 
peninsula and reduce the risk of renewed military conflict. It tried to get North Korea 
involved in more productive internal activities and external relations. As mentioned 
above, China pursued a de facto "Two Koreas" policy by playing "double strategy" on 
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the Korean peninsula. China continued to publicly support North Korean positions in 
an effort to maintain a viable relationship with Pyongyang. In practice, however, it 
evinced an increasingly growing acceptance of South Korea. 
Since 1985, there were affirmative and substantial improvements in Sino-South 
Korean relations politically, strategically, and economically. Sino-Soviet detente has 
provided a stable and peaceful environment on the Korean peninsula, g1vmg the 
Chinese leadership the freedom to pursue a de facto "Two Koreas" policy. At a time of 
Sino-Soviet detente, China no longer felt constrained from pursuing its own long-term 
policy goals and strategies, including implied limits to its economic, political, and 
defense obligations to North Korea. North Korea could not play the "Soviet card" 
against China any longer and exert leverage to prevent China from developing her 
relations with South Korea. Thus, the developing relations between China and South 
Korea could proceed without Chinese concern about North Korea. 
The Chinese torpedo boat incident in March 1985 paved the way for the second 
thaw in Sino-South Koreans relations. This incident could be seen as indicating a de 
facto recognition of Seoul by Beijing. Since then, there have been a variety of other 
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developments: a continuing dialogue between Chinese and South Korean scholars in 
third countries, Chinese attendance at conferences in third countries where South 
Koreans were present, South Korean participation in international meetings and sporting 
events held in the PRC. 
At the Chinese 131h National Party Congress in October 1987, the victory of the 
reformists made China take a more and more positive and pragmatic attitude toward 
South Korea. Meanwhile, one month later, the bombing incident of KAL jet by North 
Korean terrorists shocked the Chinese leadership and made China review its traditional 
foreign policy toward North Korea, departing from often unquestioning support for 
North Korea. 
The most visible and dramatic breakthrough in Chinese relations with South 
Korea was China's participation in the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games 
in Seoul despite North Korea's boycott. These two Games apparently played an 
important role in promoting China's positive perception of South Korea. Especially the 
Seoul Olympics provided a convenient excuse for Beijing to begin direct discussions 
with Seoul through the Chinese Olympics office in Seoul regarding a wide range of 
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issues. 
Since these two Games, the volume of trade between China and South Korea has 
grown by leaps and bounds. The rapid growth of trade between the two countries has 
demonstrated that the desire to exchange goods could break down the most solid and 
longstanding political barriers. In a sense, bilateral trade has constantly raised the level 
of economic cooperation and has gradually facilitated the political rapprochement 
between Beijing and Seoul. Moreover, in 1988, the establishment of permanent trade 
office in Seoul, representing Shandong Province in China, was an important 
breakthrough toward normalization between China and South Korea. Therefore, I argue 
that China's economic priority was the determining factor and Sino-Soviet Detente, 
Chinese Torpedo Boat Incident, Seoul Asian Games, North Korea's Terrorism, Seoul 
Olympics were a contributing factor that made China gradually change to "Two Koreas" 
policy. 
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Chapter 4: Toward Sino-South Korean Normalization, 1989-1992 
During the period of 1989-1992, Northeast Asia underwent great changes. 
Numerous important affairs in international politics shaped the turning point of the post-
Cold War era and affected the international environment in Northeast Asia, especially 
on the Korean peninsula. These changes were the disintegration of East European 
Communist regimes, Chinese-Soviet normalization, German unification, South Korean-
Soviet normalization, Moscow-Tokyo rapprochement, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the relaxation of the U.S.-Russian confrontation, the downfall of political ideology in 
world politics. With the end of the Cold War, the bi-polar system was replaced with a 
multi-polar system. The concept of the national interests of the major powers also 
changed from political and military interests to economic interests. In other words, 
economic factors became the most important determinants of the relations of the 
countries and the international order in the post-Cold War period. Such changes pushed 
China to reevaluate its policy toward the Korean peninsula. 
This chapter will set the background and context for normalization in 1992 which 
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is t~e final recognition of a "Two Koreas" policy. That is, I will put great emphasis on 
analyzing what factors caused China to make such a move. I will also examine China's 
policy toward North Korea by means of Kim 11 Sung's visits to China in 1989, 1990, 
and 1991, respectively. I will also analyze Beijing's position toward Seoul's UN entry 
bid. 
Sino-Soviet Normalization 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, since 1985 the Soviet Union began to change its basic 
strategy toward China. From 1987, Sino-Soviet relations improved rapidly. China had 
its own reasons for seeking improvement in its relations with the Soviet Union. China's 
desire for an improved relationship with the Soviet Union was motivated by a wish to 
avoid unnecessary tension and conflicts. In order to implement its "Four 
Modernizations" program, China was clearly in need of a peaceful international 
environment. Another basic motivation of China for the rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union was the desire to secure even greater economic benefits. China also wanted to 
enhance its national security by removing "Three Obstacles." Therefore, the Chinese 
leaders put forward "Three Conditions" for reconciliation with the Soviet Union: 
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withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, reductio.n of Soviet forces on the 
Chinese border and pullout of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. By the spring of 
1989, when the Soviet Union satisfied virtually China's demands on removing "Three 
Obstacles," the stage was set for a Sino-Soviet summit meeting. 1 
On May 16, 1989, China's Deng Xiaoping and Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev normalized relations between the two Communist states after a 30-year rift. 
During his visit to Beijing, Gorbachev announced his plan to reduce 200,000 Soviet 
troops from Asia, including 120,000 in the Soviet Far East bordering China.2 This was 
a vital step toward a new detente in Asia and the Pacific, greatly heightening the 
expectation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. 
The changes in the communist world and the global trend toward detente had a 
number of more specific implications for North Korea and its strategic relations. Sino-
Soviet normalization worked against North Korea. Gorbachev expressed support for 
North Korean peace initiatives, but the Sino-Soviet reconciliation might be a burden to 
North Korea. In a step to strengthen the Soviet position in Northeast Asia, Gorbachev 
put forward his concept of collective security in the region, stressing that this would 
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provide a means of settling regional conflicts, including the Korean question~ 
Gorbachev's intention hidden behind the idea of collective security was that an 
intemational forum composed of South and North Korea and powers surrounding the 
peninsula would lead to Pyongyang's renunciation of a closed, isolated society, 
eventually reducing tension there. Namely, Gorbachev's proposal for "collective 
security" was a veiled attempt to have Kim Il Sung open up North Korea and pursue 
dialogue with South Korea. 3 
But China had been cool to Gorbachev's concept of collective security in Asia 
because of its suspicion of an underlying attempt to increase Soviets' strategic influence 
in the area. The Seoul government was wary of the Soviet proposal for the Asian 
consultative body to comprise both South and North Korea, China, the United States, 
Japan as well as the Soviet Union but Seoul did not register an outright objection to the 
plan.4 South Korea generally deemed the Sino-Soviet normalization as a positive step 
to peace and stability in Northeast Asia and hoped that the normalization would ease 
tension on the Korean peninsula. It has particularly been encouraged by the 
commitment shown by the Chinese and Soviet leaders to the "supreme value of peace" 
and mutual development. 5 On the contrary, the Pyongyang regime had been unhappy 
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with the Gorbachev initiative, apparently because the creation of the forum virtually 
meant the cross recognition ofthe entities of two Korea by the neighboring powers.6 
Sino-Soviet normalization brought about a considerable change m North 
Korea's policies toward Beijing and Moscow. During the period of Sino-Soviet 
ideological and border disputes, North Korea was able to make an advantageous deal 
with its two supporters. Sino-Soviet normalization deprived North Korea of such 
chances and instead made both Beijing and Moscow further their efforts to persuade 
Pyongyang to refrain from provoking any action leading to tensions in the region.7 
That is, Sino-Soviet normalization reduced their inclination to compete actively for 
Pyongyang's favor. North Korea's leverage and ability to manipulate Sino-Soviet 
tensions to its advantage diminished. The global relaxation of tensions decreased North 
Korea's role as a fulcrum of Cold War hostility and hence lessened North Korea's 
centrality to the communist powers as a factor in global strategic competition. 8 
Since the Sino-Soviet normalization, China has assumed a more activist posture 
on Korean issues, pursuing a range of "unofficial contacts" with South Korea, urging 
the United States and Japan to begin similar contacts with North Korea to help draw it 
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into the world community, and encouraging North Korea to pursue dialogue with South 
Korea as well as undertake domestic and foreign policy reforms that would help end its 
international isolation.9 Obviously the Sino-Soviet normalization greatly contributed to 
the relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula. Beijing had less need to compete 
with Moscow over Pyongyang and the latter could no longer play one against the other. 
Regardless of North Korea, China could approach South Korea more easily as a result 
of the normalization and continue to develop economic ties with South Korea. The 
normalization gave both China and South Korea a good chance to normalize official ties 
in the near future. 
Kim 11 Sung's Sudden and Secret Visit to Beijing in 1989 
On November 5-7, 1989, Kim 11 Sung clandestinely and suddenly visited 
Beijing. During Kim 11 Sung's secret visit to Beijing, the Convention of the 5th Plenary 
Session of the 13th Chinese Communist Pmty Central Committee started on November 6. 
It was unexpected that Deng Xiaoping invited Kim Il Sung at a time when China was 
occupied in an important policy-making Communist Party conference, because 
customarily China has not invited foreigners, even very friendly ones, during such an 
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important session. 10 What was so important to force Kim Il Sung to make such a visit? 
In 1989, many East European Communist countries plunged into a maelstrom of 
political and social change. The communist regimes were collapsing. Especially, East 
Germany threw open its borders to the West, breaking down the Berlin Wall on 
November 9, 1989. Furthermore, following Hungary which established diplomatic 
relations with South Korea on February 10 1989, Poland normalized relations on 
November 11, 1989. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania were likely 
to follow suit. All these countries also increased trade with Seoul. The rapid 
rapprochement between South Korea and communist countries in the East surely added 
to the uneasiness of the North Korean leadership. The surging current in the bloc no 
doubt irritated Kim 11 Sung, who felt threatened by the pro-democracy movement in the 
Communist bloc. 11 This became one of the main reasons Kim decided to visit Beijing. 
That was why Kim 11 Sung had unpublicized talks with Chinese leaders, expressing 
concern about Pyongyang's increasing isolation as South Korea improved relations with 
communist countries. 12 Therefore, Seoul interpreted Kim 11 Sung's clandestine visit to 
Beijing to be the result of swiftly changing international relations around the Korean 
peninsula, affected by the changing relations within the communist bloc. 13 
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The Soviet Union also increased trade, scholarly and cultural exchanges with 
South Korea, causing concern that Pyongyang's most impmtant ally might normalize 
relations with Seoul. 14 The apparent change in the Soviet attitude toward the Korean 
question at the United Nations was the immediate motivation for Kim Il Sung's visit to 
Beijing. Moscow came up with a policy change of non-opposition to South Korea's 
admission into the United Nations, meaning that it would refrain from exercising its 
veto right against the Seoul proposal. With the atmosphere in the world body growing 
in the South's favor, Pyongyang must have been impelled to ask for China's help to 
block Seoul's UN entry by use of its veto right in the UN Security Council. Beijing had 
explicitly backed the Pyongyang position at the United Nations but it noticeably 
lessened the intensity of its support in the General Assembly. 15 
Kim Il Sung showed several signs of change m its relations with Western 
countries. Former US Assistant Secretary of State Gaston Sigur said, after his 
Pyongyang trip late in October 1989, that North Korean officials showed much interest 
in developing dialogues with Western countries, especially the United States. The fifth 
contact between US and North Korean diplomats in Beijing resuming after a five-month 
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deadlock also indicated changes in North Korea, which was the world's most isolated 
and authoritarian state. This event indicated that North Korea knew that it could not 
remain sealed-off forever in a world of detente. Kim 11 Sung's secret visit to Beijing 
was related to Pyongyang's new efforts to adapt itself to the changing international 
enviromnent. 16 
The changing enviromnent around the Korean peninsula forced Kim to reaffirm 
Pyongyang's relationship with China, which remained North Korea's strongest 
supporter. Pyongyang demonstrated its own comradeship with Beijing by publicly 
supporting China's bloody crackdown on the pro-democracy demonstrators in 
Tianamnen Square in early June, 1989, amid world wide censure and protests against 
the Chinese bloodbath. Beijing and Pyongyang, willingly or unwillingly, were clinging 
to conservative Communist doctrines, fearful of the collapse of their leaderships. 
Notwithstanding, as far as economic reform was concerned, China already took a 
progressive step toward a free market economy, as opposed to Pyongyang' s policies. 17 
Now that former CCP Secretary Zhao Ziyang was ousted, Kim Il Sung also 
needed to make contact with the new leadership in Beijing and renew his, albeit 
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outdated, calls for the victory of socialism and struggle against "imperialism. " 18 
During their summit talks on November 7, Deng and Kim showed a clash of opinions 
on such key issues as political reforn1s and opening up to the outside world. South 
China Morning Post reported: 
Kim 11 Sung argued strongly that rapid developments in Eastern Europe sounded a 
serious warning to all socialist countries that too much of an open door and reform 
policy was detrimental to the socialist cause. Kim said Pyongyang and Beijing should 
draw a lesson from that experience and clampdown, or at least slow down reforms. But 
Deng was determined that the reforms he pioneered should go on. 19 
Chinese financial aid to North Korea was also discussed, but Deng declined Kim's 
request for $270.3 million in military assistance. 20 
South China Morning Post said Kim was also concerned about China's increasing 
contacts with South Korea.21 But, it was reported that Deng Xiaoping told Kim Il Sung 
that "China must further develop economic relations with South Korea."22 Deng's 
remarks meant China adopted a much more flexible and pragmatic attitude toward the 
Korean peninsula. China fully realized that it would need much economic suppo11 from 
South Korea at the 1990 Asian Games m Beijing, and that it would come in the 
inevitable direct government-to-government and businessman-to-businessman contact 
with South Korea at the 1990 Asian Games. Also, China could not ignore the rapidly 
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changing international situation m which the Soviet Union and Eastern European 
countries were attempting to constructively establish diplomatic ties with South Korea. 
South Korea's Northern Policy [Nordpolitik] 
The term of "Nordpolitik" was used for the first time on June 29, 1983, as 
former Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk gave a speech at the Graduate School of 
National Defense of Korea. "Nordpolitik" was similar to the Ostpolitik of West 
Germany initiated by Chancellor Willy Brandt.23 The genests of South Korea's 
Nordpolitik could be traced back to the South Korean government's decision of June 
1973 in which it decided to pursue ties with all countries regardless of ideological 
differences but based on the principle of reciprocity. South Korea's rationale for 
expanding foreign relations was based on the need to improve ties primarily with China 
and the Soviet Union in order to reduce the ever-present tension on the Korean 
. I 24 pemnsu a. 
The Northern policy had been pursued by successive ROK administrations since 
1973. But full-scale implementation with concrete results only began to become 
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possible during the Sixth Republic, the government of former President Roh Tae Woo, 
as the internal will of South Korea to establish relations with China, the Soviet Union, 
and the Eastern European countries coincided with significant changes in that bloc and 
indeed the entire world order. These changes in the world order directly impacted on 
the environment surrounding the Korean peninsula, and thus created an atmosphere 
conducive to the successful implementation of "Northern Policy." China's 
experimentation with economic reforms launched m 1978 was accompanied by the 
pursuit of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. 
Gorbachev's reforms together with other factors brought about the collapse of the cold 
war system, a bipolar balance of power system characterized by the confrontation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this context, South Korea's 
Northern Policy could be seen as a response to the rapidly changing international 
. 25 
environment. 
In early December 1987, at the height of the presidential campaign, forn1er South 
Korean foreign minister Park Tong Jin flew to Tokyo for a private meeting with 
Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita. He handed over a personal message from 
ruling Democratic Justice Party candidate Roh Tae Woo. Roh said in his message that 
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he needed Tokyo's help in getting his position across to China. It was Roh's first 
foreign-policy initiative: building a stronger bridge from South Korea to China. This 
objective also represented the cornerstone of an election pledge by Roh to develop 
South Korea's Yellow Sea coast in an effort to heal anti-government resentment which 
had grown in the southwestern Cholla region. Roh outlined proposals to turn the 
region's seaports of Mokpo and Kunsan into China-orientated trading centers.26 
Which country had been given priority in South Korea's pursuit of the Northern 
Policy? Mr. Roh, the ruling-party victor in the 1987 presidential election, said that he 
would give top priority to establishing diplomatic ties with China with a view to 
reducing tensions in Northeast Asia.27 Beginning in 1988, Beijing-Seoul ties became 
more concrete. In his inaugural speech delivered on February 25, 1988, Roh Tae Woo 
expressed hope that Beijing and Seoul would open trade offices following the 1988 
Seoul Olympics, and he said he would try to establish diplomatic relations during his 
five-year tem1.28 On many occasions, Roh also expressed the need to actively develop 
trade between the ROK and China, and called for "bold investment" in developing 
western South Korea into an industrial base, so as to expand trade with China. In late 
1987, South Korea worked out a large-scale development plan to develop its west coast, 
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which faces China's open coastal cities, so that it could make use of the favorable 
geographic conditions to develop trade with China on a long-term basis and could better 
compete with other countries in China trade?9 
On July 7, 1988, Roh declared South Korea's new Northern Policy. 
Announcing the government's new six-point declaration on reunification and foreign 
policy, Roh made it clear he would seek improved relations with China in order to 
create an atmosphere conducive to durable peace on the Korea peninsula. In Seoul's 
view, improved relationships between South Korea and China, including other socialist 
countries not only could contribute to enhancing Seoul's international status, but also 
might induce Pyongyang to open its society to the outside world and to positively 
respond to the inter-Korean dialogue.30 
Several of President Roh 's special envoys made clandestine visits to Beij ing in 
order to sound out the possibility of developing closer political and economic ties 
between the two countries. Forn1er Foreign Minister Park Dong Jin, the President's 
Special Adviser for Policy, Park Chul On, and Kim Woo Jung, Chairman of the Daewoo 
Group, visited Beijing to convey private letters from the President. In these letters 
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President Roh outlined South Korea's intention to promote economic exchanges with 
China and to establish mutual trade offices in Beijing and Seoul and expressed the hope 
that Beijing would play a role in preventing war on the Korean peninsula.31 
Meanwhile, South Korea asked US Secretary of State George Schultz to carry 
Seoul's message for better ties to Beij ing. When Schultz visited China, he explained 
Rob's July 7 special declaration in detail to Deng Xiaoping and requested that China 
play a positive role in promoting the inter-Korean dialogue. Deng Xiaoping reacted 
positively, saying that Rob's declaration would contribute to stability and peace on the 
K . l 32 orean penmsu a. 
China for the first time explicitly backed a South Korean initiative for dialogue 
between Seoul and Pyongyang, breaking from its traditional alignment with North 
Korean positions. Chinese Premier Li Peng told visiting Japanese counterpart Noboru 
Takeshita that China supported Rob's July 7 declaration aimed at easing Korean 
tensions. Li said that China favored peace on the Peninsula. "If the July 7 special 
declaration is beneficial for the stability of the Korean Peninsula, then we would also 
support it," Li said.33 In the past China had been careful to back peace initiatives by its 
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North Korean ally or at least maintain a prudent silence. Li 's remarks were even more 
striking since North Korea had already rejected Roh's proposals. Also, his words 
indicated that China was obviously interested in improving relations with South Korea 
and taking a pragmatic posture toward South Korea. 
In April 1989, Foreign Minister Choi Ho Joong stressed the need for improved 
economic ties with China. He said cooperation with China should be distinguished 
from that with East European countries because of its impact on Seoul's relations with 
its allies. In February, 1990, Choi's offer to hold a meeting with his Chinese counterpart 
was also accepted as an expression of the Seoul government's desire for a more active 
approach toward improving relations with China. It also indicated a switch in the 
government's strategy toward China-from behind-the-scenes diplomacy to open 
diplomacy. The switch stemmed from the confidence the government had acquired in 
the course of pursuing improved ties with China. 34 
The three fundamental principles of South Korea's Northern Policy-the 
separation of politics and economics, the pursuit of mutual benefits, and private sector 
leadership-closely mirrored China's policy of separating politics from economics in 
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order to pursue mutually beneficial economic ties. Economically, China accounted for 
the bulk of South Korean trade with socialist countries (87.5% in 1989). Sino-South 
Korean trade was the backbone of South Korea's Northern Policy.35 As a result of the 
Northern Policy, many Chinese and South Korean businessmen visited each other's 
capitals to seek areas of economic cooperation and to talk about investment and trade. 
Non-political interchanges between South Korea and China intensified to the degree 
that they played a large role in making the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between China and South Korea in August 1992. South Korea's Northern Policy indeed 
brought about drastic policy shifts and significant results in relations between China and 
South Korea. This demonstrates that South Korea's Northern Policy served as a booster 
for China's pragmatic policy toward South Korea, and that it was a momentous factor 
that made China change to "Two Koreas" policy. 
South Korean-Soviet Normalization 
South Korea-Soviet Normalization was indeed a benchmark for the Northern 
Policy smce the Soviet Union had played a most critical role in constructing and 
strengthening the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula. Normalization reflected 
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the termination of the Cold War as it had existed in Northeast Asia, reducing tensions 
between the two different ideological camps. Normalization of ties between the two 
countries brought about fundamental changes m their bilateral relations which had 
remained hostile for over four decades. The new relationship also heralded a significant 
change in international politics in East Asia, especially the balance of power 
surrounding the Korean peninsula, and Sino-South Korean relations. 
Through Gorbachev's speeches in Vladivostok in July 1986 and in Krasnoyarsk 
in September 1988, the Soviet Union disclosed changes in their Far East policy by 
expressing its willingness to join Asia as a legitimate member and to improve relations 
with a significantly influential regional power such as South Korea. Since September 
1988, the USSR allowed South Korean businessmen and Soviet trade officials to 
exchange visits. The high regard for South Korea's economic development and latent 
power was a most compelling reason for the Soviet Union to consider making South 
Korea one of its own partners. In April 1989, the Soviet Union opened an office in 
Seoul, and three months later Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) opened a 
similar office in Moscow. To facilitate economic cooperation, South Korea and the 
Soviet Union agreed in November 1989 to open "consular departments" within their 
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respective semi-official trade offices as the first step toward the establishment of full 
diplomatic relations. These departments, which began operation the following month, 
were staffed by diplomats and functioned as embassies.36 
Seeing the breakthroughs in Seoul's relations with the Soviet Union before and 
after the Seoul Olympic games, China might have complicated feelings and might be 
encouraged to develop further cooperation with South Korea in the economic field. 
There was a hint that China linked Beijing's approach to Seoul to the development of 
Moscow's relations with the Seoul government. At a seminar held at the Rand 
Corporation in Santa Monica in April 1989, Hu Qiaomu, honorary president of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and former Politburo member, who still wielded 
considerable influence within the party said, "Beijing will consider political relations 
with South Korea once the Soviet Union improves diplomatic relations with the Seoul 
government. "37 
On June 4, 1990, President Roh Tae Woo and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev 
held summit talks m San Francisco and agreed to normalize diplomatic relations 
between Seoul and Moscow. 38 On September 30, 1990, South Korea's Foreign 
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Minister Choi Ho Joong and his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze signed 
historic document instantly effecting full diplomatic relations between the two countries 
in a meeting at the United Nations headquarters. 39 On December 13, 1990, Roh and 
Gorbachev issued a "Moscow Declaration" at the Kremlin in which they pledged joint 
efforts for elimination of the Cold War in Asia, relaxation of tension on the Korean 
Peninsula and eventual reunification of South and North Korea.40 
Pyongyang expressed its displeasure toward Moscow by recalling Son Song Pil, 
North Korean ambassador to Moscow, prior to the San Francisco summit talks. North 
Korea hit out at what it said was an international scheme to perpetuate "two Koreas," a 
day after the Roh-Gorbachev summit in San Francisco. The North Korean Workers' 
Party newspaper lashed out at "splittists" trying to keep North and South Korea divided. 
On the contrary, the Soviet Union abruptly stopped oil supply to North Korea shortly 
before the San Francisco summit. This meant the Soviet Union and North Korea 
entered a severe confrontational phase both in diplomatic and economic fields following 
Moscow's unilateral cut-off of oil supply. The Soviet action, which was received by 
Pyongyang as the worst crisis between the two nations in history, had much to do with 
its move to have diplomatic ties with Seoul soon.41 
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But Pyongyang suddenly offered to resume talks with Seoul. The proposal 
came just a week after North Korea announced the suspension of all channels of 
dialogue with South Korea. North Korea watchers agreed that the about-face was 
related with recent developments on and around the Korean Peninsula, particularly 
following the Roh-Gorbachev summit. They said North Korea might have made the 
surprise move out of desperate efforts to avoid international diplomatic isolation and to 
head off pressure to open up. North Korea watchers said North Korea might have 
judged that it could no longer disregard increasing pressure to open up, especially from 
its allies, China and the Soviet Union. They said there were signs that North Korea had 
been urged by Beijing and Moscow to resume dialogue with South Korea. 42 
Pyongyang might also have been prompted to reconsider its position toward South 
Korea, after witnessing some developments, including the Roh-Gorbachev meeting and 
the visit to Seoul in late May 1990 by Chinese senior leader Deng Xiaoping's second 
son.
43 This indicated the new relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union 
would bring significant changes in future international politics around Korean peninsula 
and inter-Korean relations. 
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China signaled its approval of the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
the Soviet Union and South Korea, Western diplomats in Beijing said. Diplomats noted 
China's official media reported Roh-Gorbachev summit including Roh's comments to 
reporters that they had agreed in principle to establish diplomatic relations and 
Gorbachev's remarks that the Soviet Union wanted to improve ties with all countries. 
"China is not discouraging this process," commented a Western diplomat. The diplomat 
added Beijing would be happy for Moscow to test the waters with Pyongyang before 
itself venturing to set up formal relations with Seoul. "They will let the Soviets take the 
flak from North Korea," he commented.44 
The rapid progress in Moscow-Seoul relations took the sting out of the long-
standing ideological and geopolitical Sino-Soviet rivalry over North Korea. For China 
the Soviet shift from a one-Korea policy to a two-Koreas policy provided an almost 
perfect example and almost perfect excuse for its own shift from a one-Korea policy to 
a two-Korea policy in 1992, while at the same time forcing Pyongyang to be more 
dependent upon Beijing for economic and political support. As a result, Beijing 
acquired the distinction of being the only country in the world with leverage on 
Pyongyang 's international comportment. 45 
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The political situation in Northeast Asia gave China an advantageous position as 
the single major power that was both maintaining close relations with Pyongyang and 
developing new ties with Seoul. This situation was partially the result of the 
deterioration of North Korea-Soviet links since the late 1980s, which served to allay 
China's enduring concerns about Moscow's influence in North Korea and, accordingly, 
gave Beijing more room to maneuver in the regional power game. It prompted 
Pyongyang to tilt toward China and made it easier for Beijing to justify its position of 
developing relations with Seoul. Finally, Beijing was also compelled to speed up the 
pace of its relations with South Korea.46 
Beijing followed the Soviet example, but proceeded in a more careful and 
calculating way. Some observed that Beijing showed the tendency of letting Moscow 
set the diplomatic pace.47 It had been China's practice to let Moscow take the lead in 
approaching Seoul while it avoided lagging too far behind. To placate North Korea, 
China had delayed establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea, but it showed 
flexibility in handling Sino-South Korean ties by conducting a "dual track" approach 
and "separating economics from politics." After witnessing the swift development of 
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South Korea-Soviet relations, China quickened its pace, leading to the conclusion of the 
Beijing-Seoul normalization process.48 
South Korea-Soviet normalization portended a new political order in Northeast 
Asia befitting the sea-change in the world political scene. The foundation of the 
envisaged new order was the cross-recognition of South and North Korea by their 
respective superpower allies. The normalization represented a definite turn in the 
Soviet Union's policy on South Korea toward the recognition of two Koreas on the 
Korean peninsula. This change in Moscow's stance prompted China to review its 
traditional pro-North Korea policy. Beijing had maintained a substantial degree of trade 
with Seoul. On the other hand, conscious of Pyongyang, it had shied away from 
improving political ties with Seoul. But the normalization stimulated Beijing to expand 
relations with Seoul and brought about rapid improvement in Sino-South Korean 
relations. Consequently, China could afford to pursue a policy toward South Korea that 
paralleled Moscow's, without any fear that the Soviet Union might drive a wedge 
between itself and Pyongyang. Therefore, South Korea-Soviet normalization helped 
foster a favorable atmosphere to lead to establishment of Seoul-Beijing diplomatic 
relations. It was a contributing factor that made China adjust to "Two Koreas" policy. 
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Kim Il Sung's China Visit in 1990 
On September 11, 1990, Kim Il Sung secretly met Chinese leaders including 
Jiang Zemin, chief of the CCP, in the northeastern Chinese city of Shenyang. Kim's 
clandestine visit to China was seen as his desperate effort to keep his hermit kingdom 
from further diplomatic isolation through an alliance with China. The secret visit itself 
was not new. Yet it drew keen political attention as it came on the heels of the 
unprecedented meeting between prime ministers of South and North Korea in Seoul on 
September 4-7 and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Pyongyang 
on September 2-3.49 
There were several reasons why Kim Il Sung decided to make another secret 
visit to China between September 11-13. During his visit to Pyongyang, Shevardnadze 
notified Kim Il Sung of South Korea-Soviet normalization and urged Pyongyang to 
move toward reforms and openness. But the fact that Kim did not meet Shevardnadze 
in Pyongyang revealed the extent of Kim 's distress. 50 Such a rapid change in the Soviet 
attitude toward Seoul was the immediate motivation for Kim's visit to China. With the 
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atmosphere of the world growing in Seoul's favor, Pyongyang was impelled to ask for 
China's help. 51 That was why the utmost focus during the talks between Kim and 
Chinese leaders was placed on the strategies to cope with rapidly improving ties 
between South Korea and the Soviet Union. 52 
Kim asked for China's commitment to veto the South Korean bid for UN 
membership when he met Jiang Zemin, but his request was turned down. Despite 
Kim's anxiety about Seoul's UN entry bid, Beijing did not yet give a definite promise to 
North Korea on that matter. This indicated China took a low-key stand in relations with 
North Korea and reserved its veto against a possible application for a UN seat by South 
Korea. In fact, China's veto power at the UN Security Council was regarded as the only 
serious obstacle to Seoul's joining the world body now that South Korea entered into 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 53 
The development in Seoul-Beijing relations was also disturbing to Kim Il Sung. 
Bilateral trade between Beijing and Seoul amounted to $3 billion in 1989. Furthermore, 
a Korean consular team had been already dispatched to Beijing to take care of Korean 
athletes and tourists during the Beijing Asian Games opening September 22. These 
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developments in Seoul-Beijing relations must have compelled Kim to decide the sudden 
visit to China54 while Beijing declined Kim's offer to visit the Chinese capital and meet 
Deng Xiaoping. In a step seen as calculated to avoid provoking South Korea, CCP 
General Secretary Jiang Zemin instead pointedly chose the northeastern city of 
Shenyang, and not Beijing, to welcome Kim on September 11.55 Also, Chinese leaders 
were reluctant to accept foreign leaders in Beijing, the site of the Asian Games, for fear 
of unpleasant political side effects. 56 Moreover, Kim could not meet Deng or other top 
Chinese leaders, except Jiang, a rare "pointed slight" to the head of Chinese longtime 
ally. 57 Furthermore, Jiang rejected Kim's request to prevent the South Korean national 
flag being flown at the Asian Games site, limit the number of athletes and cultural 
performers from Seoul and restrict billboards advertising South Korean products. China 
also downplayed the three-day policy consultation by not officially announcing it. 58 
China, suffering from a chronic budget deficit, made it clear that it would no 
longer be able to provide economic aid to North Korea because of Pyongyang's failure 
in economic reform. 59 CCP chief Jiang Zemin told Kim that although the "as-close-as-
lips-and-teeth" relationship of the two nations would continue, China would not be 
putting its money where its mouth is. Instead of bailing out North Korea, China advised 
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the nation to save itself through economic reform and by openmg up to foreign 
investment. China also said it would continue fixing its own troubled economy by 
forging closer relations with-and luring investment from-South Korea.60 
Although China dealt with North Korea in a cautious fashion for fear that it 
should hurt Kim 11 Sung's ego and interests, it wanted to be closer to South Korea, 
pursumg economic pragmatism and playing double strategy cunningly. China had 
urged North Korea to follow China's example since 1979. In essence, Jiang's message 
was that China and North Korea must use capitalism to save socialism.61 Chinese 
leaders must have made a fine calculation of its economic self-interests and balanced 
the overall strategic situation on and around the Korean Peninsula. Because China was 
benefiting from increasing exchanges with South Korea, and mutual trade in particular, 
it prodded North Korea to get its act together. Obviously, China knew any attempt to 
create a joint front against the worldwide trend of openness and reform would prove 
futile as an anachronistic bid that would serve neither China nor North Korea any good. 
Beijing's Position Toward Seoul's UN Entry Bid 
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China had long opposed the admission of South Korea into the United Nations, 
which suggested that it would use its veto power in the Security Council to keep South 
Korea out. Beijing's firm stance on this issue was based on its own reunification 
policy-Deng Xiaoping's formula of "one country, two systems"-in dealing with the 
Taiwan question.62 In November 1989, the Chinese Foreign Ministry had still publicly 
reaffirmed its support of the Pyongyang line by opposing simultaneous entry into the 
UN, but a year later Beijing began to project an indeterminate line, stating that the 
international community should encourage both Koreas to settle this issue properly 
through consultation.63 There were hints of flexibility in Beijing's stance. On March 
28, 1990, Chinese Foreign Minister commented on the Korean question, "Reunification 
between South and North Korea need not be identical to the plan that China favors for 
its own reunification." This statement was noteworthy in the sense that a Chinese 
leader of such high rank publicly acknowledged possible differences between Korea and 
China toward reunification.64 
South Korea had placed diplomatic priority on its UN entry since early 1990, 
encouraged by its successful Northern Policy-normalized Seoul-Moscow ties m 
September 1990 and improvement in relations with China and East European countries. 
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China, in response to Seoul's dogged pursuit of its UN membership, had refrained from 
openly supporting either South or North Korea. While urging the two Koreas to settle 
the issue by themselves through dialogue, China asked South Korea to postpone its 
application for UN membership until 1991, implying that China would not oppose such 
an entry when South Korea had to apply separately in 1991 because China would be 
unsuccessful in persuading North Korea to accept the joint entry. South Korea did not 
submit an application in 1990 but did not stop trying to persuade China through various 
channels. 65 
In the spring of 1991, South Korea decided to apply for membership in the UN 
regardless of whatever action North Korea might take on the issue. It became quite 
clear by then that negotiations with North Korea were futile, and that international 
environment was becoming more favorable to South Korea's application for UN 
membership. First, the Soviet Union declared its intention to support South Korea's bid 
for UN membership at the Soviet-South Korean summit meeting held in Cheju, a 
southern island in South Korea in April 1991. Second, China had indicated its intention 
not to veto South Korea's application for UN membership by the spring of 1991. Since 
North Korea counted heavily on China's veto power in blocking South Korea's bid for 
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UN entry, the Chinese unwillingness to cast a veto against South Korea's membership 
application was quite encouraging to Seoul. Third, in the 1990 session of the UN 
General Assembly, over 70 member nations spoke in favor of South Korea's plan for the 
simultaneous but separate admission of the two Koreas to the UN, while no UN member 
spoke in favor of North Korea's proposed plan for the joint entry of the two Koreas on a 
combined seat to the UN.66 
Thus, on April 8, 1991, South Korea announced it would formally seek 
membership in the United Nations that summer and called upon rival North Korea to 
also seek its separate membership in the world body. On the other hand, North 
Korea consistently had opposed separate UN membership of the two Korean states, 
saying that would perpetuate the division of the Korean peninsula and would not 
promote reunification. It had called for sharing one seat with South Korea, rotating 
chief delegates and abstaining from votes in case of disagreements. South Korea had 
rejected that idea as unworkable. South Korean government said, "the unification of 
East Germany and West Germany and of North Yemen and South Yemen, all of which 
held separate UN memberships, disproves North Korea's view that membership of both 
Korean states would hinder reunification. "67 
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After the South Korean government statement on April 8, South Korea stepped 
up its diplomatic maneuvers to enter the UN. But Beijing maintained an equivocal 
stand, expressing a clear commitment to neither Seoul nor Pyongyang. Obviously put 
into an awkward situation, the Chinese leaders repeatedly stressed a basic stance calling 
for dialogue and compromise to settle the issue, with the apparent aim of not getting 
involved in the Korean tangle. China had told South and North Korea to exclude it 
from their dispute over Seoul's plan to apply for separate membership at the UN.68 
Meanwhile, President Roh Tae Woo held summit talks with Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev in Cheju on April 20, 1991. During his summit talks, Gorbachev 
expressed support for Seoul's bid for UN membership in view of the universality 
principle of the world body. He said the Soviet Union consulted China over Seoul's bid 
to enter the UN. He added that even China considered North Korean offer for the two 
Koreas to share a single seat at the UN as "unrealistic, irrational, and unacceptable." 
This signified such an attitude on the part of the Soviet Union was expected to affect 
Beijing, another close ally of North Korea, who could frustrate Seoul's application for 
UN membership with its right of veto, observing that Beijing used to follow Moscow's 
188 
examples.69 
Although China had to pay attention to North Korea's strong appeal not to 
follow the Soviet model, China was fully aware that the Soviet recognition of South 
Korea meant "time favors South Korea rather than North Korea."7° China reacted 
favorably to Seoul-Moscow ties. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said, "China 
hopes that the strengthened relations between Moscow and Seoul will help ease tension 
on the Korean Peninsula." China showed the unusual reaction to the summit between 
Seoul and Moscow. It was significant that the comment came at a time when Chinese 
Premier Li Peng was scheduled to visit North Korea May 3-6 to discuss Seoul's bid for 
entry to the UN. The comment was also aimed at encouraging North Korea to take a 
flexible attitude toward Seoul's move for joining the world organization. It also hinted 
the positive attitude of Beijing officials toward the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with Seoul. 71 
Then China needed economic help not only from the Western world but also 
from South Korea to carry out its Four Modernizations. In fact, Beijing was under 
constant pressure from the United States and Japan to improve relations with Seoul. 
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But the more important fact was that Beijing was not in a position to totally neglect the 
economic role of South Korea in North East Asia. In this respect, China played a very 
important role in pressuring North Korea to apply for UN membership together with 
South Korea. 72 
Beijing's position was made clear on May 2, 1991, the day before Premier Li 
Peng was to start his Pyongyang visit, when Zhu Liang, director of the Party External 
Liaison Department, emphasized that the two Koreas should be admitted to the UN 
simultaneously. Judging from Zhu's remarks, it could be assumed that Premier Li must 
have emphasized the same idea when he met Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang the next day.73 
Moreover, a Chinese Foreign Ministry briefing on May 9, 1991 revealed that Premier Li 
Peng during his visit to Pyongyang on May 3-6 refrained from making positive remarks 
in support for the Pyongyang's position, instead he expressed a flexible view, saying 
that the UN question should be solved through bilateral negotiations between South and 
North Korea. 74 Furthermore, Li Peng told North Korea that its idea of sharing a UN 
seat at the UN with South Korea was "unrealistic" and advised it to seek another 
method during his visit to Pyongyang. 75 Li Peng advised Pyongyang to apply for a UN 
seat, pointing out that the UN atmosphere had already turned out to favor the South 
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Korean entry and under these conditions Beijing would not exercise its veto. Li Peng 
clarified Beijing's plan for not exercising veto power on Seoul's application to the 
UN. 76 At the same time, Li Peng advised North Korea to seek a separate seat in the UN 
along with South Korea, for such a move would not only enhance North Korea's 
international position but also strengthen its security against possible South Korean 
attempts to "absorb" North Korea. China's new decision in the matter eliminated North 
Korea's last hope of blocking South Korea's entry into the UN.77 
There were several reasons why China found it difficult to cast a veto, 
especially a solo veto, in the service of Pyongyang's untenable stand. Despite its 
principled opposition to a wide range of issues in the Security Council, China had 
consistently expressed its opposition in the form of abstention. In over two decades of 
participation, China cast only two vetoes: one on the Bangladesh membership issue, and 
one on the Middle East question in 1972. Since September 1972, the veto has vanished 
from Chinese voting behavior. Seoul banked on the notion that China would not dare 
repeat its embarrassing solo performance m vetoing Bangladesh's UN membership 
application in 1972. Given its habitual assault on the Soviet use of veto as an 
expressiOn of hegemonic behavior, China would do its utmost through behind-the-
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scenes diplomacy to prevent itself from being maneuvered into a corner in which it 
would have no escape option but to cast a veto. In short, Beijing learned the hard way 
that the utility of veto power, like nuclear weapons, lies more in its deterrent value of a 
threat than in actual use. More importantly, Beijing realized that there were some ways 
of reunifying divided nations in the postwar era: by war, as in the case of Vietnam 
model, and by peaceful evolution and absorption, as in the case of German model. Both 
scenarios were unattractive, even threatening, to post-Tiananmen China with its own 
acute identity/legitimacy crisis. In the wake of the German unification (this was the 
accession of East Germany to the Federal Republic of Germany), the Chinese leadership 
began to realize that the worst possible scenario of Korean reunification would be via 
South Korea swallowing up North Korea. To China, the possibility of the German 
model on the Korean peninsula was rather threatening. 78 
After numerous secret meetings, Beijing finally persuaded Kim 11 Sung to shift to 
a "two countries, two systems" strategy and jump on the UN bandwagon supporting 
Seoul's UN membership bid following the logic of "if you can't beat them, join them." 
By May 1991 the encirclement of Seoul's Nordpolitik had left Pyongyang with only two 
escape options: one, to have a showdown with its near certainty of defeat, missing the 
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last chance of joining the UN, or two, to initiate a move of its own UN bid. 79 On May 
28, 1991, North Korea's decision to apply for separate UN membership was made 
public shortly after Li's Pyongyang visit. This proved that Beijing played the most 
decisive role in influencing North Korea over the UN membership question because 
China remained the only supporter of North Korea. 80 
The simultaneous UN entry of South and North Korea provided the momentum 
for Beijing to untie one important knot, that is, its obligatory burden to support 
Pyongyang's stand regarding the UN question. As mentioned above, North Korea's 
decision to enter the world body could be attributable, first of all, to the Soviet 
reluctance to support Pyongyang's position and then to Beijing's attitude to pursue 
pragmatic foreign policies. China's unwillingness to veto South Korea's membership 
application was a decisive factor. Pyongyang was also compelled to adapt itself to 
changes in the international atmosphere favoring the simultaneous entry.81 In the light 
of China's response, China's approach to South Korea was based upon the consideration 
that the old stand would not only hurt its relations with South Korea, but would also 
isolate China vis-a-vis the pro-Seoul position of all other permanent members of the 
Council. Beijing's shift left Pyongyang no choice but to make an about-face turn and 
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apply for separate membership.82 Beijing demonstrated officially that it supported 
Pyongyang's stand, but in the behind-the-scenes talks with Pyongyang, Beijing's leaders 
emphasized the need for opening and reforms and for the improvement of inter-Korean 
relations. 
China welcomed separate UN entry by two Koreas. A Chinese foreign ministry 
spokesman said, "China always have maintained that the question of Korea joining the 
UN should be settled properly through negotiations between the two Koreas. North 
Korea's decision to apply for a separate UN membership is of positive significance and 
is beneficial to promoting talks between South and North Korea and enhancing peace 
and stability on the peninsula."83 Also, Li Ruihan, a member of the CCP Standing 
Committee, said, "Simultaneous UN entry by South and North Korea is realistic and 
will help stabilize the Korean Peninsula and profit entire Asia, including China." This 
was the first time that a ranking leader of the CCP publicly expressed a support for the 
simultaneous UN entry by the two Koreas. 84 In June 1991, during Foreign Minister 
Qian Qichen's Pyongyang visit, he said that the North Korean decision to enter the UN 
would generate far-reaching effects in the international community, and that the Chinese 
government fully supported the important and positive measures taken by North 
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Korea. 85 The North Korean decision on the UN question relieved China of its 
psychological burden to comply with Seoul's aggressive approach, coupled with ever-
growing trade volume, in Beijing's favor. It also further eased China of a burden in 
deciding whether to normalize ties with South Korea. 
Kim 11 Sung's China Visit in 1991 
Kim 11 Sung paid his I 0-day official visit to China from October 4 to 13, 1991 
to discuss the future of the socialist countries in the wake of the collapse of communism 
in the Soviet Union, the matter of North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons, 
international inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities, economic and military aid, 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea, and power 
succession.86 Unlike his previous visits to China, this visit was announced beforehand 
and was unusually long. The hospitality shown by the Chinese to the aging visitor was 
really impressive during his stay in Beijing, but Kim failed to achieve the main purposes 
of his visit. 
The Chinese government showed a cool attitude toward Kim and his proposals 
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on political matters. Particularly the reactions shown by Chinese leaders concerning 
nuclear issue were notably realistic. The Chinese leaders urged North Korea to accept 
the international nuclear inspections it had refused, since China was trying to restore 
relations with the West and cooperate with the international community, such as by 
joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.87 North Korean negligence of the duty 
required under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which it signed in 1985 was a great 
stumbling block in its normalization talks with Japan and vigorous pursuit of improved 
ties with the United States.88 General Secretary Jiang Zemin had urged North Korea to 
abandon its nuclear development project, with far more pressure than what he put on 
North Korea when persuading North Korea to enter the UN along with South Korea. 
Jiang had stated that "even if the US takes measures against North Korea, including 
military action, with regard to North Korea's nuclear facilities, China has no intention to 
interfere in it."89 In the first round of talks with Kim, Jiang applied pressure on the 
nuclear issue, saying that "China is highly concerned about the development of the 
situation on the Korean peninsula, because relaxation and stability in this particular 
region has a direct bearing on the overall situation in Northeast Asia. "9° Chinese 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said, "China does not want a nuclear presence in either 
part of the divided Korean peninsula."91 Qian's remark was interpreted as a strong 
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warning against nuclear proliferation to North Korea. Moreover, Qian opposed the 
North Korean attempt to link its acceptance of the international inspection of its nuclear 
facilities to the removal of US nuclear anns in South Korea.92 But Kim said while he 
understood China's actions, he expressed concern several times the US would instigate 
an attack by South Korea across the 381h parallel. Kim said because of this, Pyongyang 
would like to develop nuclear weapons and China to provide assistance. In response, 
President Yang Shangkun told Kim that China holds firmly to its policy regarding 
nuclear weapons of"no transfer, no cooperation, no assistance, and no proliferation."93 
As revealed by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin, China's stance 
included three main points: China hoped that peace and stability would be maintained 
on the Korea peninsula; it wished to see the Korean peninsula turned into a nuclear free 
zone; and it hoped that all the parties concerned would help South and North Korea 
settle the issue through talks, rather than adding fuel to the flames. 94 
In his meeting with Chinese leaders, Kim Il Sung hoped for some kind of 
economic aid but was left instead with suggestions and advice on economic 
development. In a meeting with Chinese Premier Li Peng on October 5, Kim 11 Sung 
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explained to him the serious economic situation of N. Korea in detail, but Li Peng 
refused his request. Instead, Li urged Kim to follow China's openness policy. Also, Li 
Peng clearly explained to Kim the difficult economic situation of China. Li Peng said: 
It is expected that 25 million tons of crops will be damaged owing to the 
floods sweeping through China this year. The large population is a difficult 
problem to China. The population which increases by 17 million people every 
year makes it difficult for the Chinese government to provide food and clothes for 
the people. China is transforming its backward economy into a developing stage 
through gradual reforms but it has no ability to compensate for the Soviet Union 
cutting off of aid to North Korea, and oil and arms supplies at much lower 
comrade prices. Quite a few China's state-owned large- and medium-size 
enterprises are a heavy burden for the central government, with many piling up 
huge losses and operating at low economic efficiency.95 
Meanwhile, Li Peng gave pointed advice about a market-oriented economy 
without assuring Kim of any substantial assistance and pointed out the unwise economic 
direction in which Kim had led his country.96 Market-style reforms introduced in 
China a decade ago led to relative prosperity in many parts of the country and Chinese 
leaders urged North Korea to follow a similar course. Li urged Kim to introduce 
reforms and liberalization to the North Korean economy, which had been dealt a serious 
blow by the evaporation of aid from Moscow.97 
Beijing's official media had also made it known to the outside world that the 
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Chinese leadership no longer regarded North Korea as an "ally" even at a time when the 
sphere of socialism had shrank rapidly.98 Jiang Zemin told Koshiro, secretary general 
of Japan's opposition Komeito Party, of his October 8 meeting with Kim, saying, "There 
are strong bonds between China and North Korea, but we are no longer allies."99 It 
seemed that China was trying to change the alliance with North Korea into "an 
extremely general, good neighborly" relationship. 100 
China rejected Kim's request that Beijing delay normalization of its relations 
with South Korea. Jiang Zemin made it clear that the establishment of relations 
between China and South Korea was "China's internal problem," rejecting Kim's 
request. 101 Jiang even informed Kim of the date China would establish diplomatic 
relations with South Korea "independently" of North Korea. 102 China also strongly 
urged that North Korea pursue an open door policy and promote personnel and material 
exchanges with South Korea. Deng Xiaoping advised Kim to adopt a correct policy by 
concentrating on economic development and engaging in a peaceful emulation of South 
Korea. 103 Beijing's refusal to delay normalization of ties with Seoul at Kim's request 
indicated a "major change" in the traditional alliance between China and North Korea. 
This meant a "diplomatic failure" for Pyongyang. In effect, it seemed that China tried 
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to change the traditional blood ties between the two countries into "friendly and 
goodwill relations." Moreover, conspicuously missing was any communique spelling 
out concrete future forms of cooperation which were expected in view of the official 
nature of the visit. There was no such statement either when Kim wrapped up two days 
of discussions with Chinese leaders and went on a tour of the provinces to observe 
economic reform in China October 6. 104 It signified the relations between China and 
North Korea were strained politically and diplomatically. Kim 11 Sung "only got 
lectures for reforms" from Chinese leaders. 
China's Economic Diplomacy with South Korea 
The Tiananmen Incident in June 1989 left China in a difficult position in its 
international economic relations as well as international political relations. Foreign 
investments and loans declined, and the number of visitors significantly dropped. In 
1990 the US Congress threatened to suspend China's Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) 
status, which helped Chinese exports in the 1980s. Given China's limited financial 
resources and technology, it could not resort to the closed-economy policy of the past. 105 
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The primary goal of Chinese foreign policy after the Tiananmen massacre was to 
improve the international environment in China's favor and bring back support for its 
economic reform. The need was dictated by the crisis of legitimacy engendered and 
exacerbated by the crackdown on the democratic movement. Since the Tiananmen 
incident, Chinese leaders had been haunted by the nightmare of renewed social umest, a 
fear intensified by the downfall of the communist system in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe largely caused, in the Chinese leadership's view, by economic 
breakdown. The absence of prosperity coupled with runaway political reform could 
only fuel discontent and, ultimately, rebellion. The lesson of the communist demise in 
Europe convinced the CCP leaders that a communist regime could be saved only by 
economic prosperity. 106 Deng Xiaoping firmly believed the economic outcomes of the 
past decade would enable China to survive in spite of the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The fall of these countries stemmed from their 
inability to manage the economy. Thus, economic construction became a vital source of 
legitimacy for communist rule in China. 107 This helped to explain China's changing 
attitude toward South Korea and the downgrading of ideology in its foreign policy. 
After the Tiananmen Incident, China imposed import restrictions on many 
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consumer goods. South Korean exports to China also were hit hard. Furthermore, from 
late 1989 Beijing began to apply new customs regulations according to which all 
imported goods of neutral packing-which then applied to most South Korean goods 
exported to China-were to be exempted from preferential duties. The result was a 
drop in South Korea's export to China for the first time since 1983, thereby slowing 
down the growth of the total trade between the two countries. As the impact of the 
Tiananmen Incident demonstrated, South Korea-China economic relations were highly 
susceptible to various domestic and foreign factors. Such limitations induced South 
Korea to reevaluate its policy toward China. That ts, South Korea came to put 
increasingly heavier stress on the principle of quid pro quo, which included its tough 
bargaining position on a variety of issues including those of establishing trade offices 
and acquiring the most-favored-nation status. China also seemed to have concluded that 
maintaining and expanding economic cooperation with South Korea was m its best 
interests. In 1989, China's trade surplus with South Korea was $267 million; and that 
for 1990 rose to $715 million. 108 Besides, South Korea was much less vocal about the 
tragic event at the Tiananmen Square and more willing to resume business with China 
than either the United States or Japan. 
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The Beijing Asian Games were held on September 22-0ctober 7, 1990. Both 
China and South Korea sought to use the Beijing Asian Games as a stepping stone in 
their efforts to speed up closer ties with each other. China agreed to South Korea's 
request for an "Olympic attache" to be sent from Seoul during the Asian Games in 
Beijing. It was the first official diplomatic contact, albeit temporary, between the two 
countries. 109 Especially, South Korea used the Beijing Asian Games as an opportunity 
to move toward normalizing ties with China. China depended heavily on Seoul for the 
successful staging of the Asian Games. South Korea provided substantial financial and 
technological assistance for the Asian Games. Apart from about $15 million in revenue 
from commercial billboards rented by South Korean companies, Hyundai and other 
automobile makers donated 400 cars to help transport athletes and officials during the 
Games. In addition, hotels in Beijing overflowed with South Korean tourists. 110 Also 
four months before the opening ceremonies of the 11th Asian Games in Beijing, Seoul 
had agreed to offer China $1 million for television coverage of the Asian Games. 111 
The total amount of financial assistance from South Korea government and 
compames to China ran to $100 million-ranging from cars, minibuses, medical 
equipment, copy machines, computer software, sports wear, boxing equipment, to 
203 
washing machines. 112 All the major South Korean firms, which made hefty donations 
to the Asian Games, hoped that their foothold in China would expand toward the end of 
the year. At least 15 Seoul-based corporations had already set up permanent office in 
Beijing, 113 with dreams of striking it rich in the world's largest market. Chun Jin Hwan, 
executive vice president of the LG Corporation told The New York Times in July 1990, 
"China wanted more, without South Korean support, China could not hold the Asian 
Games."114 This background explained the rationale behind China's decision in late 
1990 to establish trade offices with South Korea. 
During his visit to Beijing for the opening ceremony of the Asian Games, Park 
Chol On, a key architect of Seoul's Northern Policy and former First Minister for 
Political Affairs met Chinese Premier Li Peng and other high-ranking Chinese officials 
to exchange views broadly on issues such as Sino-South Korea and inter-Korean 
relations. He indicated trade offices would be opened soon after the end of the Asian 
Games and the functions of the offices would include visa issuance and other consular 
work. 115 Park added that "when Kim 11 Sung visited Shenyang on September 11-13, 
China informed Kim that South Korea and China would exchange trade offices, and 
China obtained Kim's consent."116 Meanwhile, at a news conference with only one day 
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left before the end of the Asian Games, for the first time in public, Zhang Baifa, vice 
major of Beijing and a CCP Central Committee member, predicted a rapid improvement 
of relations between South Korea and China. He said, "China will take more liberal and 
open policy toward the outside world." He also expressed thanks to South Korea for 
extending material help for the Beijing Asian Games. 117 
In return for Seoul's financial and technical cooperation extended to the hosting 
ofthe Beijing Asian Games, the cooperative bond between China and South Korea was 
strengthened. After the Asian Games on October 7, 1990 were over and after the Soviet 
Union normalized relations with South Korea on September 30, 1990, Beijing and 
Seoul finally signed an agreement to exchange trade offices in each other's capitals on 
October 20, 1990. The accord was signed by the representatives of the Korea Trade 
Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) and the China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade (CCPIT). Under the accord, the trade offices' business included 
affairs usually reserved for government missions, particularly consular affairs such as 
issuing visas, in addition to trade, commerce, scientific and technological business. 118 
These roles, which the offices could play, combined with their commercial-related 
functions, could mean significant progress in the two countries' relations. The offices 
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engaged in negotiating an investment guarantee accord for their countries' business 
executives and firms interested m or seeking trade with each other's area. Such 
institutional guarantees facilitated the trade of the two countries. 119 
The Korean side pushed for the establishment of government-level 
organizations from the start of the bilateral talks but assented to the Chinese call for 
opening private-level offices as Beijing did not want to offend Kim 11 Sung. In fact, the 
slow tempo with which Seoul and Beijing had been moving to evolve their relations 
was attributed to China's ties with Pyongyang. 120 
Another reason for China's reluctance to answer South Korea's zeal for warmer 
relations was that recognition of the South Korean government would run counter to its 
policy of not recognizing two governments in one nation. China has refused to 
recognize the government in Taiwan and argued that it should be unified with China as 
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· one country, two systems. 
Meanwhile, China reaffirmed its traditional friendly relations with North Korea 
following a decision to exchange trade offices with Seoul. 122 It meant China's Korea 
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policy was directed to maintaining existing political and military relations with 
Pyongyang on the one hand and on the other hand to seeking the expansion of economic 
relations with Seoul in pursuing "double strategy" cunningly. Such an attitude of 
Beijing derived from its need to expedite the founding of an economic basis to carry out 
its economic development program. 
To demonstrate the importance it was placing on the new trade office, Seoul 
appointed former Vice Foreign Minister Roh Jae-won as the first head of the Korean 
office. The appointment of Roh Jae-won to head the office demonstrated Seoul's 
fervor. 123 Seoul opened its trade representative office in Beijing on January 30, 1991. 
Half the 20 Koreans working there were diplomats though the office was officially 
named the trade representative office of the KOTRA. Meanwhile, the Chinese trade 
office opened in Seoul on June I 0, 1991. Beijing appointed Xu Dayou, Vice President 
of CCPIT as the first head of the trade representative office in Seoul. Obviously, the 
failure to choose a higher official was mainly because of Beijing's concern of strong 
complaints from Pyongyang. 124 
The opening of the trade representative office in Beijing provided major impetus 
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to Seoul's efforts to expand economic and trade ties with China. The newly opened 
office with consular functions worked to reduce risks for Korean firms doing business 
in China. The exchange of the trade offices helped pave the way for stepped-up 
cooperation in trade and investment as well as for full diplomatic relations between the 
two countries as seen in the case of the Soviet Union. In fact, since the termination of 
the Cold War, many countries increasingly emphasized their economic interests in 
relations with other countries, rather than ideological commitments and other political 
factors. China also had no choice but to open relations with South Korea for its own 
economic interests. 
Meanwhile, in 1989, bilateral trade between China and South Korea remained 
at about the same level ($3 .1 billion) as that of the previous year ($3 billion); in 1990 it 
reached $3.8 billion. South Korea's export to China suffered serious setbacks in 1989-
90 due to Tiananmen Incident and China's retrenchment policy. But, after establishing 
trade offices, the volume of bilateral trade jumped by 51.9 percent to $5.8 billion in 
1991. On December 31, 1991, South Korea and China signed a trade agreement giving 
MFN status to each other's exports. The accord was effective as from February 1992. 
The agreement sharply increased South Korea-China trade, which had been hampered 
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by high Chinese surcharges on South Korean products. 125 In May 1992, South Korea 
and China signed an investment guarantee pact in Beijing granting each other most-
favored-nation status on investment and business activities. The implementation of the 
treaty facilitated bilateral commercial exchanges and boosted South Korean investment 
in China. The pact also provided for both sides to work out legal steps to guarantee 
investments, and called for regular meetings to discuss ways to promote investment. 126 
Indeed, 1992 was a watershed year for the two countries both witnessed a 
remarkable growth of bilateral trade. South Korean imports from China stood at $3.73 
billion while exports to China amounted to $4.49 billion. The volume of bilateral trade 
jumped by 41.4 percent from $5.8 billion in 1991 to $8.22 billion in 1992.127 South 
Korea ranked as China's eighth largest trading partner. China became South Korea's 
third largest trading partner. In addition, China already became the third largest country 
for investment by South Korea. The comparatively faster growth of exports in relation 
to imports was due to Deng's monumental tour around southern China in January 1992: 
it touched off an accelerated pace for economic reforms and the widening in scope of 
China's open-door policy, which in turn revitalized import demand that had been 
repressed during the September 1988 to 1990 period. 128 
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Since early 1992, Deng Xiaoping was actively campatgnmg m the southern 
provinces and other parts of China to revive his open door and reform programs, most 
of which had been slowed in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. 
Deng made a month-long trip to Guangdong and Shanghai in January 1992. It was a 
high-stakes political journey. The trip was called the Guangdong Inspection, in which 
Deng visited the Special Economic Zone. Since then, there were renewed efforts for 
deepening the reforms in China's modernization. His southern trip involved the 
direction and goal toward which China should move in the near future. Though many 
uncertainties remained, Deng anticipated economic prosperity. During his trip, Deng 
called for "fast-paced reforms" and "making quicker steps." 129 Deng also pointed out 
that "the economies of some neighboring countries and regions have been developing 
more rapidly than China's, and that if China develops very slowly, people will compare 
their situation with that in neighboring countries and become dissatisfied." 130 
In the political arena, however, approaches for economtc development still 
differed among leaders. Deng noticed active resistance from "leftist" (conservative) 
leaders and felt seriously threatened politically. Deng had experienced political defeat 
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by leftist leaders: in 1933, by Wang Ming; in 1969, by Lin Biao; in 1976, by the Gang 
of Four. After the Tiananrnen Incident, Deng's popularity was weakened and side-lined, 
at least by the propaganda organs influenced by the leftists. Deng had to wage an 
important battle against his adversaries. Thus, the preparation of the 14th National 
Congress of the CCP, which was scheduled for October 1992, weighed heavily with 
Deng Xiaoping. As the Congress would set national priorities and concrete policies for 
the next five years, Deng attempted to eliminate the major barrier of his reform 
policies 131 and tried to mobilize all the support he could to gain ascendancy at the 
Congress so that the CCP convention would formally approve and legitimate his reform 
and open door policies. Apparently Deng saw the value of the "South Korean 
connection" in his crusade to step up China's modernization, rightly or wrongly. Deng 
believed that the South Korean government and Korean business community would be 
willing and able to provide capital and teclmology. 132 
Deng was interested in learning from South Korea's expenence of economic 
development and dynamism as a member of "Si Xiaolong" (Four Little Dragons). 
According to Harding, the Chinese believed South Korea to be a potential market for 
their products, a source of capital and technology, and a channel for information about 
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one of the most successful of the East Asian NICs. 133 Moreover, Deng saw South 
Korea's developmental strategy as a practical model for his own dualistic idea of reform 
and opening policy, that is, "cautious political reform and bold economic reform." For 
him, political freedom and democratization could be sacrificed for the economtc 
development, as happened in South Korea throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 134 
Deng Xiaoping saw South Korea as an economic model. Hence, instead of siding 
with many of the conservatives who remained opposed to the normalization of Sino-
South Korean relations, Deng switched his position and supported the opening to Seoul. 
With Deng's blessing, the Chinese government moved quickly, in late July, to negotiate 
and formalize the establishment of full diplomatic relations, which was made public on 
1r August 24, 1992. ) 
Conclusion 
During the period of 1989-1992, China's foreign policy toward the Korean 
peninsula was that, first, China wanted to maintain a peaceful and stable security 
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environment by deterring any countries from seeking hegemony on the Korean 
peninsula and by standing firm m pursumg its persistent anti-hegemony principle. 
Although China, bound by a treaty to defend North Korea, has given Pyongyang verbal 
support to its commitment of reunification, in reality China has held back North Korea 
from using military means to that end, for fear of provoking large-scale, armed conflict 
that could involve China in direct military confrontation with the US, which is tied to 
South Korea's defense by a treaty. 136 Moreover, since the sudden collapse of North 
Korea and the resultant disorder could also break peace and stability on the Korean 
peninsula, Beijing's policy toward North Korea aimed at the reduction of tension as 
well as the redress of its military adventurism against South Korea. 137 Maintaining a 
"Two Koreas" policy, China neither wanted to be blamed by either Korea, nor support 
one side at the expense of the other. Putting the utmost importance on being more 
influential both on South and North Korea and never being excluded from the major 
players on the Korean peninsula, China has taken its realistic policies. 138 Second, the 
most important reason why China has strived to promote peace and stability on the 
Korean peninsula was to aid China's "Four Modemizations" program which has 
become Beijing's topmost priority smce the 1980s. China wanted to use capital, 
machinery, technology, and expertise from South Korea. 139 
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Sino-Soviet normalization heightened the expectation of peace and stability on the 
Korean peninsula. As a result of the normalization, Beijing had less need to compete 
with Moscow over Pyongyang and the latter could no longer play one against the other. 
Regardless of North Korea, China could expand its economic ties with South Korea 
more actively. Therefore, Sino-Soviet normalization served as a catalyst for China's 
Two Koreas policy. 
South Korea's Northern Policy brought about drastic and significant results in 
Sino-South Korean relations. The Northern Policy was aimed at giving top priority to 
establishing diplomatic ties with China with a view to reducing tensions on the Korean 
peninsula. Chinese leaders also reacted positively and backed Seoul's Northern Policy. 
As a result of the Northern Policy, non-political interchanges between China and South 
Korea intensified to the degree that they played a large role in establishing diplomatic 
relations between the two countries in August 1992. 
South Korean-Soviet normalization stopped the longstanding ideological and 
geopolitical Sino-Soviet rivalry over North Korea. For China the decisive Soviet tilt 
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toward Seoul provided a convenient cover for its own shift to "Two Koreas" policy two 
years later. Consequently, South Korea-Soviet normalization helped foster a favorable 
atmosphere to lead to establishment of Seoul-Beijing diplomatic relations. 
Since early 1990, South Korea had placed diplomatic priority on its UN entry. 
China needed economic help not only from the Western world but also from South 
Korea to carry out its economic reforms. Especially, Beijing was not in a position to 
totally neglect the economic role of South Korea in North East Asia. In this respect, 
China played a very important role in pressuring North Korea to apply for UN 
membership together with South Korea. Beijing finally persuaded Kim Il Sung to shift 
to a "two countries, two systems" strategy and jump on the UN bandwagon supporting 
Seoul's UN membership bid. 
China adopted a "two countries, two systems" approach for Korea, while 
maintaining a "one country, two systems" approach for Taiwan. But this was a major 
contradiction in China's foreign policy. According to Samuel S. Kim's analysis, the 
reason for China's "two countries, two systems" approach to Korea was that China's 
Korean policy in the post-Mao era has constantly been adjusted to the Realpolitik logic 
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of the rapidly changing domestic, regional, and global situations. Namely, China's 
Korean policy has shifted from an ideological policy to a realistic and pragmatic policy. 
It evolved through several phases, shifting first from a One-Korea policy to a One-
Korea de jure/Two-Korea de facto policy, and then again to a Two-Korea de facto and 
de jure policy. China's Korean policy was guided by the realist strategy of maximizing 
its national interests defined in many different ways, while minimizing its costs and 
responsibilities as a great power. Beijing adopted a multi-tasking approach on the 
Korean peninsula of emphasizing different, but mutually complementary priorities in 
different issue areas. It was obvious that China took a "Two Koreas" policy when 
Beijing withdrew its former support to Pyongyang's "One Korea" stand by refusing to 
cast its solo veto against Seoul's accelerated entry to the UN in mid-1991. 140 North 
Korea's decision to enter the UN relieved China of its psychological burden to support 
North Korea's stand and to comply with South Korea's aggressive approach, coupled 
with the rapidly growing trade volume. It also further eased China of a burden in 
deciding whether to normalize ties with South Korea. 
Meanwhile, South Korea used the 1990 Beijing Asian Games as an opportunity to 
move toward normalizing ties with China. Seoul's financial and technical cooperation 
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for the Beijing Asian Games explained the rationale behind China's decision in late 
1990 to establish trade offices with South Korea. The establishment of trade offices was 
the most remarkable and dramatic breakthrough in Chinese relations with South Korea. 
After that, South Korea and China signed a trade agreement giving most-favored nation 
status to each other's exports and an investment guarantee pact granting each other 
MFN status on investment and business activities. Such institutional guarantees sharply 
facilitated bilateral commercial exchanges and boosted South Korean investment in 
China. Clearly, the trade offices served as a booster for the eventual Sino-South Korean 
normalization. 
The Tiananmen Incident m 1989 put China in a difficult position m its 
international economic relations as well as international political relations. After the 
Tiananmen Incident, Deng noticed active resistance from conservative leaders and felt 
seriously threatened politically. Therefore, Deng attempted to eliminate the major 
barrier of his reform policies and tried his best to gain ascendancy in the CCP so that the 
CCP would formally approve and legitimate his reform and open door policies, most of 
which had been slowed since the Tiananmen Incident. The renewed economic reform 
and opening directed by Deng in January 1992 prompted Beijing to further upgrade its 
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relations with Seoul to an eventual normalization. 
The most decisive factor in establishing full diplomatic ties with South Korea was 
Deng Xiaoping's recognition of the value of the "South Korean connection" for 
stepping up China's "Four Modernizations" program. Deng saw South Korea's 
developmental strategy as a practical model for his own dualistic idea of reform and 
opening policy. Finally, despite many conservative leaders' opposition, Deng supported 
full diplomatic relations with South Korea in August 1992. Therefore, I argue that 
China's economic diplomacy toward South Korea was the most important factor and 
Sino-Soviet Normalization, South Korea's Northern Policy, and South Korean-Soviet 
Normalization were a contributing factor that made China change to a "Two Koreas" 
policy. 
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Chapter 5: Sino-South Korean Normalization on August 24, 1992 
Traditionally, political, military, and ideological concerns had been the most 
important factors in determining China's policy toward the Korean peninsula. China 
saw its relation to Korea as close as lips and teeth. As we saw in previous chapters, 
China has always attached special importance to the Korean peninsula. China regarded 
solidarity with North Korea as essential, not only because it directly served China's 
security interests and ideological considerations, but also because it gave Beijing greater 
geopolitical leverage in dealing with other major powers and with South Korea. But 
since 1978, while pursuing economic reform and open door policy to the outside world, 
China began to readjust its external relations by asserting its peaceful and independent 
foreign policy. China's new policy toward the Korean peninsula was to promote peace 
and stability in the region to aid China's Four Modernizations program. Since then, this 
has become Beijing's topmost priority. 
To realize this, China has subtly played a "double strategy": on the one hand, 
strengthening its strategic, military, and ideological ties with Pyongyang, and on the 
other hand, actively but cautiously facilitating its political and economic relations with 
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Seoul. China's economic development program and the removal of dangers to its 
strategic security contributed to China's decision to shift from "One Korea" policy to 
"Two Koreas" policy. Finally, on August 24, 1992, China and South Korea established 
full diplomatic relations, putting an end to almost four decades Cold War hostility, and 
restoring their formal ties for the first time in 82 years after the Chosun dynasty was 
deprived of its sovereignty due to the Japanese occupation. 
In this chapter, I will analyze the North Korea factor, official normalization talks 
between Seoul and Beijing, and Taiwan's response in the process of Sino-South Korean 
normalization. I will also examine the political and economic factors on China's 
historic decision to change to a "Two-Koreas" policy. Furthermore, to analyze China's 
"Two-Koreas Policy" on the Korean Peninsula, I will also examine Sino-North Korean 
relations after Sino-South Korean normalization and historic Sino-South Korean summit 
talks. 
North Korea Factor 
The possible establishment of diplomatic ties between China and South Korea 
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had been discussed for more than two years. In the spring of 1990 Chinese Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen had already declared in a foreign affairs report that the 
establishment of diplomatic ties between China and South Korea was scheduled to be 
completed after China established diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia. But this was not 
realized. A main reason for this was that China's plan was interfered with by its 
relations with North Korea which were usually described to be "as close as lips and 
teeth." 1 According to Parris H. Chang, at least some top Chinese officials were 
reluctant to recognize South Korea, due to the following considerations. China's 
reunification has been one of the topmost leadership priorities-they did not wish to 
initiate a "two Koreas" policy by recognizing South Korea officially, lest other nations 
would use it to justify a "two Chinas" policy by restoring diplomatic ties with Taiwan. 
When Grenada in July 1989, Liberia in October 1989, Belize in October 1989, Niger in 
June 1992, and other states established formal ties with Taiwan, Beijing terminated 
diplomatic relations with them immediately.2 Senior China's leaders attached great 
importance to North Korea. Some of them saw the normalization of Sino-South Korean 
relations as China's betrayal of North Korea. What worried the Chinese leadership 
most was that such a diplomatic move could deepen Pyongyang's sense of isolation and 
vulnerability and might contribute to the collapse of North Korea.3 
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In early March 1992, Kim Il Sung sent a special envoy to visit China. The 
special envoy held talks with General Secretary Jiang Zemin and State President Yang 
Shangkun. He handed to Jiang Zemin a personal letter that Kim Il Sung wrote to Deng 
Xiaoping. As revealed by an authoritative source,4 the main purpose of Kim's letter 
was to request that China put off its schedule for establishment of diplomatic relations 
with South Korea till the signing of a non-aggression treaty between South and North 
Korea, the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, and the establishment of 
diplomatic ties between North Korea and Japan; use its influence for the establishment 
of diplomatic relations between North Korea and Japan; provide more economic and 
military aid, including supply of advanced naval vessels and anti-aircraft weapons 
systems; and consider signing a Sino-North Korea friendship, mutual aid, defense, and 
security treaty to counterbalance the US-Japan Security Treaty and the US-South Korea 
Treaty on Defense Cooperation. 
But China declined alliance with North Korea. It was disclosed that the North 
Korean special envoy only managed to obtain some commitments from China. Jiang 
Zemin declined North Korea's request for supply of China's most sophisticated naval 
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vessels and anti-aircraft weapon systems. Jiang Zemin asked the special envoy to pass 
on a message to Kim 11 Sung: "Preparations for establishment of diplomatic ties 
between China and South Korea have been completed, and the CCP central authorities 
and the State Council have already made a decision." Chinese President Yang 
Shangkun also clearly said to the special envoy, "the normalization of diplomatic ties 
between China and South Korea can not be postponed any longer, China will not export 
any offensive weapons, and will not sign any treaties of military nature with any 
countries or blocs. "5 
Official Normalization Talks 
As the volume of economic cooperation increased rapidly, and as their 
diplomats had to have face-to-face encounters at multilateral conferences, Beijing and 
Seoul came to appreciate the need for direct official negotiation. Beijing's Vice Foreign 
Minister Liu Huaqiu had official contacts with Seoul's Foreign Minister Lee Sang-ok 
when the 4 ih session of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP) was convened in Seoul in April 1991. Meanwhile, South Korea 
successfully mediated the resolution of the membership issue for China, Hong Kong 
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and Taiwan for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministerial meeting. 
On August 28, 1991, the admission of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan into the economic 
consultative body was decided at a senior officers' meeting in South Korea as a result of 
an intermediary role of the host South Korea. Beijing needed Seoul's assistance in 
becoming a member of these forums for Pacific cooperation. It was remarkable for 
Seoul to mediate the membership issue for Beijing and Taipei at APEC. Through these 
diplomatic contacts, both sides were able to have better understanding about each 
other's political positions and economic necessities for official negotiation.6 
Official normalization talks between Beijing and Seoul began on October 2, 
1991 when then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met his South Korean 
counterpart Lee Sang-Ock in New York at the UN General Assembly meeting. The 
second round of ministerial talks was held in November 1991 when Qian Qichen was in 
Seoul for the foreign ministers meeting of APEC. The South Korean and Chinese 
foreign ministers, saymg Seoul-Beijing relations were developing "realistically and 
diligently," agreed to further expand bilateral contacts. Apparently, conversations 
between the South Korean government and Qian offered a timely channel for 
formalizing the growing Seoul-Beijing ties. 7 During his stay in Seoul, Qian described 
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his view on the prospects of Sino-South Korean normalization as shuidao qucheng 
(When water flows, a waterway will appear). 8 
The third round occurred in Beijing in April 1992, when Lee was present for 
the convening of the UN General Assembly's Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). Lee, in the first visit by a South Korean foreign minister 
to China, met Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, Chinese foreign minister Qian, and CCP 
General Secretary Jiang Zemin. On those occasions, Lee conveyed President Roh's 
message for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries as early 
as possible. Qian's reply was encouraging. Qian made it clear that China was ready to 
enter into negotiations with South Korea toward that end. They agreed that "South 
Korea-China diplomatic normalization was necessary for peace and security in the Asia-
Pacific region." Upon his return home, Lee, with President Roh's strong backup, 
hurriedly organized a secret task force within the Foreign Ministry to carry out 
successfully the "Tonghae Jakjon (East Sea Operation)," a code name for the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with China.9 
Taiwan's Response 
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At that time, Lee secretly met Taiwanese ambassador to Seoul, King Charles 
Shu-Chi and told him that "South Korea and China agreed to cooperate for the 
normalization of relations between the two countries." Taiwan became extremely 
embarrassed. Taiwan had told South Korea that Taiwan would fully understand South 
Korea's desire for diplomatic ties with China, but had suggested that South Korea find a 
solution or "special formula" to maintain its official relations with Taiwan. Under such 
assumptions, Taiwan had proposed to South Korea that Taiwan give the top priority to 
South Korean companies in the state-run major construction projects covering five years 
between 1992 and 1996 and more benefit and favor to South Korea in their mutual 
trade. In addition, Taiwan had even implied that she would open official relations and 
expand trade with North Korea, if South Korea sacrificed Taiwan in favor of China. In 
desperation, the Taiwanese president sent his special envoy, Jiang, to Seoul. On May 6, 
1992, Jiang met Roh. Roh clearly indicated that South Korean-Chinese normalization 
would be inevitable for the peace and security of Northeast Asia and for Korean 
reunification. In fact, it was impossible from the beginning for South Korea to find a 
"special formula" for Taiwan, because South Korea was fully aware of China's "One 
China policy." Whenever China has established diplomatic relations with other 
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countries, China has emphatically illustrated that the PRC is the sole legitimate 
government and that Taiwan is inevitably a part of China. The United States and Japan 
could not make any exception. They could maintain only civilian-level relations with 
Taiwan. South Korea also followed the precedents set by the United States and Japan. 
Lee officially informed King that Lee would leave Seoul on August 21 to Beijing and 
on August 24 the joint communique would be announced. 10 
Sino-South Korean Normalization 
In the final stages of the negotiations between Beijing and Seoul, events 
developed rapidly. The negotiation proceeded with utmost secrecy at Beijing's behest, 
and even many South Korean officials in the Foreign Ministry and other government 
agencies were kept in the dark. 11 According to James T. Myers' analysis, Deng 
Xiaoping himself blessed the development and issued instructions that it should be 
done. Negotiating directly with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian who apparently had 
been given full power by Deng, Roh Jae-Won, head of KOTRA in Beijing, reported that 
answers from the Chinese side would come back almost hourly and that the entire 
matter was concluded in about two months. At the end of the negotiations, China asked 
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for a month's delay before announcing the normalization so that Qian could brief the 
Chinese leaders who had been kept in the dark about the secret negotiations he had been 
authorized to conduct. 12 
As for China, North Korea was a major hurdle to be overcome. During the 
whole process, China kept North Korea informed and persuaded North Korea that the 
Sino-South Korean normalization of diplomatic relations would help North Korea 
establish her relations with the United States and Japan. China was reported to have 
promised North Korea that China would press the United States and Japan more 
energetically to step up their normalization negotiations with North Korea and to follow 
the Chinese model. China was careful enough to arrange for both South Korean 
President Roh and North Korean President Kim Il Sung and his heir apparent, Kim 
Jong-11, to visit China after the announcement of the final agreement. 13 
Finally, on August 24, 1992, Foreign Ministers Lee Sang Ok and his Chinese 
counterpart Qian Qichen signed the joint communique on the historic establishment of 
full diplomatic ties between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the People's Republic of 
China (PRC). The joint communique was as follows: 
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1. The government of the ROK and the government of the PRC have decided, in 
conformity with the interests and desire of the two peoples, to recognize each other and 
to establish diplomatic relations as of August 24, 1992. 
2. The governments of the ROK and the PRC agree to develop the enduring relations of 
good neighborhood, friendship, and cooperation on the basis of the principles set forth 
in the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 
3. The government of the ROK recognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legal 
government of China, and acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one 
China and Taiwan is part of China. 
4. The government of the ROK and the PRC firmly believe that the establishment of 
the diplomatic relations between the two countries will contribute to the improvement 
of situation and stability on the Korean Peninsula and thus to the peace and stability in 
Asia. 
5. The government ofthe PRC, respecting the aspiration of the entire Korean people for 
an early reunification of the Korean Peninsula, supports that the Korean Peninsula shall 
be peacefully reunified by the Korean people. 
6. The government ofthe ROK and the PRC agree, in accordance with the 1961 Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to provide each other necessary assistance in the 
establishment and functioning of embassies in their respective capitals and to exchange 
ambassadors at the earliest possible date. 14 
The Sino-South Korean normalization of diplomatic relations was a symbolic 
event that demonstrated the reformers' victory against the conservatives in foreign as 
well as domestic affairs. Also it was concrete evidence that Deng Xiaoping and the 
supporters of reforms and openness were in firm control of the country. The move also 
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indicated the reformers' confidence that they could head off resistance from 
conservatives. Meanwhile, China gained more than it had hoped for from its 
recognition of South Korea in that the latter upheld the five principles of peaceful 
coexistence and cut its diplomatic ties to Taiwan, recognizing China's reunification 
formula, "one country, two systems." This enhanced China's prestige and influence on 
the emergent international order in East Asia. In addition to the other economic benefits 
that flowed from the diplomatic recognition, China took over control of the Chinese 
embassy compound in Seoul, the value of which was estimated at a little over $2 billion. 
Taiwan was a short-term loser in this process. At first, Taiwan's response was 
extremely negative. Taiwan elected to sever all diplomatic, trade, and transport ties 
with South Korea in response to the latter's switch of Chinese diplomatic partners, even 
though trade, tourism, and diplomatic contacts were important to both sides. Before the 
cutoff, trade totaled $3 billion per year, while afterwards trade declined by about $700 
million annually. 15 But in July 1993 South Korea and Taiwan agreed to establish 
informal ties and exchange a liaison office at the civilian level, similar to those in place 
between Taiwan and most other political entities, with diplomatic embassies replaced 
with unofficial but quasi-diplomatic missions. Thereupon, airline and shipping links 
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were restored, tourism recovered, and cultural exchanges were renewed. With the loss 
of South Korean diplomatic ties, Taiwan was totally isolated in Asia in the formal sense. 
But in real terms, nothing had changed, except that Chinese and South Korean 
diplomats could see each other openly and Taiwan and South Korean diplomats had to 
take care as to what formal names each used for the other. 16 The main reasons why 
South Korea forsook Taiwan were that South Korea would benefit from trade with 
China and that South Korea could better manage North Korea through ties with China. 
Factors on China's Historic Decision 
Beijing through its Korean decision demonstrated its remarkable capacity for 
constantly redefining the international situation and adjusting to changing political 
winds in the pursuit of state interests. 17 Beijing's August 1992 Korea decision made by 
Deng Xiaoping himself underscored the role of political economics in Chinese foreign 
policy thinking and behavior manifest in Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's secret report 
to the CCP's Central Committee Foreign Affairs Group (with Li Peng as group leader). 
In the article of "Inside Story on China's Abandonment of North Korea," Tangtai 
(Contemporary) in Hong Kong claimed to have disclosed Qian Qichen's secret report. 
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Qian made the "four birds" comment when delivering a report to the CCP's Central 
Committee Foreign Affairs Group recommending normalizing relations with South 
Korea. In this report Qian argued that Sino-South Korean diplomatic relations would 
have the multiple benefits of "killing four birds with one stone (or attaining four 
advantages at one move)," as it would (1) further isolate Taiwan in foreign affairs, (2) 
strengthen Beijing's growing economic exchanges with South Korea, (3) weaken some 
of the American pressure on China through South Korea, namely, enhance Beijing's 
bargaining power to defuse the mounting "Super 301" pressure from the United States 
on unfair trade practices, and (4) put an end to North Korea's endless requests for more 
economic, military, and political aid and support. 18 
Tangtai said that what most upset the CCP in these four points was the relations 
with North Korea. Beijing was tired of Pyongyang's unending requests. China wished 
to rid itself of this burden. This, in part, contributed to China's decision to put aside 
more than four decades of cold war animosity and establish relations with Seoul. In 
fact, due to the international political situation, China could not immediately cut off 
North Korea. China granted free assistance to North Korea in a disguised form. 
Confronted with this situation, China had no choice but to carefully seek 
239 
countermeasures. On the one hand, China carefully developed its relations with South 
Korea, and some activities were even carried out in secret. On the other hand, China 
tried by every possible means to get rid of North Korea's endless requests, using the 
method of"pushing away while coaxing."19 
In addition to the previously-mentioned many important factors, there were 
other reasons China actively pursued relations with South Korea. China's decision to 
establish formal ties with South Korea stemmed from its realistic appreciation of the 
rapidly changing situation in Northeast Asia as well as the globe. North Korea's nuclear 
ambitions figured in China's decision to hasten establishment of ties with South Korea. 
China had long advocated that the United States and Japan should set up diplomatic 
relations with North Korea in return for its diplomatic recognition of South Korea. 
China made the same demand during the working-level negotiations with Seoul 
officials. But they deserted the policy of "cross recognition" after the North Korean 
nuclear issue came under the international spotlight. Facing the tough stance of the 
United States that it would not improve relations with North Korea without settlement 
of the nuclear issue, China eased its stand.20 
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China wanted to take the initiative in reformulating a new order in East Asia 
after the demise of the former Soviet Union and the breakup of the Cold War structure 
in the world. They also wanted to balance the expanding power of Japan in the region. 
Very well aware of Japan's ambition to play an important role in setting up a new world 
order and creating an "Asia-Pacific 21st century," China felt it necessary to take 
measures to check Japan so that it could not take hegemony in Asia and the Pacific. 
South Korea, which then grew as the world's 1 ih largest trading country, provided as a 
good partner in the scheme. Such Chinese efforts required the normalization of 
diplomatic relations with South Korea, another victim of Japanese colonial rule. Finally 
China gained a reliable partner to counterbalance Japan's increasing international and 
regional roles in political and economic as well as military areas.21 
Beijing also wanted to improve its international image by establishing ties with 
South Korea. China's international prestige still remained damaged after its suppressive 
crackdown of democracy protesters in Tiananrnen Square in 1989. The Tiananmen 
Square massacre worsened the relations between China and the United States, pressured 
by Congress to take retaliatory measures against Beijing. China feared that the victory 
of Democratic Party candidate Bill Clinton, who raised questions about human rights in 
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China, m the 1992 presidential election, would bring about tremendous diplomatic 
burdens for China. Even if incumbent President George Bush were reelected, Beijing 
would have to pay prices for returning bilateral ties to normal as before the Tiananmen 
incident. Therefore, Beijing felt the need to hasten diplomatic ties with Seoul to 
Improve the relations between China and the United States. China's diplomatic 
normalization with South Korea fulfilled the American expectation that China play a 
constructive role in the region.22 
As mentioned in Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's secret report, China 
wanted to isolate Taiwan by normalizing ties with its ally South Korea. The Chinese 
leadership had been annoyed by Taiwan's "dollar diplomacy" which, in its view, relied 
on a strategy to buy formal recognition from other nations in order to bolster Taiwan's 
legitimacy. 23 In fact, Taiwan's economic diplomacy since 1989 had gained a 
considerable success in ousting Beijing's influence from at least seven countries which 
restored diplomatic relations with Taiwan.24 One example was the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between Niger and Taiwan in June 1992. This African state had 
maintained diplomatic relations with the PRC for years, but as a result of Taiwan's 
checkbook diplomacy, agreed to also recognize Taiwan. Beijing demurred and 
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promised to offer economic aid to keep Niger from setting up diplomatic ties with 
Taiwan. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen even visited Niger to dissuade Niger 
from setting up ties with Taiwan. Apparently Taiwan outbid Beijing, and induced Niger 
to hold firm on its commitment with an initial grant of U.S. $50 million. Unable to 
keep Niger m line, China cut off ties with Niger to forestall the creation of "two 
Chinas." The setback was an embarrassment to Premier Li Peng, who had played an 
active role in China's foreign affairs, and he decided to retaliate and teach Taiwan a 
lesson for bragging the success of its "flexible diplomacy." One option available to 
China was to accept Seoul's offer of establishing full diplomatic ties and demand Seoul 
sever ties with Taiwan. 25 China's decision led to the termination of official ties 
between Taiwan and South Korea, further isolating Taiwan politically at a time when 
Taiwan was successfully utilizing its economic strength to expand economic and 
political ties with other nations. 
The conditions China had laid down in order to maintain peace and stability on 
the Korean peninsula were basically met. For example, following their simultaneous 
participation in the United Nations, in December 1991 both South and North Korea 
signed the protocol on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and 
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Cooperation and the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula. "26 
According to Samuel S. Kim, Sino-South Korean economic relations were part 
of its new strategy of diversification designed to overcome China's over-dependence on 
the American market, which represented over 30% of China's exports. This over-
dependence was regarded as having given the United States an undue leverage in Sino-
American relations, as shown in the annual most-favored-nation struggle between 
Beijing and Washington. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian's secret report specifically 
mentioned the new strategy of diversification as one of the factors in the Chinese 
d . . . S hK 27 ectswn to recogmze out orea. 
China weighed against the possible cost of a deterioration of its relationship 
with Pyongyang. But the risk was acceptable to China, because even if the decision 
displeased Pyongyang, not many options remained open for North Korea. Chinese 
leaders' sympathy for North Korea was diminishing rapidly as the old revolutionary 
leaders who had emotional ties with North Korean communists gave way to a younger 
generation of Chinese leaders who did not experience the Korea War and therefore 
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resented Pyongyang's unending requests for material, military, and political aid and 
support. Furthermore, Beijing concluded that by establishing diplomatic relations with 
Seoul, it could exert more leverage over North Korea, compelling it to be more flexible 
in its dealings with Washington and Seoul.28 
Sino-North Korean Relations After Sino-South Korean Normalization 
Beijing's "Two-Korea Policy" deprived North Korea of its long-time privilege 
of enjoying one-sided support from Beijing. In fact, North Korea, after the political and 
economic brush-off by Moscow, was totally dependent on Beijing for economic and 
political survival. The traditional relationship of "Teeth and Lips" between China and 
North Korea became sour due to the Sino-South Korean normalization despite the North 
Korean resistance and hard-line Chinese conservative leaders' opposition. Pyongyang 
announced the end of cultural exchanges with China. 29 Although there was no open 
outburst from North Korea, North Korea restricted travel across its border with China 
for several months in silent protest.30 The situation was exacerbated on December 29, 
1992 when China tightened the economic pressure on North Korea by announcing that 
all trade beginning in 1993 must be paid for in cash rather than through barter. North 
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Korea, which was already suffering from a severe economic crisis, depended on China 
for crude oil and other supplies. It had no hard currency to pay its bills and was already 
in arrears on its $4 billion foreign debt. North Korea had recorded minus economic 
growth for three consecutive years. 31 But North Korea did not publicly express as 
much displeasure toward China as they had toward the Soviet Union, mainly because it 
could not afford to alienate or antagonize China, who was its irreplaceable patron and 
guardian following the demise of the Soviet Union.32 
After the end of the Cold War, Beijing attached a great deal of importance to 
articulating a more balanced Korea policy. For China, the Korean peninsula was rapidly 
becoming one of the most vital links in its independent foreign policy. Although 
economic imperatives encouraged China to implement its two-Korea policy, security 
concerns still required China to maintain a close relationship with its traditional North 
Korean ally. It was in China's interest to continue a policy of helping North Korea 
maintain its domestic political and economic stability-if the Korea peninsula were 
plunged into a military conflict once again, China would be the biggest loser.33 For this 
and many other reasons, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin said, "After 
the establishment of full diplomatic ties with the ROK, China will continue to maintain 
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friendly relations with North Korea on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, and the Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 
signed by China and North Korea in 1961 and all other pacts between the two countries 
will not be affected by the setup of diplomatic ties with South Korea," during a press 
conference after the signing of the joint communique.34 It indicated that its door to 
North Korea remained open. China's new diplomatic relations with South Korea were 
achieved without burning Beijing's bridge to Pyongyang. China increased its power 
and influence more than did Russia, the United States, and Japan. With the decline of 
Russian influence in the Korean peninsula and the lack of diplomatic relations between 
North Korea and the United States and Japan, no major power had China's influence in 
North Korean affairs. 
Historic Sino-South Korean Summit Talks 
President Roh made an historic state visit to China on September 27-30, 1992, 
and held summit talks with the Chinese leadership, including President Yang Shangkun, 
Prime Minister Li Peng, and CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin. Roh asked Chinese 
leaders to use China's influence to get North Korea to accept mutual inspections of 
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nuclear facilities by South and North Korea,35 and called on the Chinese leaders to 
persuade North Korea toward "meaningful progress" m inter-Korean relations. 
However, the Chinese leadership assumed a lukewarm attitude. Beijing opposed 
application of open and outright pressure on North Korea, while voicing support for 
inter-Korean talks to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.36 Chinese leaders 
acted prudently and reserved a commitment to soliciting Pyongyang to accept the 
demand for inter-Korean nuclear inspections, in an apparent effort to avoid appearing as 
if it wished to intervene in the domestic affairs of North Korea.37 China tried not to 
hurt the feelings of North Korea, in an apparent move to use the "Pyongyang card" in 
dealing with South Korea.38 Such an attitude of Beijing demonstrated that China has 
played a "double strategy" between South and North Korea. 
On the economic front, on this occasion, the Chinese leaders repeatedly called 
for more South Korean investment in their country. To facilitate expanded economic 
ties, the two countries signed a series of economic accords, including a broad-based 
general trade agreement, an investment protection agreement, a pact establishing the 
Joint Committee for Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation, and an agreement on 
scientific and technological cooperation. Additionally, the two countries agreed that 
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their respective governments would cooperate closely to encourage South Korean 
companies' participation in China's eighth five-year ( 1991-1995) economic 
development plan. To this end, they agreed that they would actively take steps to 
conclude bilateral agreements on tax, arbitration, and other trade-related issues.39 
These measures increased the value of trade between the two countries after Si no-South 
Korean diplomatic ties. The volume of Sino-South Korean trade in 1992 at $8.22 
billion was over eight times that of Sino-African trade ($1 billion) and nearly three 
times that of Sino-Latin American trade ($3 billion). By the end of 1993, China became 
the third-biggest export market for South Korea, and South Korea China's sixth-biggest 
export market. 40 
Conclusion 
China's policy toward the Korean peninsula was to maintain a peaceful and stable 
security environment, secure its influence, and promote its economic interest. On the 
one hand, Beijing wanted to maintain political and military relations with Pyongyang 
and on the other hand, seek the expansion of economic relations with Seoul. In other 
words, China has played a "double strategy" on the Korean peninsula. Such an attitude 
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of Beijing derived from its need to achieve its economic _reform and open door policy to 
the outside world. This has led to a shift in Beijing's position toward Seoul from "One 
Korea" policy to "Two Koreas" policy, culminating m the historic diplomatic 
breakthrough between the two countries. 
Finally, on August 24, 1992, China and South Korea established full diplomatic 
ties, despite North Korea's strong interference and conservative China's leaders' 
opposition. However, although economic factor made China pursue its Two Koreas 
policy, security concerns still required China to maintain a close relationship with North 
Korea. Immediately after Sino-South Korean normalization, China declared that all 
pacts between China and North Korea would not be affected by the setup of diplomatic 
ties with South Korea. China's new diplomatic relations with South Korea was 
achieved without injuring China's diplomatic relations with North Korea. China tried 
not to hurt the feelings of North Korea, in a move to use the "Pyongyang card" in 
dealing with South Korea. Such an attitude of China proved that China has skillfully 
played a "double strategy" between South and North Korea, maintaining "Two Koreas" 
policy in order to maximize its national interest on the Korean peninsula. 
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China's August 1992 Korean decision demonstrated that China's Korean policy in 
the post-Mao era has constantly been adjusted to the practical politics logic of the 
rapidly changing domestic and global situations in the pursuit of state interests. That is 
why China adopted a "two countries, two systems" approach for Korea. Namely, 
China's Korean policy has changed from an ideological policy to a realistic and 
pragmatic policy. China's Korean policy was guided by the realist strategy of 
maximizing its national interest, while minimizing its costs and responsibilities. 
Beijing's August 1992 Korean decision underscored the role of political economy 
in Chinese foreign policy. In conclusion, China's economic reform and open door 
policy to the outside world have caused Chinese foreign policy toward the Korean 
peninsula to shift from national security concerns to economic prosperity, from 
ideological emphasis to pragmatic consideration, and from rigid . foreign policy to 
flexible multidirectional policy. 
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Chapter 6: North Korea's Nuclear Crisis and Four-Party Talks, 1993-1999 
In the 1990s, China pursued pragmatic diplomacy, eliminated the Cold War 
mind-set in diplomatic activities, and discarded socialist ideology in foreign policy. The 
Korean peninsula has always been one of the focuses of China's foreign policy because 
it has been politically, economically, and strategically critical to China in dealing with 
the Pacific powers including the US and Japan. China has a vital interest in stabilizing 
the political situation on the Korean peninsula in order to actively pursue its economic 
reform and open door policy. 
To pursue these aims, China has used a dualistic, but pragmatic policy on the 
Korean issues: it wants neither a unified Korea nor instability on the peninsula. It puts 
the utmost importance on being more influential both on South and North Korea and 
never being excluded from the major players on the Korean peninsula. To maximize its 
national interest, China has skillfully played a "double strategy," strengthening its 
traditional gee-strategic relations with North Korea, even as it has actively advanced 
new geo-political and. economic relations with South Korea. In other words, China's 
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"double strategy" toward the two Koreas means that, while maintaining a "Two Koreas" 
policy, China does not want to publicly support one Korea, at the expense of the other, 
as this risks offending one of them. 
To analyze China's "double strategy," on the Korean peninsula, in this Chapter I 
will address North Korea's Nuclear Crisis and Four-Party Peace Talks. 
China's role of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-1994 
North Korea joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 
1985, but delayed fulfilling its obligation under the treaty to conclude a nuclear-
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
According to the NPT, North Korea was required to conclude the agreement with the 
IAEA within eighteen months after it became a member. As the IAEA Board of 
Governors first raised this issue in February 1989, North Korea's blunt refusal to allow 
the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities led Western nations, especially the United 
States, to suspect that it had the intention and capability of developing nuclear weapons. 
North Korea asserted .that until all US nuclear weapons were withdrawn from South 
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Korea, it would not sign the safeguards agreement. 1 
With the end of the Cold War, President Bush announced in September 1991 that 
the United States would withdraw all its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. 
His initiative opened the way for both Koreas to sign the "December 1991 Agreement 
on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation Between the South 
and the North" and a joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. 
The joint declaration provided for the renunciation of the testing, production, possession, 
use of nuclear weapons, and for the forbiddance of nuclear reprocessing and uranium 
enrichment facilities, and for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the South-North 
reciprocal inspection of nuclear facilities. Pyongyang was no longer able to find any 
excuse to delay the acceptance of the IAEA inspection, as its stated conditions for 
allowing the international inspection were all satisfied. As a result, on January 30, 1992, 
North Korea signed the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and agreed to open its 
nuclear facilities for inspection. However, North Korea failed to implement the South-
North reciprocal inspections as obliged to under the joint declaration.2 
In particular, when the IAEA made an unprecedented request that North Korea 
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submit to a "special inspection" of two suspected undeclared nuclear waste sites at the 
Yongbyon nuclear complex, Pyongyang denounced this call for a special inspection as 
an espionage scheme on its military facilities and as such beyond the purview of 
international inspection. Moreover, the special inspection request triggered North 
Korea's public announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT on March 12, 1993. The 
withdrawal announcement caused panic in Seoul, Tokyo, Washington, as well as the UN 
since North Korea, once legally out of the NPT, would be legally free to proceed with 
its nuclear weapons program.3 
Clearly North Korea used the nuclear weapons option as the best means to 
ensure its domestic and national interest simultaneously especially since the end of the 
Cold War. Faced with international isolation after the Soviet Union and China 
normalized relations with South Korea, ahd faced with the severe economic disruption 
that resulted from this isolation and the failure of collective and autarkic management, 
North Korea found the nuclear card very useful in struggling for the survival of the 
regime and the state. 
China's attitude. toward nuclear non-proliferation has undergone changes from 
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actively supporting proliferation to opposing it. Under Mao Zedong, China was highly 
critical of superpower hegemonism. Accordingly, it supported nuclear proliferation 
among socialist states in order to win in the struggle against superpowers. Reversing 
this traditional position, in 1984 China stated at the United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament: "We do not advocate nor encourage nuclear proliferation, nor do we help 
other states to develop nuclear weapons.'A China's support for non-proliferation was 
clearly manifested in its full commitment to the Joint Declaration of the UN Security 
Council Summit Meeting on January 31, 1992, which stated: "the proliferation of all 
weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. 
Therefore, if the IAEA notifies any case of violations of the NPT and safeguards 
agreement, then the members of the Security Council will take appropriate measures to 
tackle those problems."5 
Furthermore, commenting on Chinese policy toward the Korean peninsula in a 
closed conference held by the Chinese Foreign Ministry in February 1993, Premier Li 
Peng said that: ( 1) China had no intention to maintain close military and security ties 
with Pyongyang; (2) China fully supported the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, 
and opposed the North Korean nuclear program and the deployment of foreign nuclear 
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arms in South Korea; (3) China would stop supplying advanced military equipment to 
Pyongyang. 6 
After the conflict between North Korea and the IAEA came to a head, the US 
considered compelling Pyongyang to disclose information on its nuclear facilities 
through UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions. According to the analysis by the 
fom1er American Secretary of State, James Baker, China's participation was essential. 
On the one hand, China had a veto in the UN Security CounciL A UN resolution with 
sanctions against North Korea, therefore, could not be adopted without China's consent. 
On the other hand, international economic sanctions only functioned insofar as China 
was involved and refrained from providing energy and food to North Korea. In Baker's 
opinion, therefore, Washington could not bypass Beijing with respect to North Korea: 
"Washington needs China on North Korea-and Beijing knows it."7 
Despite the February 1993 closed conference, China took a contradictory stance 
on North Korea's nuclear issue. China vigorously advocated a nuclear weapon-free 
zone on the Korean peninsula. But, when Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from 
the NPT, Beijing rejected Washington's initiative to bring up the Issue m the UN 
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Security Council and to Impose international economic sanctions. Chinese Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen said: 
International problems with Pyongyang should be settled by patient consultation. 
If the question is referred to the UN Security Council, it will only complicate the matter. 
We are opposed to the application of sanctions. The NPT treaty does not include rules 
for imposing international punitive action. There are no provisions that those who 
withdraw or those who stay away should be punished. 8 
There were vanous reasons why Beijing opposed any UN-imposed economic 
sanctions against North Korea: China traditionally detested international sanctions. 
China's memory of the UN collective security was very negative. From its viewpoint, 
China was among the first victims of collective security. The UN's involvement in the 
Korean War had a lasting negative impact on Chinese thinking and behavior on UN 
peacekeeping operations. Not surprisingly, collective-security measures taken by the 
UN, in Beijing's eyes, were usually synonymous with imperialist aggression and 
intervention. During the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, for instance, China abstained on 
Security Council Resolution 678 (on the use of all necessary means), as its own way of 
adhering to principles and upholding international justice. China could not support the 
use of force in the name of the UN, on the grounds that the United Nations, as an 
international organization for the maintenance of peace and security, was responsible 
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both to international security and to history. Qian explained in an interview for the 
home audience: "Being responsible to history means that the Chinese people still clearly 
remember that the Korean War was launched in the name of the United Nations."9 
The decisive factor, however, was that China was not willing to let its special 
status and influence in Korea be restricted by any binding universal crisis management. 
China was more interested in manipulating the situation to increase its influence over 
both North and South Korea than in resolving the nuclear issue. This only reflected 
China's traditional hegemonic attitude toward the Korean peninsula. A further 
important aspect was the tactical intention of the Chinese leadership to politically 
capitalize on its influence on Pyongyang and to force the US to accept political 
compromises contingent upon American concessions on the human rights issue and 
upon the unconditional extension of the most favored nation (MFN) arrangement so 
vital for China's exports to the United States. 10 
China politically feared a collapse of Pyongyang and thus the emergence of 
instability on the Korean peninsula. China was more committed to maintaining stability 
on the Korean peninsula than to the long-term objective of denuclearizing the Korean 
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peninsula. Beijing was detern1ined enough not to have another socialist regime 
collapsing on its vital northern strategic cordon nor a chaos or war with the ominous 
implications that would have for its domestic and regional stability (including a flood of 
refugees joining its already uncontrollable floating population within its porous borders). 
China argued that the international community should not push Pyongyang into a corner 
and leave it no choice but to resort to military adventurism. 11 
Chinese leaders felt that, beset by both internal and external troubles, Pyongyang 
could react unpredictably, irrationally, and recklessly, threatening peace and stability on 
the Korean peninsula. It meant that UN-imposed economic sanctions and increased 
pressure might lead to a serious military confrontation on the Korean peninsula again. 
On such an occasion as this, Beijing would be hard pressed to decide whether to openly 
support Pyongyang in accordance with their treaty of military alliance. If the United 
States adopted military sanctions against Pyongyang, such as bombing the nuclear 
facilities in North Korea, Beijing would also have difficulty deciding how to react. 12 
With veto power on the Security Council, Beijing would be in a dilemma if the 
Security Council were.to vote on the issue. Beijing wanted to ensure that North Korea 
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would be free from international pressure and sanctions, but at the same time it was 
unwilling to offend the United States and other Western countries. 13 
Beijing maintained that the North Korean nuclear crisis was actually caused by an 
attempt to alleviate a crisis in the power succession of North Korean leadership. In 
other words, Beijing believed that without foreign assistance, North Korea was 
incapable of producing nuclear weapons by itself. Kim 11 Sung once openly pledged to 
Beijing that Pyongyang had no intention and was incapable of developing nuclear 
weapons. Therefore, Beijing's stand was that if North Korea kept its promise, China 
was obligated to prevent Pyongyang from being sanctioned. 14 
Beijing believed that Western countries over-exaggerated the Issue of 
Pyongyang's refusal of the IAEA inspections. Beijing saw the assertion of the IAEA 
that Pyongyang was developing nuclear weapons in secret as an attempt to create a 
legitimate reason for toppling the Pyongyang regime. Moreover, Beijing regarded 
various kinds of sanctions imposed by Western countries on Third World nations as 
"hegemonic behavior." 15 
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According to the analysis of Hsin Pao, a pro-Beijing newspaper published in 
Hong Kong, what intensified Beijing's security concern and its opposition to any kind 
of sanctions against North Korea was the perception of US strategy on the Korean 
nuclear issue. Hsin Pao said, "The United States wants to use this chance to topple the 
DPRK, and this is a component of US strategy to carry out peaceful evolution in the 
socialist countries." 16 And "the United States will practice a strategy of destruction 
against North Korea-the last Stalinist regime in the world-with the aim of enabling 
South Korea to gobble up North Korea, like West Germany gobbling up East 
Germany."17 Such US strategy posed not only an ideological challenge but more 
significantly a strategic threat as "China regards the Korea region as an important buffer 
zone between China and the United States." 18 
The conservative and anti-Americart turn in China's domestic politics suggested 
another explanation for Beijing's opposition to US-sponsored international sanctions. 
In April 1993, Admiral Liu Huaqing, a standing committee member of the Politburo and 
the most influential military officer in the Chinese party-state, mobilized 50 top military 
officers to send an anti-US petition to General Secretary Jiang Zemin. It was reported 
that the petition said the military "strongly oppose bartering away [China's] principled 
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criteria for state-to-state relations in exchange for bilateral trade." 19 In early September 
1993, two top-secret documents, based on two policy analysis and recommendation 
reports prepared by the CCP Central Policy Research Center and CCP Central Military 
Commission Research Office, were relayed to Politburo members, Secretariat secretary, 
Central Military Commission members, and party committees of all armed services of 
the People's Liberation Army (PLA), military regions, provinces, cities and autonomous 
regiOns. It was reported that they stressed the importance of building a new type of 
relations with Russia as a new strategic move to prevent US hegemonism from 
subverting China and intervening in the internal affairs of Asian countries. 20 
China argued that sanctions would have no effect on Pyongyang: the North 
Korean self-reliant economy was not dependent upon foreign markets; North Korea had 
been under economic sanctions from the West since 1953, yet its economy had 
remained intact. China also maintained that sanctions against North Korea would have 
a negative effect on the open-minded among North Korean leaders. It would weaken 
their positions and the consequence would be contrary to the original objective of 
. d . fi d . 21 m ucmg re orm an opemng. Therefore China pointed out on numerous occasions 
that the four parties of the United States, the IAEA, DPRK, and ROK should iron out 
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their differences and resolve the problem through dialogue and talks within the tripartite 
framework. China maintained that neither threats nor pressure would work; they would 
only intensify the contradictions and play a destructive role. 22 
One thing remained clear and consistent in Chinese foreign policy over the 
years--China's strategic position and value could never be taken for granted by any 
external power, for it had the will and power to change its geopolitical course in phase 
with its changing definition ofthe domestic and international situation. 
As a semor American government official put it in late April 1993, "The 
consensus [within the Clinton Administration] is that China is the key to solving the 
North Korea crisis."23 The United States wanted China to play a mediative role and 
had carrots to offer China in reward for its role. When the annual MFN deadline 
approached in May 1993, the Clinton Administration announced that it would extend 
China's MFN status for another year without any conditions. Thus, the Clinton 
Administration decided to turn a blind eye to China's own violations of the 
nonproliferation norms, based on the assumption that the Korean crisis could only be 
defused with support from Beijing.24 
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Meanwhile, during Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's visit to Seoul in late 
May 1993, he pledged Beijing's full participation in efforts to reverse the North Korean 
decision before it took effect June 12, 1993. By announcing the Chinese position, Qian 
also clearly told North Koreans that China would not use its veto power to stop the UN 
Security Council from leveling sanctions against North Korea?5 
On May 11, 1993, the Security Council adopted a resolution by a vote of 13 to 
zero, with only China and Pakistan abstaining, merely calling upon North Korea to 
reconsider its announced withdrawal from the NPT. The issue was taken out of the 
Security Council and became a subject of US-North Korea bilateral negotiations in New 
York between 2 and 11 June 1993.26 Meanwhile, China, which suggested direct talks 
between Washington and Pyongyang over the nuclear matter, found an excuse, in 
Washington's proposal for bilateral talks, to leave the resolution passed by the council. 
China could say to North Koreans that it did not oppose the resolution because the 
United States had made it a precondition for any bilateral contacts with North Korea, for 
which Pyongyang had long sought. 27 
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After two rounds of bilateral negotiations, beginning on June 2, 1993, between . 
the United States and North Korea, North Korea agreed on June 11 to suspend its 
previous decision to withdraw from the NPT. The announcement was made during 
United States-North Korean negotiations at the United Nations in Geneva, reversing 
Pyongyang's March 12 decision just one day before the decision would have become 
effective on June 12. The appeals of the South Korean and United States governments 
to China, North Korea's only remaining major ally, for assistance in resolving the 
nuclear issue resulted in North Korea's suspension of its withdrawal from the NPT.28 
In July 1993, Pyongyang and Washington made an Interim Agreement that 
essentially reiterated the commitments made by the parties in 1992, when Pyongyang 
joined the IAEA. The Agreement was as follows: 1) assurances against the threat and 
use of force, including nuclear weapons; 2) impartial application of full-scope 
safeguards; 3) mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs; and, 4) support for the peaceful reunification of Korea. 29 
But these principles had little abiding power, and were empty rhetoric. As it 
turned out, the first principle never prevented North Korea from bluffing with the threat 
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of war, and the application of full-scope nuclear safeguards was obstructed repeatedly 
because Pyongyang insisted that it was not impartial. However, Pyongyang did achieve 
an important goal, i.e., to engage the United States directly. Through direct talks with 
the United States, Pyongyang attempted to improve relations with the United States so 
as to pull itself out of international isolation. Pyongyang's intention of maintaining 
direct dialogue with the United States was clearly shown after the July 1993 Geneva 
talks. Although Pyongyang had agreed in Geneva that it would resume negotiations 
with the IAEA regarding inspections of its nuclear facilities, the talks with the IAEA 
were soon deadlocked because Pyongyang again insisted that "the nuclear issue was not 
a matter between North Korea and IAEA but rather between North Korea and the 
United States. "30 
As the rift between the IAEA and North Korea deepened· in October 1993, 
Washington reacted to North Korea's cancellation of further continuity of safeguard 
inspections by canceling the third round of high-level talks. Pyongyang responded to 
the US action by breaking off working-level talks on the exchange of nuclear envoys 
with South Korea. When Washington once again threatened North Korea with 
economic sanctions unless it resolved the nuclear issue quickly, Pyongyang threatened 
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to touch off a conflict that would engulf the whole land of Korea, both the South and the 
North, m the horrors of war. Although such brinkmanship was not unusual for 
Pyongyang, it showed that Pyongyang held South Korea as hostage in the nuclear crisis. 
Thus, it was not surprising that Seoul's behavior became inconsistent: while it supported 
the effort to roll back Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, it was very reluctant to 
endorse, and even opposed to, any serious efforts to impose sanctions against North 
Korea.31 
Although the Clinton administration continued to consider the option of economic 
sanctions, it was not eager to push it before the Security Council because it lacked the 
support of South Korea, China, and Japan. South Korea and Japan both feared that Kim 
11 Sung might respond to sanctions with an invasion and even direct nuclear attack on 
their countries.32 Therefore, South Korea and Japan preferred the Chinese approach as 
less likely to provoke a violent North Korean reaction. 
Meanwhile, China remained North Korea's mainstay and its most important 
trading partner. China was also North Korea's protector of last resort from possible US 
sanctions. When UN .Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali visited Beijing in late 
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December 1993, Chinese Premier Li Peng made clear that on the contentious issue of 
the application of IAEA safeguards to North Korea's nuclear facilities "China favors a 
proper settlement of the issue through dialogues and consultations, instead of imposing 
pressure and sanctions. "33 
A number of considerations helped explain China's position. Although the 
usefulness of North Korea to China's national security had diminished with the end of 
the Cold War, Beijing's leaders still regarded North Korea as a bargaining tool in 
dealing with other major powers. As the last remaining ally and only major economic 
patron of a diplomatically isolated and economically crippled North Korea, Beijing was 
still the gateway to Pyongyang.34 China had its own reasons for seeing that Korea 
remained divided; certainly, a unified pro-US Korea on its border would be viewed as a 
major security concern. The existence of two Koreas provided greater opportunities for 
exercising influence. As North Korea's most reliable partner, China had no reason to 
fear a North Korean nuclear capability. A few nuclear bombs in Pyongyang's hands, 
while not desirable, were nonetheless not a threat to China.35 
Beijing played "double strategy" on the North Korean nuclear issue: on the one 
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hand, while agreeing with the principle of a denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, 
Beijing made it clear to Washington that "dialogue, not pressure and sanctions" was the 
only reasonable way to solve the nuclear crisis. In March 1994, Chinese Premier Li 
Peng called a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula a matter of greater interest to his country 
than to the United States in talks with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Li 
advised against any other method than diplomacy and patience in solving the North 
Korean nuclear problem.36 Beijing was able to move US policy closer to China's 
"dialogue, not pressure and sanctions" stance by threatening to use its UNSC veto 
power. Beijing also repeatedly reminded Washington that China was still North Korea's 
"large rear area" and that the traditional security alliance between Beijing and 
Pyongyang still stood. On the other hand, Beijing not only maintained its traditional 
geostrategic ties with North Korea, but also suggested to Pyongyang that it could use 
the nuclear issue to enhance its bargaining position in negotiating with the United States. 
Following the Chinese approach, North Korea drove a hard bargain with the United 
States for over a year.37 
From Pyongyang's vantage point, the nuclear weapons program constituted the 
most cost-effective nuclear deterrent and strategic equalizer in its competition with 
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South Korea. In the four-year period 1990-1993, for instance, South Korea's defense 
budget increased from US$1 0.62 billion for 1990 to US$12.06 billion for 1993, an 
13.6% increase, while North Korea's defense budget decreased from US$5.23 billion 
for 1990 to US$2.19 billion for 1993, a whopping 58.1% decline.38 The diminution of 
Russian support for North Korea and de facto removal of the Russian nuclear umbrella 
strengthened the determination of the North Korean leadership to go nuclear as a matter 
of necessity, not choice, for regime survivai.39 
From China's vantage point, North Korea recognized that it no longer had 
economic, political, and military backing from its Cold War allies. So North Korea 
needed a new strategy to ensure its survival in the face of the shifting military, economic, 
and diplomatic balance of power in favor of South Korea. The dangerous South-North 
imbalance of power had developed since the end of the Cold War as a result of North 
Korea's political and economic isolation, and the obstacles it faced in obtaining 
weapons; it was further aggravated by the failure of the United States and Japan to 
normalize relations with North Korea after China and Russia established diplomatic ties 
with South Korea, thus achieving cross recognition. This imbalance was a potential 
danger because North Korea viewed its nuclear weapons program as the only way to 
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overcome this situation. Pyongyang realized its nuclear weapons program provided a 
strong card to play against the US to achieve diplomatically its political, economic, and 
security objectives for the post-Cold War environment. The North Koreans wanted to 
squeeze as much as they could from the US because they knew the US was very 
frightened by their nuclear program.40 
In June 1994, Chief of the DPRK General Staff of the People's Am1ed Forces, 
Choe Gwang, visited Beijing. During his talks with senior Chinese leaders, including 
Jiang Zemin, Choe was reported to have accepted the Chinese suggestion to freeze 
North Korea's nuclear program. Choe, however, raised some concerns, including 
Pyongyang's great worries about the military imbalance on the Korean peninsula. Hong 
Kong Ching Pao reported that Jiang promised Choe that if North Korea were to be 
invaded, China would not sit back and watch. Namely, Beijing promised to come to the 
aid of the DPRK if the ROK and the United States waged military aggression against 
North Korea. Moreover, Chinese leaders also revealed to Choe that within an 
appropriate period of time, the PLA would carry out a military exercise to embody 
China's determination to keep its security commitment.41 China also promised to send 
a ground army of 85,000 troops to North Korea if war were to break out on the Korean 
276 
peninsula, and to provide credit assistance for such as food and energy if UN economic 
sanctions were effected. 42 
It was reported that on 23 August, 1994, Beijing conducted a large-scale military 
exercise on the Liaodong peninsula, a strategic point adjacent to the Korean peninsula 
across the sea, with the tactical objective of landing its armed forces on the Korean 
peninsula to aid the DPRK and fight against the United States and the ROK. The 
services of the Chinese Armed Forces jointly participated in the military exercise, which 
was conducted with the approval of the CCP Central Military Commission. The 
military exercise showed off its force of arms to the ROK and the United States while 
the situation on the Korean peninsula was strained and demonstrated China's firm 
resolve not to look on as a spectator in case the DPRK became an object of military 
aggression. Furthermore, the military exercise contributed positively to North Korea's 
political stability and to Kim Jong Il's smooth power succession after Kim 11 Sung's 
death on July 8, 1994.43 
However, China did not want to be seen as the only permanent member of the 
Security Council unwilling to punish North Korea for its intransigence on the nuclear 
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Issue. For the Chinese, the major foreign policy dilemma was finding a way "to keep 
the North Korean regime from going bottom up in a dangerous way, while preventing 
themselves from being isolated on this issue at the United Nations."44 
Meanwhile, China's rejection regarding Washington's initiative gave Beijing a 
favorable position in the fight against the linkage of MFN and human rights by the US. 
Washington was confronted with the choice between the ideals of human rights and 
security interests. Under the pressure of the worsening conflict between Pyongyang and 
the IAEA and in the hope of Chinese cooperation, the Clinton Administration dropped 
the linkage between the human rights issue and the MFN clause on May 26, 1994. 
Despite the economic accentuation in the justification for this move, Washington did not 
hide the fact that it expected a Chinese service in return on North Korea. Beijing 
stepped up pressure on North Korea after Washington indicated that the MFN would be 
extended unconditionally. A few days later, at the beginning of June 1994, China 
backed a UNSC Resolution urging North Korea to grant unimpeded access to IAEA 
representatives to inspect the Yongbyon nuclear reactor.45 It meant Chinese foreign 
policy toward the Korean peninsula was flexibly guided by a realistic and pragmatic 
considerations, not ideology. 
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On 13 June 1994, Pyongyang once again announced its withdrawal from IAEA 
and the announcement touched off a crisis on the Korean peninsula. But, unexpectedly, 
a "breakthrough" was achieved after former President Jimmy Carter made a historical 
visit to North Korea on a mediatory mission on 15 June 1994. Carter's visit eased the 
tense situation on the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang's sudden softening of its stand and 
Washington's willingness to make compromises were the main reasons for such a 
d . h 46 ramatlc c ange. 
However, China's exertion of influence on Pyongyang was a decisive factor. 
China played an important, behind-the-scenes role in persuading North Korea to freeze 
its nuclear program and informed the United States of its efforts. Just days before 
Carter visited Pyongyang, China's Foreign Ministry in Beijing called in North Korea's 
ambassador to warn that his government could not depend indefinitely on Chinese 
support m its confrontation with the United States over its nuclear program. The 
message China delivered was that it would be m Pyongyang's self-interest, for 
economic development and for its desire to reunify Korea, to cooperate more with 
international efforts to inspect its nuclear facilities. Beijing's efforts to influence North 
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Korea were timed in a way that was aimed at rewarding the Clinton administration for 
changes in its China policy. They came within weeks after President Clinton announced, 
May 29, that he would extend China's trading privileges in the United States without 
imposing any conditions for improvements in human rights. By directly informing the 
Clinton administration of its message to North Korea, China apparently sought to 
demonstrate to the White House the foreign policy benefits of avoiding further friction 
between Washington and Beijing. The impact of China's message to Pyongyang was 
great. Within a short time, Kim 11 Sung, during Carter's trip, offered to freeze the 
nuclear program and to let international inspectors remain in North Korea.47 
Not surprisingly, Pyongyang was imitating Beijing's own indeterminate nuclear 
shell game strategy, by holding the international community at bay, then allowing 
international inspections at the last possible moment but still not allowing full and 
unconditional on-site inspections. Apparently following Beijing's advice and 
negotiating style, Pyongyang somehow managed to obtain a package deal from the 
United States in the third round of US-North Korean talks in Geneva.48 
Beijing used its influence to persuade the United States to drop its original 
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sanctions concept and to concentrate on bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang. On 
August 13, 1994, North Korea and the United States issued a joint statement which 
ushered in the settlement of the nuclear dispute on October 21, 1994. The Geneva 
Framework Agreement generally reflected the wishes of North Korea. The United 
States agreed to immediately promise that the US would not use nuclear weapons 
against North Korea, to remove barriers to political and economic contacts between the 
US and North Korea, to organize an international consortium (called the Korean Energy 
Development Organization, KEDO) to finance and supply two light-water reactors in 
North Korea by the year 2003 at a cost of about $4 billion, to provide North Korea with 
500,000 metric tones of heavy oil to make up Pyongyang's energy shortfall in the 
interim, and to exchange liaison offices between Washington and Pyongyang. In return, 
North Korea agreed to remain a member of the NPT, to freeze activities at its existing 
reactors and at the reprocessing site, ncit to construct any new graphite reactors or 
reprocessing facilities, to place the 8,000 fuel rods in special cans for long-term storage, 
to resume high-level talks with South Korea, and to pern1it limited IAEA inspections of 
its nuclear facilities. 49 
The reasons why China was interested in defusing the nuclear issue in Korea were 
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that, once North Korea deployed its long-range missiles loaded with a nuclear warhead, 
it would fundamentally shake the stability in Northeast Asia. The United States might 
reinstate its nuclear weapons in Korea, or South Korea might attempt to replicate the 
North Korean arsenal. South Korea did endeavor to develop its own nuclear capacity in 
1974-75, a strategy which was checked by the United States intervention by offering the 
force modernization program at the cost of $5 billion. In this light, China did not want 
to see nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, no matter which side owned them. 50 
International attention was focused on Beijing's attitude. It needed to take some actions 
against Pyongyang's move in order not to hamper its economic cooperation with the 
United States, South Korea, and Japan. 51 
China viewed the Geneva US-North Korean Framework Agreement as a 
vindication of its insistence that the dispute could only be resolved through bilateral US-
DPRK negotiations. From Beijing's vantage point, the Geneva US-North Korean 
Framework Agreement created a window of opportunity for improving North Korea's 
economic conditions, for bolstering the legitimacy of the Kim Jong Il regime, and for 
enhancing the prospects for maintaining political stability. China strongly supported 
US-DPRK negotiations to resolve the nuclear weapons issue as an alternative to United 
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Nations sanctions or a possible confrontation. China praised the accord as enhancing 
stability and the prospects for a "soft landing" in North Korea. Beijing considered full 
implementation of the agreement to be essential to peace and stability on the Korean 
peninsula and thus to be critical to Chinese national security interests. 52 
In conclusion, Beijing emerged as a beneficiary from the nuclear dispute between 
the US and North Korea. With Washington's help, the nuclear risk at its own country's 
northeast gateway was reduced; and, thanks to the leverage which resulted from the 
special relationship to North Korea, the problem of the most-favored nation clause was 
resolved once and for all. Furthermore, China gained a diplomatic victory; the US was 
forced to abandon the concept of international sanctions against Pyongyang and to settle 
for the US-North Korean bilateral negotiations. 53 
Obviously, the October accord did satisfy Chinese objectives concerning peace 
and stability on the peninsula. It also helped preserve the NPT and the spread of nuclear 
weapons to the South, Japan, and Taiwan, and lessened the likelihood of Northern 
nuclear threat to China itself. China saw the agreement as another step in the direction 
of full cross-recognition (e.g., by the US and Japan of North Korea), a means to 
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encourage Pyongyang to open up and reform economically, improve South-North 
relations, and facilitate a general relaxation of tensions throughout Northeast Asia. 54 
China's Position on the Four-Party Peace Talks 
On April 16, 1996, South Korea and the United States jointly proposed the four-
party peace talks between representatives of the four countries, North Korea and China 
and themselves, to ease tension and promote peace on the Korean peninsula and to 
replace the 1953 Korean Military Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. This peace 
proposal was long overdue, given that for many years North Korea had been asking that 
the Annistice Agreement be replaced by a permanent peace system on the Korean 
peninsula. 55 
The position of South Korea and the US was that permanent peace should be 
achieved through direct inter-Korean negotiations and that the Armistice Agreement 
should remain valid until a new peace treaty is established. However, North Korea had 
smce 1994 launched a persistent and consistent campmgn to nullify the Korean 
Armistice Agreement. .On 28 April 1994, North Korea proposed bilateral talks with the 
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US for the purpose of establishing a new peace system on the Korean peninsula. But it 
was frustrated by the US refusal. Since then, Pyongyang instigated a series of events to 
press the US to accept its proposal.56 North Korea had violated the Armistice 
Agreement, first paralyzing the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) by withdrawing 
its delegation and forcing China to do the same, and then closing down the Neutral 
Nations Supervisory Commission by expelling its Polish members from North Korea on 
May 3, 1995.57 
Furthermore, the North Korean People's Army in Panmunjom, the only crossing 
point in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas, announced on April 
4, 1996, that it was giving up its responsibilities under the armistice accord to help 
maintain and administer the buffer zone. This caused increased tensions on the inter-
Korean border. On several occasions in the following days, North· Korea sent armed 
troops into the Panmunjom Joint Security Area inside the DMZ as a show of force. The 
North Korean Navy made similar incursions in the seas off the West Coast. These 
intentional violations of the Armistice Agreement were aimed at invalidating the 
Agreement and thus pressunng Washington to negotiate a peace treaty with 
·g 
Pyongyang.) Clearly North Korea's intention to scrap the Armistice Agreement was 
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related to its survival strategy. North Korea appeared to have concluded that a peace 
treaty with the US would guarantee security in North Korea. Thus, it insisted on 
concluding a DPRK-US peace treaty replacing the Korean Armistice Agreement.59 
On the other hand, South Korea long held the firm position that issues related to 
replacing the Armistice Agreement with a new peace treaty were matters purely 
between the two Koreas. 60 Thus, South Korea insisted on concluding a peace treaty 
between the two Koreas and insisted that any improvement of Washington-Pyongyang 
relations should be contingent upon fruitful inter-Korean dialogues.61 However, South 
Korea and the US could not be at ease with the fact that the Armistice Agreement had 
become technically obsolete. Therefore, South Korea and the US proposed the four-
way peace talks. The four-party talks proposal could be regarded as South Korea's 
counter diplomacy to deter North Korea's attempt to nullify the Armistice Agreement, 
and to prevent possible disagreements between Seoul and Washington over how to deal 
with North Korea's strategy.62 Namely, the four-party talks proposal involved South 
Korea's attempt to create a new diplomatic instrument to pre-empt the development of 
US-North Korean relations independent of inter-Korean relations. 63 
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From the American standpoint, although successful in halting North Korea's 
nuclear weapons program, the 1994 Framework Agreement neither reduced tensions nor 
advanced North-South reconciliation. The US needed the four-party talks aiming at the 
establishment of a permanent peace because the 1994 Framework Agreement was 
vulnerable to political pressures and regional tensions.64 Washington's policies were 
aimed at preventing Pyongyang from continuing its nuclear weapons program and 
export of missiles and chemical weapons and from continuing its violation of the 
Armistice Agreement, the sole peace regime on the Korean peninsula. Washington 
believed it could achieve this aim by employing an "engagement policy" designed to 
induce North Korea to open up its doors and become a rational member of the 
international community. Washington's proposal for the four-party talks was part of its 
strategy to realize this "engagement policy." Washington believed the four-party talks 
would compel North Korea to carry out its promise regarding the 1994 Geneva 
Framework Agreement, thus helping it make a "soft landing," and enabling the US to 
promote cooperation with China. 65 
China's initial response to the proposal was positive. A Chinese Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Shen Guofang said of the proposal, "Being a signatory to the Armistice 
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Agreement, China is willing to play its due constructive role."66 However, as time 
went on, Chinese attitudes to the proposal became lukewarm. The then Chinese Foreign 
minister Qian Qichen said, "China is not opposed to the US-ROK initiative but it must 
get the approval of the DPRK and that China will participate on condition that the two 
Koreas agree to a dialogue."67 Chinese President Jiang Zemin also reiterated China's 
position that "South and North Korea should first discuss peace on the Korean peninsula 
before other countries concerned take part to guarantee the peace process." Jiang's 
words were interpreted as an indirect expression of concern about North Korea's denial 
of its duties under the Korean Armistice Agreement.68 Namely, China wanted to let 
North and South Korea try to resolve their tensions on their own before either Beijing or 
the United States stepped in to help.69 
This tepid Chinese position on the proposal was due, in part, to the Taiwan issue. 
Beijing regarded the Taiwan problem as an internal issue and finnly refused any foreign 
involvement. China's participation in the four-party talks on the Korean peninsula was 
contradictory to this position. Beijing worried about legitimizing US involvement in the 
Taiwan issue in return for China's participation in the four-party talks. 70 That is, China 
was afraid that the four-party talks would establish a precedent for internal matters, like 
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China-Taiwan unification problem, to become subject to multilateral -intervention. That 
apprehension was one of the reasons why China was supporting, at least in rhetoric, 
inter-Korean dialogue. This position on the proposal placed China in a dilemma. On 
the one hand, Beijing wanted to keep its traditional influence over North Korea, and 
therefore felt obliged to support the North Korean strategy of improving its relationship 
with the US. On the other hand, however, China was realistic enough about the need to 
respect South Korea's emphasis on inter-Korean dialogue. Formally, therefore, China 
was close to South Korea's position. 71 
In fact, Beijing was unhappy, partly because it was not involved in the initial 
discussion between Seoul and Washington on the proposal. It was reported that China 
arranged secret bilateral talks between South and North Korea in Beijing after the US-
ROK proposal was put on the table. The purpose was to show the Americans that China 
had considerable clout to influence developments on the peninsula and must be more 
fully involved in working out a solution to the Korean problem.72 
Pyongyang was dissatisfied with the four-party talks proposal. North Korea's 
antipathy came from China's ambivalent attitude toward the Korean peninsula. China's 
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principle of direct talks between North and South Korea implied and acknowledged 
South Korea as a partner, which was completely opposite to North Korea's policy of 
excluding South Korea. China's statement on playing a constructive role in Korean 
peninsula was seen as a hindrance to direct talks between North Korea and the US. 
North Korea considered direct talks between North Korea and the US would be the only 
way to solve the Korean issue and nuclear issue.73 Also North Korea was opposed to 
Chinese participation in the talks because it feared that China, the US and South Korea 
would stand together to pressure North Korea. In short, North Korea hoped to exclude 
China because Beijing's objective of promoting direct North-South talks and achieving 
a consensus among all the parties ran counter to Pyongyang's goal of establishing a new 
security mechanism bilaterally with the United States. 74 
Joongang llbo reported on May 24, 1996 that China and North Korea were in 
acute confrontation with each other with regard to whether China would participate in 
the four-party talks, and that the confrontation was severe enough that North Korea had 
to apologize to China. China reportedly advised North Korea to positively review the 
four-party talks proposal. However, it was learned that China's leadership became 
extremely angry at learning that the North Korean side had denounced China, saying 
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"do not interfere in another person's affairs," and at receiving information that some 
high-ranking circles in Pyongyang had gone so far as to say that "The chinks [racial slur 
against Chinese] have colluded with South Korea for money."75 
Joongang llbo added that a decisive reason for China's anger was the fact that the 
official statement released on 7 May 1996 by the spokesman of the North Korean 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that "Though some countries have called for us to 
accept the four-way talks proposal, this will only make the situation more complicated." 
This statement was viewed as implicit criticism of China. China immediately expressed 
deep displeasure about this and sent a strong warning message, stressing that "If [North 
Korea] persistently attempts to exclude China, relations between the two countries will 
be seriously damaged."76 It was learned that when North Korea perceived China's 
anger, North Korea immediately expressed regret, saying "Our assertion was 
misquoted," thus apologizing in a roundabout way. On 22 May 1996, the North Korean 
Vice Premier Hong Song-nam openly expressed thanks to the Chinese Premier Li Peng 
for China's economic assistance to North Korea. This could be interpreted as a sort of 
apology.77 
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Meanwhile, despite North Korea's opposition to Chinese participation in the four-
party talks, China was concerned that the economic crisis in North Korea might, in the 
long term, destabilize the socio-political situation of North Korea. Thus, on 22 May 
1996, China and North Korea signed an Agreement on Economic and Technological 
Exchange and Cooperation. China secretly promised North Korea that it would provide 
500,000 tons of grain, 1,300,000 tons of petroleum and 2,500,000 tons of coal, half of 
them in grant aid and the other half at one-third of international price, in the next five 
years. China's economic assistance was an indication that China would make positive 
efforts to prevent the possibility of North Korea's abrupt collapse due to food shortages 
and an economic crisis. 78 
In the wake ofNorth Korea's opposition to Chinese participation in the four-party 
talks, in late August 1996, North Korea suddenly warned the US it was ready to break 
off its agreement to freeze its nuclear program and also not join peace talks if there was 
no support for the issues in Washington. 79 North Korea was suspicious of the true 
intent behind the four-party talks proposed by Seoul and Washington. Saying that 
China and North Korea had exchanged their views on the proposed four-party talks, 
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said, "North Korea is harboring suspicion 
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because of the complexity of the Korean question, distrust between South and North 
Korea and the complexity of the four-party talks itself. In this connection, South Korea 
and the United States should take more substantial steps to clear North Korea of the 
doubts. "80 
Traditionally China has held North Korea back from pursumg military 
adventurism, while continuing to oppose any ideas of provoking or containing North 
Korea. One of the examples was China's objection to the options of air strikes and 
sanctions against North Korea in 1994. Another good example was related to the 
submarine incident. On September 18, 1996, North Korea dispatched a submarine to 
land 26 armed agents in South Korea. South Korea accused North Korea of not only 
infringing upon its territorial waters but also violating the Armistice Agreement. South 
Korea pushed hard to seek China's support for its bid to pass a UNSC resolution or a 
council president's statement denouncing Pyongyang for its submarine incursion. 
China, which has veto power as a permanent council member, refused to render full 
support to Seoul in late September 1996 when Seoul put the submarine incursion issue 
before an unofficial meeting of the UNSC for a council president's press statement 
expressing concern over the incident and requesting Pyongyang's ambassador to appear 
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at a council meeting to explain about the incident.81 China took a cautious stance 
toward South Korea's plan to have the UNSC president issue a statement condemning 
North Korea for its submarine incursion. In the beginning, China's delegation did not 
consent in principle to a presidential statement or any other action by the UNSC. 
However, considering the concern of the sides concerned, China agreed not to block any 
such action, instead insisting that the document concerning the incident be balanced and 
mild. When China voted in favor of issuing the presidential statement on the incident, it 
exerted its influence so that the statement was worded with "the submarine incident" 
rather than "military incursion," which South Korea and the US (at least officially) had 
wanted to use. In view of the trend to defend peace and stability on the Korean 
peninsula, China felt the submarine incident should not aggravate the situation or exert 
an influence on the course of detente [four-party peace talks] on the peninsula.82 
China has adopted a multi-tasking Realpolitik strategy of seeking different but 
complementary interests-geostrategic, geoeconomic, and antihegemonic---on all three 
sides of the Beijing-Pyongyang-Seoul triangle. On the first and second sides of the 
triangle, Beijing continued to maintain its traditional geostrategic ties with North Korea 
even as it promoted new geoeconomic ties with South Korea. On the third side of the 
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triangle, the most turbulent and contentious domain in many respects, Beijing tried hard 
to keep out of harm's way by following an indeterminate policy, as evidenced by its 
shifting and ambiguous stand on the proposal for four-party peace talks. As a way of 
maximizing its influence over Korean affairs, China often was and became all things to 
all parties. Thus, many were anxious about its real intentions. China has never put 
itself in the front line of the Korean conflict as either a mediator or a peacemaker. 83 
Hwang Jang-yop affair caused an unprecedented trilateral tug-of-war. Hwang 
Jang-yop84 (the Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party) asked for political asylum in 
the South Korean embassy in Beijing on February 12, 1997. China was thus forced to 
take its first mediating role between South and North Korea. South Korea proposed that 
in return for China's help in taking Hwang to Seoul, it would actively cooperate in 
reunifying China and Taiwan and carry out economic cooperation with China. North 
Korea proposed that in return for China's repatriation of Hwang, it would Improve 
overall North Korea-China relations, which were somewhat strained.85 Hwang's 
defection put China in an uncomfortable position between an old ally and a new trading 
partner. Hwang's action in Beijing threatened to shake the foundation of China's 
carefully crafted policy of equi-distance on the Korean peninsula. But on February 18 
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there came the first hint that Pyongyang might accept Hwang's defection. 86 Through a 
series of negotiations, China persuaded North Korea to accept the defection. Beijing 
managed to escape from the predicament by killing two birds with one stone. On the 
one hand, espousing Seoul's position, China accepted international law principles of 
allowing Hwang to go to a country of his choice. Beijing decided to let Hwang go. On 
the other, Beijing managed to reduce Pyongyang's anger by deporting Hwang to a third 
country (the Philippines), thus showing compliance with its own domestic law of not 
granting political asylum. At the same time China blocked the United States from 
assuming any role in the resolution of this inter-Korean crisis in Beijing. Beijing 
extracted Seoul's promise not to take political advantage of the Hwarig Jang-yop 
affair. 87 
Chinese officials said that North Korea's deteriorating economtc situation 
compelled it to take a more flexible, pragmatic attitude to obtain food aid and carry out 
internal economic reform. This flexible diplomacy included North Korean leadership 
decisions to apologize to South Korea in late December 1996 for the submarine 
incident, to accept Hwang's defection to South Korea, and to accept the initial briefing 
on the proposed four-party talks in March 1997. If North Korea had taken a hard line 
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on the defection issue, it would have received nothing from China.88 
Beijing began to show interest in the four-party peace talks in the early part of 
1997 when Pyongyang accepted Washington's invitation to take part in a briefing on the 
four-party peace talks. On 1 July 1997, North Korea agreed to attend preliminary talks. 
Next day Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Tang Guoqiang said China also agreed 
to take part in the four-party talks and stood for building a peace mechanism for the 
Korean Peninsula. After protracted negotiations, preliminary four-party talks were 
convened in New York on August 5 and September 15, 1997 to decide on a date, 
participating levels, venue, and agenda for substantive negotiations. The issue of setting 
the agenda proved most difficult and the meeting adjourned without agreeing on it. 89 
During the preliminary four-party talks, China retained a neutral position 
regarding relations with both Koreas. China sided with South Korea and the United 
States in opposing North Korea's demand concerning a US-North Korea peace treaty 
and withdrawal of US troops in South Korea. But China sided with North Korea by 
supporting Pyongyang 's aspiration to improve relations with the United States instead 
of confidence-building and tension-easing measures.90 This meant that China on the 
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four-party peace talks used its "double strategy" proficiently. 
China played an important role in inducing North Korea to decide to take part in 
the first round of the 4-way talks in December 1997. For example, Chinese Deputy 
Foreign Minister Chen Jian, who headed the Chinese delegation to preparatory meetings 
for four-way talks, made a one-week visit to North Korea to persuade Pyongyang to 
participate in the four-party talks.91 Furthermore, during the Jiang Zemin-Bill Clinton 
summit in Washington in late October 1997, China and the United States agreed to press 
North Korea to participate in the four-party talks for the sake of establishing peace on 
the Korean peninsula.92 Public pressure by China urging North Korea to participate in 
the four-party talks was obviously a decisive factor that North Korea could not ignore. 
In the third preparatory meeting in New York on November 21, 1997, North and 
South Korea, China and the United States finally agreed to hold the first round of the 
four-party talks in Geneva, Switzerland in December 1997. The first round of the four-
party talks was convened on December 9-10, 1997, but failed to produce concrete 
results due to differences over agenda items. South Korea and the United States wanted 
to focus on a peace regime and confidence-building measures, whereas North Korea 
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wanted to include the US troop withdrawal issue and a North Korea-US peace treaty in 
the agenda. China called for the normalization of US-DPRK relations and easing the 
tense relations between the North and South sides on the Korean peninsula through 
dialogue. Tang Jiaxuan, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister and head of the Chinese 
delegation, summarized the Chinese position: 
China takes maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula as the fundamental 
principle in its handling of peninsula affairs. Over years, China has dedicated itself to 
maintaining peace and stability there, endorsing the improvement of relations between 
the North and South of Korea and supporting their independent and peaceful 
reunification. China believes that the ultimate solution of the Korean issue requires not 
only the reconciliation and mutual trust between the DPRK and South Korea, but also 
the improved DPRK-US relations.93 
The second round of the four-party talks was held in Geneva from March 16-21, 
1998, but the four parties had failed to reach any concrete agreement. Differences over 
the US troop withdrawal issue once again proved the main stumbling block. North 
Korea insisted on putting the US troop issue on the agenda, while the US and South 
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Korea refused to include it on the agenda. But the three parties agreed to China's 
impasse-breaking proposals that a sub-committee be established on a provisional basis 
to discuss legal matters, long-term arrangements and confidence-building measures.94 
The third round of the four-party talks was convened in Geneva from October 21-
24, 1998. During this round, the delegates from the four countries finally reached an 
agreement on setting up two working-level subcommittees for establishing a peace 
system and easing the tense situation on the peninsula.95 
The fourth round of the four-party talks was convened in Geneva from January 
18-22, 1999. The four parties officially launched the two subcommittees on the 
establishment of a peace regime and tension reduction on the Korean peninsula and 
agreed on the procedures of the operation of the subcommittees. China played its part 
in a positive, pragmatic, and constructive manner to usher in a dawn of lasting peace on 
the peninsula. Especially, China put forth five principles and four basic contents 
respectively on the specific issues to be discussed by the two subcommittees. The five 
principles the Chinese delegation put forward on tension reduction on the peninsula 
were: 1) exchange and mutual cooperation in the political, diplomatic, military, 
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economic and social fields should be developed, and confidence in an all-round way 
should be increased; 2) the further improvement of relations among relevant countries 
should be supported, and the gradual normalization of relations between the DPRK and 
the US as well as other countries would be welcome; 3) relevant parties should maintain 
multilateral and multi-fonned military cooperation and trust; 4) the parties should take 
effective and feasible measures to cope with the reality on the peninsula and prevent 
possible military conflict; 5) each party should not take any hostile and provocative 
military action against the other parties.96 
Moreover, on the issue of establishing a peace zone on the Korean peninsula, the 
Chinese side put forward suggestions on the content that should be included in the 
Korean Peninsula Peace Accord. They were: 1) the relevant parties should put an end 
to the confrontation, improve their relations, and coexist in peace so that independent 
and peaceful reunification could be finally achieved on the peninsula; 2) the parties 
should resolve all disputes through peaceful means instead of resorting to the use or 
threat of force; 3) the relevant parties should develop exchanges and cooperation in such 
fields as economy, trade, science and technology, culture, and sports on the basis of 
equality and mutual benefit; and 4) the relevant parties should establish confidence-
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building measures m the military field and carry out phased disarmament on the 
peninsula.97 These proposals and suggestions meant Beijing desired to establish a 
peace mechanism on the peninsula, ease tension, and achieve a lasting peace and 
stability at an early date. China believed that the establishment of a peace mechanism 
in the Korean peninsula through the four-party talks would serve to maintain peace and 
stability in the peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. 
The fifth round of the four-party talks was convened in Geneva from April 24-27, 
1999. But the four parties failed to set agenda items.98 The sixth round of the four-
party talks was convened in Geneva from August 5-9, 1999. But the delegations from 
the four nations failed to produce any tangible results. The countries even failed to set a 
tentative date for the next round oftalks because of North Korea's negative posture.99 
Meanwhile, China tried to settle differences over issues between South and North 
Korea. During the sixth round, head of the Chinese delegation, Qian Yongnian stressed: 
To alleviate tension, to reduce destabilizing factors on the peninsula, and to create 
necessary atmosphere for the four-party talks, four parties should perform more deeds 
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that are conducive to alleviating t~nsion on the peninsula, and refrain from doing things 
that may provoke others. Four parties should gradually eliminate Cold War shadows, 
and let detente truly be the main trend on the peninsula. 100 
China insisted that its foreign policies were based on the principle of no 
interference in internal affairs. Therefore its intentions toward the four-party peace 
talks were interpreted as being designed to use the talks as a means to awaken North 
Korea to the need to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula. 101 
Conclusion 
After Sino-South Korean normalization, Beijing attached a great deal of 
importance to articulating a more balanced Korea policy. For China, the Korean 
peninsula was rapidly becoming one of the most vital links in its independent foreign 
policy. Although economic factor made China pursue its Two Koreas policy, security 
concerns still required China to maintain a close relationship with its traditional North 
Korean ally. It was in China's interest to continue a policy of helping North Korea 
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maintain its domestic political and economic stability. 
During the period of 1993-2000, Chinese foreign policy toward the Korean 
peninsula 1s to balance strategic and military interest in the DPRK and economic 
interest in the ROK to maximize its national interest, using its "double strategy" deftly. 
Beijing used "this strategy" on North Korea's nuclear 1ssue, extracting maxtmum 
payoffs at mtmmum cost. On the one hand, China agreed with the principle of a 
denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, supporting South Korean and American 
position. On the other hand, China opposed the imposition of any international 
sanctions on North Korea and tried to persuade the two Koreas and the US to substitute 
dialogue for confrontation. China wanted to protect North Korea's military and 
diplomatic positions and ensure its survival because of its strategic importance. Finally, 
China's opposition to international sanctions on North Korea gave Beijing a favorable 
position in the fight against the linkage of MFN and human rights by the US. After 
Washington indicated that the MFN would be extended unconditionally, China played a 
decisive, behind-the-scenes role in persuading North Korea to freeze its nuclear 
program. It meant Chinese foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula was flexibly 
guided by realistic and pragmatic considerations, not ideology. 
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Despite North Korea's opposition to Chinese participation in the four-party talks, 
China has endeavored to play the part of "constructive broker" between the DPRK on 
one side and the ROK and US on the other, using its "double strategy" deftly, helping 
break the stalemate in negotiations, and keeping the process moving, although it 
retained a neutral position throughout both preliminary talks and full-scale talks: it was 
opposed to Pyongyang's demand that the question of US withdrawal from the Korean 
peninsula and a US-North Korea peace treaty must be adopted as an agenda item, 
though it supported North Korea's aspiration to normalize US-DPRK relations. On the 
other hand, China has striven to play a positive and pragmatic part in the "four-party 
talks" for the purpose of securing regional stability and projecting a new peace 
mechanism for the well-being of all involved because building a peace regime on the 
Korean peninsula through the "four-party talks" was a critical external condition for 
China's national security interest. In the future, China will act as a useful mediator and 
help set up a new peace mechanism in the "four-party talks" because it strongly needs a 
stable and peaceful environment on the Korean peninsula to continuously pursue 
economic reform and open door policy, which have been top priorities m Chinese 
foreign policy since 1978. 
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Chapter 7: China's New Leadership and North Kor_ea's Missile Program, 
1997-2000 
Since Sino-South Korean normalization, China's influence over North Korea's 
security and military affairs has been on the decline. However, China still remains the 
most influential country affecting North Korea politically and economically. China is 
balancing its relations with South and North Korea, usmg a "double strategy" 
proficiently to maximize its national interest on the Korea peninsula. In a sense, China 
is occupying a pivotal position in the three-way relationship among the three countries. 
After North Korea's nuclear crisis in 1993-1994, there were dramatic political 
changes in Sino-Korean relations: the great changes in leadership at the 151h Chinese 
Communist Party Congress in September 1997 after the death of Deng Xiaoping in 
February 1997; the upgrading of Sino-South Korean ties as a result of Sino-South 
Korean summit talks in November 1998; North Korea's missile program in August 
1998. 
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At the 15th Congress, Chinese President Jiang Zemin was reelected as the head of 
the Communist Party. The 15th Congress totally retired the first and second generations. 
The new leadership was composed of a third generation of technocrats. The new 
Chinese leadership has become free from Mao's legacy, therefore taking more flexible 
policies toward the Korean peninsula. The tendency toward multi-layered policy 
decision-making under China's new leadership; the increased importance of economic 
factors in the policy decision-making process; reduction of the military's intervention in 
the policy decision-making process prompted China to pursue more pragmatic and 
realistic policies toward South Korea. 
China's new leadership took a vague posture, playing a "double strategy" deftly, 
on North Korea's missile development program to maximize its national interest on the 
Korea peninsula. That is, the new Chinese leadership dissuaded North Korea from 
raising tension on the Korean peninsula while they opposed Theater Missile Defense 
(TMD) system and transferred missile components to North Korea. 
In this Chapter, to analyze the upgrading of Sino-South Korean ties, I will address 
the changes of China's Leadership in 1997. Also, to analyze how the new China's 
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leadership plays a "double strategy" on the Korean peninsula, I will address North 
Korea's Missile Program. 
China's New Leadership and Upgrading of Sino-South Korean Ties 
At the 15th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 1997, held every five years, 
China's communist elite strengthened President Jiang Zemin's power by endorsing his 
ambitious economic reforms and an anti-corruption drive and retiring key opponents. 
Jiang Zemin's re-election as Communist Party chief strengthened his position as 
successor of late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. 
During the 151h Congress, trying to claim Deng's mantle, Jiang proposed 
enshrining Deng's economic pragmatism as party doctrine.' Finally the Congress 
unanimously agreed to establish Deng Xiaoping Theory as the guiding ideology of the 
Party and to clearly write it down into the Party Constitution? The amendment 
signaled that the party regarded economic development, not political reform, as the 
central task. 
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The seven-member top policy body of the congress took on two new faces. 
Legislative Chief Qiao Shi's unexpected retirement from the party politburo's all-
powerful standing committee, the country's top policy body, removed a major stumbling 
block to Jiang's political ascension. The diarchy Jiang formed with Premier Li Peng 
filled the vacuum created by Deng's death, entrenching Jiang as leader of China's ruling 
hierarchy.3 Meanwhile, the major interest group to lose out in the shuffle was the 
military, which lost General Liu Huaqing through retirement.4 For the first time, the 
Politburo did not have any representative from the People's Liberation Army. 
In a shakeup on the seven-member top policy body, Executive Vice Premier Zhu 
Rongji, who was given large credit for bringing China's boom economy under control 
and modernizing its financial system, moved up from the number five spot to the 
number three spot in the leadership. Zhu's rise to the position vacated by outgoing Qiao 
Shi marked a surge in the acclaimed economic strategist's spectacular career. 
Meanwhile, aged only 55, with a rapid rise through the ranks under his belt, the baby of 
the politburo, Hu Jintao, rose from the last position in the body to number five. 5 
The newcomers, Wei Jianxing, and Vice Premier Li Lanqing replaced retiring Liu 
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Huaqing and Qiao Shi-long seen as rivals t9 Jiang. Li Lanqing cut his teeth on 
shaping China's foreign trade and investment policies in the 1980s. The two 
promotions came from different cliques within the leadership. While Li Lanqing was 
identified as a closely allied to Jiang, Wei Jianxing was long identified as a Qiao Shi 
protege and his elevation was described to be part of a deal under which Qiao Shi 
agreed to step down. The removal of Qiao Shi and Liu Huaqing left Jiang with no 
serious challengers for the first time. This allowed Jiang to maneuver more supporters 
into top posts, and established a more professional set of leaders to simultaneously 
manage his complex package of economic reforms and attacking corruption-two main 
themes ofhis opening address to the 15th party congress.6 
The 15th Congress completely retired the first and second generations of the 
"Revolutionary War" veterans. In other words, for the first time the new line-up 
consisted of a third generation of technocrats who had no military background. 7 Their 
expertise was vital for Jiang as he started his second full term as general secretary. 
According to a South Korean scholar, Doo Bok Park's analysis, the strengthening 
of China's new leadership created a domestic political atmosphere more conducive to 
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the promotion of bigger foreign policy. In particular, the military's infl1:1ence in foreign 
policy decision-making was greatly diminished as Jiang Zemin's regime gained control 
over the military since the 15th Congress. China's foreign policy became smoother with 
an extended range of options. As a result, China's new leadership took a more 
pragmatic and realistic posture for adjusting their policies toward the Korean peninsula. 
Specifically, the North Korean factor, which served as a major stumbling block to any 
adjustment of China's policy toward the Korean peninsula, was reduced, thus enabling 
China to more freely pursue a policy toward the Korean peninsula which better reflected 
its new emphasis on national interest. The following factors prompted China's 
government to pursue such policy toward the Korean peninsula, as a means of 
enhancing its national interest: the change in the policy decision-making process under 
the realignment of China's leadership; the collapse of the past unitary leadership with 
the absence of a strong charismatic leader; the relative increased importance of 
economic factors in the process of policy making; and reduction of the military 
intervention in policy decisions. 8 
Following the 15th Congress, China and South Korea actively sought to upgrade 
their bilateral ties. A good example was President Kim Dae-jung's visit to China on 
318 
November 11-15, 1998. During the summit meeting, China and South Korea agreed to 
upgrade their bilateral relations to a "cooperative partnership" for the 21st century, 
which was regarded as the third level of China's five-stage diplomatic ties with other 
countries. According to protocol, China's diplomatic ties with other countries are 
formed m five stages: opemng of diplomatic ties, friendly and goodwill relations, 
partnership relations, traditional friendly and cooperative relations, and blood ties.9 
China and North Korea used to be genuinely close: "like lips and teeth," in a favorite 
phrase. Another is "friendship sealed in blood." Saving Kim Il Sung's bacon during the 
Korean War cost China a million lives; the dead included Mao Anying, Chairman Mao's 
favorite son. 10 Since then, China had regarded Sino-North Korean relations as blood 
ties. Meanwhile, China "downgraded" its ties with North Korea to the fourth-stage 
"traditional friendly and cooperative ties" from the highest "blood relations" after Sino-
South Korean normalization in 1992. 11 · This move clearly showed that China 
emphasized pursuit of national interests over ideological alliance. 
However, China still maintained close military ties with North Korea and played a 
pivotal role in propping up North Korea. China did not want to hurt the sentiments of 
North Korea. Therefore, China said that its ties with North Korea were "unaffected" by 
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Kim Dae-jung's visit. 12 The high-level North Korean delegation's visit to China in 
June 1999 signified that China sought to play a "double strategy" by restoring its 
weakening relations with North Korea. 
Jiang and Kim Dae-Jung agreed on a 12-point joint statement, which detailed 34 
cooperation programs in economic, cultural, environmental, diplomatic and other fields. 
The joint statement was greatly meaningful as it encompassed political, diplomatic, and 
security sectors, areas that had been relatively apart in the past. China and South Korea 
declared three principles: peace and security on the Korean peninsula, peaceful 
reunification through dialogues between the two Koreas, and a nuclear-free Korean 
peninsula. The economic and trade cooperation between China and South Korea 
became a sector enabling both sides to take concrete steps to implement the 
"cooperative partnership." South Korea-China bilateral trade increased 20 percent each 
year and nearly quadrupled after 1992, reaching $23.7 billion as of the end of 1997. By 
the end of 1998, China and South Korea became the third-biggest trading partners with 
each other. 13 
In conclusion, the 151h Chinese Communist Party Congress was a major historical 
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turning point, as important as the 11th in 1978 when Deng launched his reforms. Jiang 
Zemin had pushed through a reformist blueprint for the nation, vanquished his 
opposition and elevated his allies. Above all, Jiang unequivocally established himself 
as China's supreme leader and heir to the late Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping 
Theory-his political philosophy and economic reform program-was enshrined in the 
party's constitution as its guiding ideology. 
At the 15th Congress, Jiang's re-election as Communist Party chief enabled China 
to more freely pursue a policy toward the Korean peninsula which better reflected its 
new emphasis on national interest. After the 15th Congress, finally China and South 
Korea agreed to elevate their bilateral relations to a "cooperative partnership" in 
November 1998. Hence, we can conclude that, at the 15th Congress, the strengthening 
of Jiang Zemin's regime in the process of pursuing economic reforms and open door 
policies was an important factor that made China heighten its relations with South 
Korea. 
China "downgraded" its ties with North Korea after 1992. However, China still 
maintained close military ties with North Korea and could not ignore North Korea 
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because of its strategic importan~e on the peninsula. On the other hand, it sought the 
expansion of economic relations with South Korea. In other words, it meant China has 
played a "double strategy" on the Korean peninsula to maximize its national interest 
since Sino-South Korean normalization. 
North Korea's Missile Program and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) System 
On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a three-stage rocket over Japan. Part 
of it traveled about 6,000 kilometers (3,750 miles) in the Pacific near Alaska. The test-
firing caused immediate tension on the Korean peninsula. The launch prompted the US 
to sign an agreement with Japan on September 20, 1998, to conduct joint research on 
developing a TMD system. China was dismayed, and the issue emerged as a new 
flashpoint in East Asian security. 
The North Korean motives behind the test-firing were not unfathomable. 
Pyongyang perceived survival, economic, and identity crises. The possibility of US 
military action; improvements in South Korea's relations with Pyongyang's former 
allies, China and Russia; absorption by an economically robust South Korea; and 
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internal commotion or implosion must have been seen as major threats to the regime's. 
survival. The North's economic crisis was so pervasive that it could not redress food 
shortage and poverty problems without outside help. Furthermore, the increasingly 
problematic legitimacy of the juche (self-reliance) ideology and the erosion of the 
country's socialist system were destroying the identity under which the regime governed 
the nation. With the rocket firing, North Korea apparently wanted to demonstrate its 
long-range retaliatory capability to deter outside threats to regime survival, particularly 
the US. The launch was the perfect tool to inspire juche ideology and demonstrate the 
superiority of the socialist system. North Korea seemed to believe that the rocket 
indirectly would also generate economic benefits. It was noteworthy that the launch 
came immediately after North Korea's representatives at the New York talks had 
doubled the pnce for ceasmg missile exports. Given that the Korean Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO) is based on a burden-sharing arrangement, North 
Korea may have been gambling that any program to cope with North Korea's missile 
threat would also take the same form. It seemed undeniable that Pyongyang was upping 
its ante in negotiating with the US over missile exports. 14 
The Japanese press analyzed the reasons for North Korea's ballistic missile 
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development as follows: to ensure military superiority against the United States and 
South Korea; to earn foreign exchange through exporting missiles; to establish a 
defense system independent of China and Russia through independent weapons 
development; to establish the domestic authority of Kim Jong Il; to refuse substantive 
nuclear inspections as a bargaining chip in diplomatic negotiations. 15 
On the US-Japanese plan to establish TMD system, China warned against 
pushing TMD system to counter future threats from North Korea. Chinese Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said: 
The parties concerned should exercise restraint and refrain from doing anything 
that may cause tensions and spark a new arms race in the region. China opposes any 
party seizing a pretext to exaggerate this matter, seeking military superiority and 
undermining regional stability. 16 
Ta Kung Pao, a Hong Kong newspaper sympathetic to the PRC, said, "The 
United States and Japan have fabricated a 'North Korean threat theory,' painstakingly 
playing up the 'terrorist climate' of North Korean missiles." 17 Many Chinese officials 
were convinced that the United States and Japan were using the North Korean missile 
test as a pretext for pushing forward with TMD. They believed that TMD was really 
aimed primarily at containing not North Korea, but China. 18 
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The North Korean missiles could prompt a Japanese response that in turn would 
alert China and complicate the Northeast Asian security environment. This in turn 
would heighten tensions over the Taiwan Strait. There also are those in Northeast Asian 
countries who fear that Japan may take advantage of the North Korean missile test to 
expedite the modernization of its own military. A swift reinforcement of Japan's 
defense capability could inflame anti-Japanese sentiments in those Asian countries that 
experienced Japanese colonialism. This situation could give rise to a region-wide arms 
race following the Sino-Japan competition over military modernization and political 
leadership, thus souring bilateral and multilateral peace endeavors. 19 
North Korea's test revived support for Star Wars-type missile defense systems in 
Japan and Taiwan. That made China nervous. China believed . that Japan would 
eventually rearm itself-a possibility Tokyo denied-and asserted that TMD could be 
part of the process. TMD in Japan was delicate enough, but what really had the Chinese 
upset was the possibility that the US would help Taiwan install the system, too. 
Missiles were a key part of Beijing's strategy to get Taiwan's leaders to the bargaining 
table. It made as much clear in March 1996 with missile exercises in the seas off 
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Taiwan that were designe~ to demonstrate the island's vulnerability to a blockade. 
China continued to warn that it viewed any deployment of TMD in Taiwan as a 
fundamental betrayal of agreements that underpinned the US-China relationship. 20 
China opposed TMD because of its limited economic and technological resources 
and its counterattack military strategy. China continued to attach primary importance to 
the implementation of its four modemizations. In order to provide an environment 
favoring the four modernizations, China advanced a counterattack military strategy. It 
also emphasized the subordination of military modernization to economtc 
modernization. From the economic viewpoint, China believed TMD would consume 
too much of its limited resources that could be used for economic development, and 
from the military viewpoint it did not fit a counterattack strategy.21 
South Korea's TMD policy is constrained mainly by its strategic ineffectiveness. 
For South Korea, TMD technology does not fit with its defense strategy. The distance 
between Seoul and the Demilitarized Zone is only about 40 kilometers, within the range 
of artillery, which makes TMD ineffective to security strategy. Moreover, the designed 
capability of TMD systems would be too limited to protect Seoul from a North Korean 
326 
missile attack.22 Furthermore, the cost and technology requirements for participation in 
the initiative are beyond South Korea's current means.23 
China's strongly expressed antipathy to TMD is another major reason for Seoul's 
policy. Beijing publicly spoke highly of Seoul's decision not to join the TMD program. 
On June 7, 1999, Korean and Chinese arms control officials held talks on disarmament 
and nonproliferation issues in Northeast Asia. Sha Zukang, director general of the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry's arms control and disarmament bureau, reiterated support for 
the South's decision to refrain from joining the TMD program and made statements 
about the need for North Korea to comply with the Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Conventions to help alleviate fears over the proliferation of weapons of mass · 
destruction on the Korean peninsula.24 In other words, South Korea's decision not to 
join the TMD program is seen as a reflection of South Korean sensitivity to China's 
potential to be a party influential of future developments on the Korean peninsula, as 
well as a recognition that TMD in itself does not add to South Korea's own protection 
from the North Korean artillery that already represents the primary military threat to 
SeouL 
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China took an ambiguous position, playing a "double strategy," on North Korea's 
missile development program. China said it was willing to play a role in dissuading 
Pyongyang from raising tensions on the Korean peninsula by launching missiles or 
taking other provocative actions while it opposed TMD system and transferred missile 
components to North Korea. During a visit to Beijing by North Korea's number two, 
Kim Yong-nam on June 17-19, 1999, China endorsed the South Korean policy of 
engagement of the North, encouraged the North to avoid raising tensions on the 
peninsula, and encouraged tension reduction.25 It indicated that China did not wish to 
see the North raise tensions on the peninsula through another missile test or through 
other kinds of very provocative activity. 
Moreover, during the China-Japan summit meeting in Beijing in early July 1999, 
shedding its past reluctance to pressure North Korea, China expressed a willingness to 
play a greater role in helping to deter North Korea from furthering its missile 
development program and carrying out any test-firing. Chinese Prime Minister Zhu 
Rongji said that "China would continue to do its best to promote peace and stability on 
the Korean peninsula, and that no country should act against peace and stability in the 
Korean peninsula." Such remarks were particularly noteworthy because they indicated 
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that the views of the Chinese leadership on this issue were beginning to shift. China has 
long contended that it would not meddle in North Korea's missile program, saying that 
the matter remained essentially an issue involving North Korean sovereignty.26 
The foreign ministers of South Korea and China held talks in Singapore in late 
July 1999 on Seoul's concerns that North Korea would test another missile. Chinese 
Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said that Beijing would do what it could to deter North 
Korea from conducting another missile test. However, Tang did not pledge close 
cooperation with South Korea to stop North Korea from test-firing a long-range missile. 
This showed a subtle gap between China and South Korea. Tang, without referring to 
North Korea, merely reiterated China's basic stance of opposing the development of 
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the Korean peninsula. Given the 
special relations between Beijing and Pyongyang, Tang was not in a position to make a 
definite pledge over North Korea's missile program.27 
The Washington Times reported in late July 1999 that Chinese compames 
transferred missile components to North Korea. Quoting U.S. intelligence officials, it 
said that the Chinese technology sold to the North Korean missile program included 
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ac~elerometers, gyroscopes and special high-tech machinery. More distressing were 
comments made by the Chinese ambassador to Seoul, Wu Dawei, a few days after the 
report of the sales. Wu reaffirmed that China would play a constructive role in 
resolving the missile issue. But he also indicated his nation was tacitly supporting the 
North when he said, "There is no system under which some countries are allowed to 
develop missiles while others are not."28 
Furthermore, China was continuing to supply materials for North Korea's long-
range missile program, the Washington Times reported on January 6, 2000, citing a 
Pentagon intelligence report. The newspaper said that China sent missile related goods 
to North Korea through a Hong Kong company and that the shipment and others in the 
past showed that Beijing was breaking a commitment to curb such sales covered by the 
29-nation Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),29 which is the only existing 
multilateral agreement designed to regulate missile proliferation. 
In fact, China rejected the US offer to join the MTCR as a charter member. 
China's rejection of MTCR membership was based on a number of factors. China 
calculated that the threat stemming from missile proliferation among Third World 
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countries and the benefits of joining the regime were not high whe~ compared with the 
losses it would sustain should it participate in an arms control regime led by the West. 
Beijing reasoned that it did not wish to be bound by controls on missile technology by 
subjugating itself as a developing country under Western influences. China also sought 
to expand its political influence in light of its self-described role as a leader of Third 
World countries that was opposed to the West. Missile exports played a significant role 
in helping China to achieve certain diplomatic goals. Through missile exports, Beij ing 
improved its relations with Pakistan and helped with its military buildup, which in turn 
forced India to redeploy some of its forces away from the tense Indian-Chinese border. 
Politically, with the support of Pakistan, China also improved its relations with a 
number of Islamic countries, as illustrated by its diplomatic rapprochement with Iran 
and Saudi Arabia. In return for the delivery of CSS-2 missiles, China established full 
diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, which severed its previous relationship with 
Taiwan.30 
China maintained an aggressive missile export program for substantial economic 
gains. China earned some $3 billion from missile exports to Saudi Arabia, and until the 
late 1980s its annual sales from missile exports ranged from $1.2 billion to $2 billion. 
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China continued to stick to its calculation that it would benefit more by staying out of 
the agreement. Furthermore, since the United States has realized tremendous gains by 
selling all sorts of arms, including missiles, it could not force China to give up the 
economic benefits from sales of missile-related items. Beijing was critical of the 
MTCR for its lopsidedly favoring the Western powers. Pointing out that not only 
missiles but also bomber aircraft could serve as vehicles of weapons of mass 
destruction, China chastised the West, and particularly the United States, for its attempt 
to curtail China's missile dealings while demonstrating no intent to curb its own sales of 
bomber aircraft. 31 
It should also be noted that China's missile export management controls are rather 
loose. In particular, it would be possible for Chinese businessmen and private 
enterprises to export missiles by taking advantage of loopholes in. the government's 
management system.32 
Meanwhile, the first South Korea-China defense ministers' meeting in Beijing in 
late August 1999 was recorded as a historic event in that it established a framework for 
a new military relationship between Seoul and Beijing. The meeting added significance 
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as it took place at a time when the military situation on the Korean peninsula was 
growing increasingly tense amid fears North Korea would follow through with plans to 
test-fire a missile. The two defense ministers agreed to hold regular talks and exchange 
visits of high-level military delegations from the two countries in the years ahead. But 
the Chinese defense chief declined to give a direct response to a request from his South 
Korean counterpart that Beijing work to persuade North Korea not to test another 
ballistic missile, saying only that he would make efforts to ensure peace and stability on 
the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, apparently conscious of North Korea's potential 
response, the Chinese defense minister rejected a suggestion from his South Korean 
counterpart that the South Korean and Chinese navies conduct combined maritime 
rescue operations. Moreover, China, to avoid offending North Korea, did not publicize 
South Korea's defense minister visit.33 This indicated that whatever Pyongyang's 
posture might be, North Korea was still China's most important strategic ally. 
After the historic and unprecedented summit talks between the leaders of North 
and South Korea in Pyongyang on June 13-15, 2000, then-US Secretary of State 
Albright hastily visited Beijing and Seoul to seek details on their meetings with North 
Korean President Kim Jong 11. But Chinese officials were more interested in the 
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potential effect the success of the summit would have on US plans for TMD system. 
Even as Albright held meetings throughout the day, Chinese officials sought to dispel 
the belief that North Korea represented a security threat. Chinese foreign ministry 
spokesman Zhu Bangzhao said, "China has always believed that the United States' 
excuse for developing TMD does not hold water. And now that tensions have eased in 
Korea, that is even more true."34 The apparent reconciliation ofNorth and South Korea 
has left Chinese officials wondering about the need for the TMD. "If the North Korean 
threat is gone, if they continue to push for the TMD, then the target would be China. 
That would be obvious," Jia Qingguo of Beijing University said.35 Chinese officials 
indicated: 
No matter whether the US National Missile Defense (NMD) system and TMD was 
implemented, the current global strategic balance and stability would be destroyed. The 
goal of the United States in developing NMD is to solidify its own position as world 
hegemonist. The United States and Japan are cooperating in the development of TMD, 
with the goal not of defending themselves against a missile attack from [North] Korea, 
but of directing an attack against China. "36 
China was convinced that the United States and Japan were using the North 
Korean missile test as a pretext for pushing forward with TMD. China's concern is that 
TMD is really aimed primarily at containing not North Korea, but China. The 
deployr:nent of TMD system in Northeast Asia could nullify China's strategic leverage. 
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In particular, China's growing concern is that TMD could undermine the impact of 
China's short- and mid-range ballistic missile forces. China is concerned that the TMD 
program will include Taiwan. If extended to include Taiwan, TMD could eliminate the 
only effective option left to China to deter Taiwan from seeking independence. 
However, Beijing has little patience for its stubborn Communist ally's development of 
missile capabilities which has propelled Japan toward military buildup.37 China is 
concerned that North Korea's missile program could revive latent Japanese militarism 
and suspects that Japan is trying to become both a political and military power by dint 
of TMD deployment.38 China is interested in limiting missiles since North Korean 
missiles could place all parts of China within their effective range and Pyongyang's 
missile program provides justification for a US-led TMD program.39 
Conclusion 
The 151h Party Congress was a major historical high-water point, as important as 
the 11th in 1978 when Deng launched his reforms. At the 15th Congress, Jiang's re-
election enabled China to more freely pursue a realistic and pragmatic policy toward the 
Korean peninsula. After the 151h Congress, China and South Korea agreed to upgrade 
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their bilateral relations to a "cooperative partnership." Finally, the consolidation of 
Jiang Zemin's regime in the process of pursuing economic reforms and open door 
policies was an important factor that made China enhance its relations with South 
Korea. This clearly showed that China emphasized pursuit of national interest over 
ideological alliance. 
China has "downgraded" its ties with North Korea since 1992. However, China 
cannot ignore North Korea because of its strategic importance on the Korean peninsula. 
Therefore China has still maintained close military ties with North Korea and China 
does not desire to injure the sentiments of North Korea. After President Kim Dae-
jung's visit to China in November 1998, the high-level North Korean delegation's visit 
to China in June 1999 signified that China played its "double strategy" by restoring its 
weakening relations with North Korea. · On the other hand, China has sought the 
expansion of political and economic relations with South Korea. It signifies China has 
adopted a "realist strategy" of maximizing its national interest, while minimizing its 
costs and responsibilities since Sino-South Korean normalization. 
In 1998, North Korea's missile program emerged as a new flashpoint in East Asian 
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security. China warned against pushing TMD system to counter future threats from 
North Korea. China asserted that the United States and Japan have concocted a "North 
Korea's threat theory," playing up the tenorist climate of North Korea's missiles. 
China's new leadership assumed a vague stance toward North Korea's missile 
development program, playing its "double strategy" on the Korean peninsula. China 
dissuaded North Korea from raising tensions on the Korean peninsula by projecting 
missiles or assuming other belligerent actions while China objected to TMD system and 
transferred missile components to North Korea. It means China's Korean policy has 
constantly been adjusted to the Realpolitik logic of the rapidly changing domestic and 
international situations. Hence, we can conclude that China's Korean policy is led by 
the pragmatic strategy of maximizing its national interest, while minimizing its costs 
and responsibilities. 
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Chapter 8: China's Position on Korea's Unification and US Forces Korea 
(USFK), the Present and the Future 
China's strategic position in Northeast Asia is rising after the end of the Cold 
War. Since 1990 China's economic reform program and her relatively rapid economic 
growth have continuously increased its national power. This is the basic condition for 
the nation to implement a more flexible foreign policy in the region. In his speech at 
the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, Chinese President Jiang Zemin put forward a 
five-point proposal to be observed in building up a new international order after the end 
of the Cold War. Namely: to create a safe, reliable and stable international peace 
environment; to observe the core norms of international relations such as equal 
sovereignty and non-interference of each other's internal affairs; to build up a new 
international economic order for mutual benefit and common development; to bring 
about a harmonious situation for the nation's self-determination and seek common 
ground while preserving differences; and to make joint efforts while facing challenges 
to all mankind for survival and development. These are the fundamental principles of 
China's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, and are also the guidelines of China's 
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policy to both South and North Korea. 1 
After the historic and unprecedented inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang on June 
13-15, 2000, there are many debates on Korea's unification and the status of US Forces 
Korea (USFK) after Korea's unification. China has an ambivalent attitude toward 
Korea's unification and USFK after Korea's unification. China's official position on 
Korean unification is that China supports a peaceful Korea's unification. However, 
China does not really desire Korea's unification under any circumstances. China clearly 
prefers a stable and peaceful but divided Korean peninsula. Meanwhile, one of the 
main issues for a reunited Korea is the status of USFK. This is part of a wider debate. 
China officially objects to USFK. However, since the 1980s, China has reevaluated the 
status of USFK from a more realistic viewpoint. Namely, China has acknowledged 
USFK as a stabilizer of regional security on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. 
In this Chapter, to analyze China's flexible and realistic foreign policy on the 
Korean peninsula, I will address China's position on Korean unification and the U.S. 
military presence on the Korean peninsula. 
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China's Position toward Korea's Unification 
How does the PRC leadership see the future of the Korean peninsula? 
According to Parris H. Chang's analysis, PRC leaders' lip service notwithstanding, they 
do not really desire Korean unification under whatever circumstances. Although the 
PRC has improved relations with the ROK and tries to capitalize on South Korea's 
vibrant economy to accelerate its own modernization drive, for at least two reasons it 
would strongly oppose the unification of the two Koreas under a non-communist 
regime. For geopolitical reasons, the PRC is concerned with any potential threat to its 
800-mile-long Sino-Korean border and resource-rich Manchuria. In economic terms, 
the PRC does not favor Korean unification, because the enormous costs, as suggested 
by the German example, could greatly reduce Korea's contribution to China's economic 
development. Likewise, Beijing is not enthusiastic about Korean unification under the 
DPRK. A unified communist Korea, like Vietnam, would be too tough to cope with. 
Besides, if the Korean peninsula comes under communist control, international tensions 
in East Asia would inevitably mount, and could adversely affect China's relations with 
the US and Japan, and that, in turn, could harm Chinese economic modernization. 
Thus, two divided Korean states would serve Beijing's interest better, as the PRC would 
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be able to play one against the other. In the years to come, the PRC will strive at the 
same time to expand economic ties with South Korea and keep North Korea in line by 
providing political support and modest economic assistance. Beijing's goals are both to 
enhance Chinese influence in the Korean peninsula and to reduce/neutralize the 
influence of other major powers over Korea? 
But, according to Zhang Xiaoming's analysis, China does not oppose the 
reunification of the Korean peninsula. What concerns China the most is the process of 
reunification. Reunification by force is not in China's national interest. German-style 
reunification (unification by absorption of one part by the other) would bring chaos to 
the Korean peninsula and threaten China's security. It seems that the ideal way of 
reunification should be based on voluntary and evolutionary participation, this is, 
unification through negotiations. China would support the political dialogue and 
economic transaction initiated by the two Koreas as the first step to reunification. A 
reunified Korean peninsula, itself, will not pose a threat to China's national security. 
China should maintain a good-neighbor relationship with a reunified Korea. In geo-
economic terms, a reunified Korea with a prosperous and healthy economy will 
encourage and promote the economic development of China, especially in areas that are 
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close to the Korean peninsula. As Hong Kong and Taiwan serve as an impetus to the 
economic development of the southern Chinese provinces, the Korean peninsula already 
plays a similar role in the neighboring areas of the northeast. 3 
Chinese experts said that reunification through the sudden collapse of the North 
Korean regime would be dangerous for China, but most insisted that Beijing would not 
be concerned about the demise of a communist ally on its border through peaceful 
reunification under the Seoul regime. The Chinese leadership feared a North Korean 
collapse not because it wanted to avoid the loss of another communist state, but because 
of the possible negative impact on China. The dangers cited includes a possible large-
scale flow of refugees across the border and civil war in the North, which could spark a 
North-South conflict or spill over into northeast China. Concern about these dangers 
would lead Beijing to take steps to prevent the North Korean economy from collapsing. 
Chinese analysts had differing assessments of the implications for Beijing of a reunified 
Korea, irrespective of whether it would be united by mutual agreement or as the result 
of a regime collapse. Most researchers worried that reunification of the Korean 
peninsula would be detrimental to China's interests because its ties with Korea would 
weaken relative to those of the other major countries. A unified Korea would be mostly 
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influenced by Western countries, especially the United States. It would be especially 
dangerous for Beijing if Korea were reunified at a time of increased tension between the 
United States and China.4 
A minority of Chinese analysts, however, insist that Beijing's interests would not 
be threatened, and could even be advanced, by peaceful reunification. A stronger, more 
independent Korea would not pose more of a challenge to China. Beijing's priority 
concern would be a unified Korea's attitude toward China, not its political system. 
There was little doubt among these specialists that reunification would take place under 
the South and that a re unified Korea would maintain close relations with Beij in g. 
China's interests would not be damaged by an inevitable realignment of powers that 
would follow eventual reunification of Korea under the South. An expert asserted a 
reunified Korea could not keep an equal distance from the major powers, noting that 
many Koreans would be hostile to Japan and suspicious of Russia; a united Korea 
would have better relations with China and the United States than with Japan and 
Russia. 5 
China's official position IS that it would welcome Korean unification if it IS 
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achieved peacefully and orderly through the concerted efforts of the two Koreas. Even 
though China wants to preserve stability on the peninsula, it does not really desire 
Korean unification under any circumstances.6 Openly supporting a peaceful unification 
of Korea in principle, Beijing clearly prefers the status quo on the Korean peninsula. 
Beijing's dominant interest is a stable and peaceful but divided Korean peninsula. 
Beijing perceives the unification of Korea with ambivalence: in the long run, a 
unified Korea could create stability and peace on the Korean peninsula and would 
eliminate the existence of external military and political forces. A unified and stronger 
Korea could serve as an important force countering Japan in East Asia-to constitute a 
new multipolar structure desired by Beijing. Thus Beijing openly, publicly, and 
somewhat sincerely welcomes the efforts towards Korean unification. On the other 
hand, Beijing has a strong sense of uncertainty over the future of the US-ROK military 
alliance, the political fate of the DPRK, and the fallout of Korean unification. 
Considering the possibility of military alliance between a unified Korea and the United 
States, and fearing the political and economic consequences of rapid Korean unification, 
Beijing has clearly ranked the stability of the status quo higher than unification in its 
policy calculations about the Korean peninsula. 7 
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China has decided that rapid unification may not be in its national interest, and 
it has worked toward a preservation of the status quo which is viewed as a top priority 
of Beijing's Korea policy. China has tacitly and conditionally accepted the ROK-US 
military alliance and viewed that alliance as a part of the preferable status quo of 
international relations in Northeast Asia, as long as the Korean peninsula remains 
divided. Currently, there is a rough equilibrium of military forces between South and 
North Korea; thus one side cannot swallow the other side. The Chinese believe that 
neither the DPRK nor the ROK has the confidence or ability to militarily unify the 
peninsula on its own terms. A German-style peaceful but rapid unification is also 
deemed to be infeasible or even impossible since there is still foreign military forces on 
the peninsula. The South is unwilling and unable to play the role of former West 
Germany, and the North is unlikely to collapse rapidly like the former East Germany. 
Strategically and politically, a surviving and stable but peaceful North Korea is a very 
useful buffer zone between the PRC and the United States. Economically, a stable and 
prosperous South Korea is a major economic partner. Geopolitically, a divided Korea 
provides an excellent laboratory for the Chinese to deal with the United States, the 
number one external factor affecting China's security and economic interest. 8 
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China's policy of status quo, despite its commitment to Korean unification, ts 
deeply rooted m its concerns about the implications of Korean unification. Beijing 
clearly feels the uncertainties and wornes about the possibly unfavorable fallout 
associated with Korean unification. There are several reasons. First, even if the 
unification is achieved peacefully and orderly, a capitalist, liberal and US-backed, 
unified Korea would become a threat not only to the strategic security of China but also 
to the political security of the socialist regime.9 China does not want to see its 
influence reduced or even eliminated on the Korean peninsula. 10 China has no 
compelling reason to push for Korea's immediate political reintegration, even by 
peaceful means, insofar as they vtew North Korea as a useful buffer zone that 
contributes to their national security and at the same time enjoy a thriving commercial 
relationship with South Korea. 11 
Second, even if there ts no military conflict on the peninsula, the unification 
process is likely to produce refugees. They may cause socio-economic turmoil in the 
Northeastern region, putting China in a troublesome situation. Waves of refugees from 
North Korea would constitute a direct and immediate cost on the Chinese. Third, a 
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unified Korea is expected to expenence economic stagnation, as was seen m the 
German case. 12 Peaceful unification following the German model would be a costly 
process for South Korea. Far Eastern Economic Review reported that: 
Most estimates of the financial burden fall between $200 billion and $500 billion, 
or between 40% and 103% of South Korea's GDP [in 1996]. Since 1990, the much 
richer and more numerous Germans have spent about $680 billion, but still have not 
completely glued themselves together. Some say South Korea would have to pay 
around at least $2 trillion in a peaceful reunification with the North. 13 
China believes that stable, peaceful but divided Korean peninsula would better serve the 
interest of China in developing its economy than a sluggish unified Korea. 
Fourth, on the other hand, Chinese analysts believe that a unified Korea in the 
long run will become a regional power with world-influence. The new Korea may have 
the fifth or a top-ten largest economy in the world, thus leading to a new power 
structure in the region and fundamentally changing Korea's foreign relations with the 
four major powers. That will make the power struggle and economic competition in the 
region more apparent and more intense. 14 Chinese analysts worry that a united Korea 
would eventually become a formidable economic competitor. 15 
Fifth, the rise of a united and much more powerful Korea, under the influence of a 
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new Korean nationalism, may produce very undesirable consequences for the Chinese 
since there already are some standing Sino-Korean disputes in the areas such as the 
resources in the Yellow Sea. 16 China may be afraid of the possibility that post-
unification Korean nationalism will challenge the territorial sovereignty of China over 
part of its Northeastern region. In case the unified Korea, which is likely to remain 
allied with the US, tries to obtain support from the US for the realization of its cause, 
the problem would be too tough for China to cope with. 17 Some Chinese analysts are 
fearful that a unified Korea would pursue claims against China for territory along the 
Sino-Korean border, which Koreans in both the North and the South consider to be the 
birthplace ofthe Korean nation. 18 
On the irredentism in Korea: In the years immediately prior to Japan's annexation 
of Korea in 1910, the historian Sin Chae-ho posed a fundamental challenge to 
conventional assumptions about the limits of Korean territoriality: was the nation bound 
to the [Korean] peninsula or did it more properly extend into the lands of Manchuria? 
Sin called brazenly for a Korean Manchuria. Sin moved to free himself from peninsular 
definitions of territory by redefining the subject of history away from the state to the 
racially defined nation, or minjok. 19 
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The story of Sin's irredentist narratives did not end with the fall of the Japanese 
empire, however. Since the late 1970s, a number of groups working in privately funded 
research institutes on the fringes of the South Korean historical community have 
attempted to reformulate Sin's linkage of minjok and territory through history. These 
individuals have employed Sin's views on the centrality of Manchuria to not only the 
past but also the future. Following the successful resurrection of the minjok by 
mainstream scholars, it became a rhetorically simple leap for these writers to reassert 
claims on the minjok's progenitor, Tangun, and his birthplace, Manchuria, then extend 
these down to today. One of the main voices for these groups, the conservative 
magazine Freedom, has vociferously criticized academics for what it calls their 
peninsular historical perspective (pando sagwan). This defeatist history, one writer 
accused, abandons the north, leading Koreans to forget that the minjok occupied the 
northern lands for over three thousand years and has retreated to the peninsula for only 
one thousand years. The writer demanded to revise school history textbooks such that 
what is called the "continental historical perspective (taeryuk sagwan)" be taught to all 
schoolchildren. 20 
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With the normalization of diplomatic tie.s with the PRC, historians and tourists 
from the South have been able to travel freely to Manchuria for the first time in decades, 
resulting in a growing interest in the region and resident Korean communities. This 
interest has been transformed into a growing number of books dealing with various 
aspects of Manchuria, including a number that owed much to the irredentism of Sin 
Chae-ho. Manchuria represents for the Korean more than a lost ancestral land or 
birthplace. It is also the source of a stronger Korea. 21 Finally, with a position grounded 
firmly in widely recognized minjok-centered views of history and by adopting such 
potent irredentist and nationalist symbols as Tangun, these irredentists and nationalists 
after Korea's unification will be able to appeal to widely recognized nationalist 
conceptions, attracting an audience. 
Organizations such as Damui (Reclaim) in South Korea, with more than 50,000 
members, are advancing the irredentist claim, "Manchuria was ours but was taken away 
(and) ... maybe, one day, it will be ours again." Damui's irredentist activities have 
already provoked Beijing's strong protests.22 
Irredentist and n~tionalist fervor from a united Korea may raise Beijing's concern 
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about the ethnic Korean communities in southern Manchuria. Highly educated and 
living autonomously in Jilin province, this population numbers some two million and 
constitutes the largest contingent of overseas Koreans in the world. A potentially 
serious situation could arise between Seoul and Beijing if the latter perceives this ethnic 
minority as an internal security risk.23 
Meanwhile, Chinese officials and analysts say that Beijing's primary concern is 
that reunification occurs peacefully and gradually, preferably based on agreement 
between North and South and a strengthened North Korean economy. A permanent 
security arrangement on the Korean peninsula is perceived by Chinese officials as 
conducive to peaceful reunification. Reunification will require a period of peaceful 
coexistence since reunification through force is not possible. Whatever the timetable 
for reunification, most Chinese officials expect a united Korea to eventually be under 
the rule of the Seoul regime. Beijing's overriding concern is that the reunification 
process be peaceful, and that it lead to a more stable and prosperous Korea so China can 
have the benefit of another rich neighbor like Hong Kong and Taiwan.24 
In 1995, Chinese leaders stepped up their maneuvering in Korea, where they 
354 
took an explicitly anti-Japanese stance. In a historical state visit to South Korea in 
November 1995, Jiang Zemin appealed to Korean's antmus toward Japan at every 
opportunity. Evoking memories of Japan's colonial rule of Korea, Jiang joined with 
Korean president Kim Young-sam in condemning Japan's history of "aggression," with 
Jiang suggesting further that Japan's "militarists" were still a threat to both Chinese and 
Korean well-being. Actually, Jiang's initiative in Korea, based on the assumption that 
the Pyongyang regime will eventually crumble, encourages the Japanese nightmare: a 
reunified, nuclear-armed Korea that tilts toward China and against Japan?5 
In conclusion, China has played a "double strategy" on Korea's unification issue. 
It prefers peace and stability on the peninsula, maintaining a balance between North and 
South, and avoiding any conflict into which China could be drawn, in order to 
consistently pursue economic reform and open door policy. China is not completely 
rigid in its attitude toward the unification of the two Koreas. A pragmatic China will 
not swim against the tide. But China will not facilitate Korea's unification. China is 
particularly interested in preventing the fall of North Korea. Meanwhile, South Korea's 
irredentist activities have already provoked Beijing's strong protests. Renewed Korean 
irredentism and nationalism arising from a united Korea may raise Beijing's concern 
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about the ethnic Korean communities m Manchuria. China does not really desire 
Korean unification under any circumstances. Obviously, to Beijing, a stable, peaceful 
and friendly but divided Korean peninsula is more desirable for Chinese national 
interest than Korea's immediate unification. 
China's Posture toward US Forces Korea (USFK) 
One of the main issues for a reunited Korea is the status of USFK. This is part of 
a wider debate. China's official stand on the USFK is for the withdrawal of the US 
forces from South Korea. But its actual policies have fluctuated according to ·the 
Chinese leadership's changes and the strategic environment. According to China's 
basic foreign policy principle, China has opposed any foreign armed forces being 
stationed in other countries, thus objecting to the US troops presence in Korea. Since 
the 1980s, however, China has reevaluated the issue of US forces in Korea from a more 
realistic standpoint. 26 
China assumes an equivocal posture on US troops in Korea. On the one hand, it 
would not make sense. to have the US forces in a neighboring nation, given its wish to 
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become a regional hegemony or be powerful enough to resist the US domination in 
Northeast Asia. China has a strong sense of uncertainty about the future of the South 
Korea-US military alliance. A US military presence near the Korea-China border 
would be intimidating and unbearable to Beijing. Chinese analysts view the ROK-US 
as working hard to consolidate and enhance the US-ROK military alliance, which, as an 
increasingly more genuine partnership between Washington and Seoul, may be easily 
used to address not only North Korea but also other countries or regions that may 
threaten US or Korean interest. Those possible threats would naturally include the 
standing Sino-Korean disputes in the areas. Therefore, a united Korea with an effective 
US-ROK military alliance appears to be the worst scenario Beijing can contemplate 
concerning the future ofthe Korean peninsula.27 
To the regional hegemony-conscious China, the presence of US forces in one of 
its neighboring countries is obviously unwelcome both in theory and in practice. This is 
even truer when viewed with relation to the US-Japanese New Defense Guidelines, 
which is deemed as pressure against China.28 Some Chinese analysts have openly 
accused the developments of the US-Japan military alliance for turning that alliance 
from a defensive shield to an offensive lance against China. That has caused Beijing to 
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be more vigilant and worried. The semi-official report by the Chinese Association of 
Strategy and Management m 1998 criticized the new US-Japan alliance for 
orchestrating a containment strategy against China, an effort that may well include 
South Korea, Taiwan, and the disputing parties in the South China Sea. Therefore, in 
Beijing's view, the US-ROK military alliance could easily be used for that purpose as 
well-to complete an America-dominated military structure in East Asia for the purpose 
f . . Ch. 29 o contammg ma. 
One of the reasons for the US-Japan military alliance was China's threat to 
Taiwan in 1996. Many in Japan's political elite believed that Japan's greatest strategic 
threat came from an ever more assertive China. In mid-April, 1996, a US-Japan Joint 
Declaration on the Security Alliance for the 21st Century was announced. In it, Japan 
affirmed that the American military presence in Asia was essential for preserving peace 
and stability. Japan agreed that American military forces could operate from Japan in 
the event of future crises on the Korean peninsula and Taiwan, and it promised to keep 
the number of American troops at roughly the same level as before. China tried to 
block, or at least weaken, the US-Japan Security Alliance, dispatching its foreign 
minister, Qian Qichen, to Tokyo two weeks before Clinton's scheduled arrival there in 
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April 1996. Qian publicly worried about the security treaty that was about to be signed, 
which was a diplomatic way of attempting to dissuade the Japanese from going ahead 
with it. He failed in this, however. It was one of the costs to Beijing of its aggressive 
actions in the Taiwan Strait a few weeks before and in Japan's sea-lanes, the South 
China Sea, where China had seized Mischief Reef from the Philippines in 1995.30 
But, on the other hand, it is rational and cost-effective for China to allow the US 
to pay the cost of stabilizing the Korean peninsula. It is unlikely that the US-Japanese 
security alliance will be reinforced to the extent that would undermine the stability of 
Northeast Asia. Therefore, based on a calculation of the overall costs versus benefits, 
China might think it in its economic interests to have the US pay the cost to maintain 
the stability in Northeast Asia, including the Korean peninsula. China does not think 
that a withdrawal of US forces from South Korea is in its national interest due to the 
Japanese threat. A large number of Chinese experts agree that US-Japan security 
cooperation has prevented Japan from being a military expansionist. They believe that 
by offering Japan national security at low cost, the US has fostered public opinion and a 
political climate in Japan to oppose further armament and has caused the right-wing 
elite to lose ground. 31 
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However, the picture would be different if US forces withdrew from Korea. In 
that case, Japan would be the only Asian country where a large number of US am1ed 
forces were stationed. Consequently, the pressure to reduce or remove the US presence 
m Japan would surely increase.32 Eventually the significance of the US-Japanese 
security alliance will diminish. It would lead the US-Japanese security alliance to lose 
much of its legitimacy. China is concerned that Japan will then assume a far more 
prominent military role and that the ever-present hawks could more easily foment re-
militarization. That is, China believes that Japan has a strong ambition to become a 
regional hegemony. 33 
Recently, there are somewhat different views between the Chinese leadership and 
hardliners in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) on US troops presence in a unified 
Korea after a historic inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang on June 13-15, 2000. On the 
one hand, hardliners in the PLA seem to strongly oppose the continued presence of US 
forces in Korea after reunification. For example, an editorial in the PLA Daily said: 
The stationing of 37,000 American troops in South Korea is the biggest obstacle 
to the reunification of the Korean peninsula, and the key to maintaining US hegemony 
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in East Asia. Especially with the cooling down of the tense situation on the Korean 
peninsula, the US miiitary presence in South Korea is out of sync with the times. If the 
United States removes its troops from South Korea as relations between North and 
South Korea improve, then it would be even more difficult to find a reason to maintain 
. 34 troops 111 Japan. 
The editorial appeared to represent hopes in China that South Korea and Japan would 
soon end their security relationship with the United States to the benefit of Beijing. 
On the other hand, the PRC reportedly supports USFK presence until Korean 
reunification. It has been confirmed that during contacts between Chinese and South 
Korean national policy research agencies after the inter-Korean summit, China 
conveyed to South Korea its position that the nature of USFK is different from that of 
US Forces Japan. It also conveyed the position that, for the sake of maintaining security 
in Northeast Asia, USFK must remain until Korean reunification. The Chinese 
Government conveyed these views to the ROK Government during the ROK-China 
Academic Conference on International Issues held in Seoul beginning 19 June 2000. 
Such Chinese views are an expression of a new order taking shape around the Korean 
peninsula following the inter-Korean summit. The statement the Chinese made 
regarding recogmzmg the necessity for the stationing of USFK has considerable 
meaning with regard to the complex diplomatic contest that will unfold in the future 
around the Korean peninsula. China's expression of the need for the stationing of 
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USFK is judged to be a position that keeps in mind the US and Japan, as well as the US 
position. One South Korean government official said, "China worried about a power 
vacuum that might occur if the United States withdrew its forces in the present situation. 
It seems to think the development of Japan's military power or Japan's transformation 
into a major military power cannot be blocked. "35 
China maintains an ambiguous stance regarding the stationing of USFK. China 
officially objects to the stationing of troops in foreign territory, but has acknowledged 
the stabilizing presence of American troops in East Asia, while placing hopes on 
Washington to curb any resurgent militarism in Japan. In the present situation on the 
Korean peninsula, China will not push for the entire withdrawal of USFK. In a sense, 
China believes that the continued posting of USFK, if maintained at a proper level, is 
desirable as a device used to keep the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia stable. 
However, China does not recogmze the need for a USFK posting after Korea's 
unification, because China does not want to face US forces at Korea-China border. 
Conclusion 
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Since the end of the Cold War, China's strategic position on the Korean peninsula 
and in Northeast Asia has improved. Since 1990, China's economic reform, open door 
policy, and its relatively rapid economic growth have continuously increased its 
comprehensive national power. This is the basic condition for China to implement a 
more flexible foreign policy on the Korean peninsula. China unswervingly pursues an 
independent foreign policy of peace. The fundamental goal of this policy is to defend 
China's independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity, to create a favorable 
international environment for the economic reform and opening to the outside world 
and for the modernization drive, to maintain world peace and promote common 
development. The main contents are as follows: 1. China consistently persists in the 
principle of independence and taking the initiatives in its own hands. 2. China opposes 
hegemonism and safeguard world peace. 3. China actively promotes the establishment 
of a just and rational new international political and economic order. 4. China respects 
the diversity of the world. 5. China would like to establish and develop relations of 
friendship and cooperation with all the countries on the basis of the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-Existence namely, mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 6. China cames out a multi-dimensional 
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openmg up policy on the basis of the principle of equality and mutual benefit to 
promote common prosperity. 7. China takes an active part in multilateral diplomatic 
activities.36 These are the fundamental principles of China's foreign policy in the post-
Cold War era, and are also the guidelines of China's policy to both South and North 
Korea. 
North Korea's ambitions to develop nuclear and missile technologies are 
complicating the situation on the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang is counting on its 
proven or unproven capabilities with weapons of mass destructions as an asset, in its 
approach toward China, just as the Communist regime uses it as vital leverage in 
dealing with the West, especially the US. Beijing needs to keep Pyongyang as its ally 
for strategic purposes, despite its burdensome economic situation. The two countries' 
national interests also seem to conjoin at this particular time. China wants the status 
quo to persist on the Korean peninsula and its prescription for peace and stability in the 
area is for the North to follow the path it has taken itself over the past few decades to 
achieve economic advancement. A balance in economic power between the two halves 
of Lhe Korean peninsula IS desired by China, m order for North Korea to avoid 
absorption by South Korea, which would leave China in direct confrontation with a 
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unified Korea that is regarded as under US influence. 
Since 1978, China's foreign policy has prioritized economic development 
demanding capital, technology and market. South Korea is an important source of 
capital and technology for China's economic reform. Therefore, China has greater 
interest in South Korea than North Korea because of its economic cooperation and 
political advancement in the regiOn. China believes that South Korea will have an 
initiative in the decision making of unified Korea. Although China maintains relatively 
close relations with North Korea, it is doubtful that China would intervene in internal 
Korean affairs to prevent unification. The political situation in a unified Korea is vital 
for China's national interest economically as well as strategically. So Beijing's Korean 
policy is to pursue close economic and political cooperation ties with Seoul. On the 
other hand, without hurting Pyongyang, China is to pursue strategic and military interest 
in Nor1h Korea. In other words, China has played its "double strategy" deftly, to 
maximize its national interest and will continue this strategy, until reunification on the 
Korean peninsula. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Chairman Mao Tse-tung once wrote: "Who are our enemies? Who are our 
friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution. " 1 He went on to 
stress the great importance of distinguishing real friends from real enemies so as to 
unite with the former to attack the latter. To the Chinese communists, China has neither 
eternal allies nor perpetual enemies, only its national interest is permanent. Since the 
establishment of the PRC, China's enemies and friends have changed accordingly. 
Also, China's foreign policy on the Korean peninsula has undergone major shifts. 
China's "One Korea" policy started to change to a "Two Koreas" policy gradually 
after December 1978. Finally, China and South Korea established diplomatic relations 
in August 1992. Furthermore, in November 1998, China and South Korea agreed to 
upgrade their bilateral relations to a "cooperative partnership" for the 21 51 century. 
What caused China gradually to go ahead toward a "Two Koreas" policy during 
the period of 1978-1984? As I argued in Chapter 2, Deng Xiaoping and his followers in 
December 1978 adopted bold economic reforms and open door policy to further China's 
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economic development at the Third Plenum of the 11th Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee. Since the Third Plenum, China's top priority has been to promote 
successful economic reforms and open door policy. To achieve its economic reforms, 
China needed peace and stability on the Korean peninsula because a renewed war on the 
Korean peninsula would clearly jeopardize the regional economy. Thus, China's policy 
objective on the Korean peninsula was the avoidance of serious instability or tension, 
thus preventing renewed war that would again involve the US and China on opposite 
sides of a major military conflict. China also needed foreign capital and technology 
from capitalist countries for its economic reforms. Since the Third Plenum, China 
began to acknowledge South Korea as an important trading partner and as a source of 
capital and high technology. China began to modify its Korean policy, taking a positive 
and pragmatic attitude toward South Korea. Therefore, the Third Plenum's decision 
was a contributing factor that made China gradually change policy toward Korea. 
In the late 1970s, Sino-American and Sino-Japanese rapprochement formed a new 
type of loose bipolar system in the Northeast Asia. China was strongly interested in 
Northeast Asian stability. China desired to expand economic cooperation with America 
and Japan to advance its four modernizations program. As China improved its relations 
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with the US and Japan, China's hostility toward South Korea also decreased and China 
stopped seeing South Korea as an enemy. Sino-American and Sino-Japanese 
rapprochement greatly contributed to the relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula. 
These political-diplomatic changes in Northeast Asia served as a catalyst that made 
China take a flexible and conciliatory stance toward South Korea. 
The first official Sino-South Korean contact unexpectedly occurred in May 1983, 
as a result of the hijacking of a Chinese aircraft to South Korea. As a consequence of 
the hijacking incident, the inter-governmental negotiation between China and South 
Korea explicitly proved that China tacitly acknowledged the existence of South Korea 
on the Korean peninsula though it could not formally recognize South Korea. The 
hijacking incident caused China to decide to engage in unofficial ties with South Korea 
and enabled China to make further contacts with South Korea. After that, Sino-South 
Korean relations improved greatly at non-governmental levels. Obviously, the hijacking 
incident gave Beijing an excuse to modify its South Korean policy and thus to develop 
direct contacts more overtly. Thus, the hijacking incident contributed toward changing 
China's Korean policy bit by bit. 
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The attempted bombing of South Korean President in Burma in October 1983 
made Chinese leadership uneasy because North Korea's teiTorism could bring about 
renewed war on the Korean peninsula. China's leaders recognized that renewed war in 
Korea would put China in the strategic dilemma of either supporting North Korea, 
thereby jeopardizing Sino-American relations, or abandoning North Korea totally to 
Soviet influence. Furthermore, renewed war m Korea would demolish China's 
economic development. To forestall such a possibility, China began to pursue a more 
practical policy toward South Korea. After the Rangoon bombing, many unofficial 
activities m Sino-South Korean relations accelerated strikingly in vanous fields. It 
signified that China tried to punish Pyongyang for its actions. That is, the Rangoon 
bombing persuaded China to assume a much more active stance in relation to Korea, 
although this role remained constrained by North Korea's leaders' extraordinary 
sensitivities. Therefore, the Rangoon bombing incident led China by piecemeal to 
change to a Two Koreas policy. 
After the Third Plenum in December 1978, China's foreign policy toward South 
Korea changed by degrees from a "non-policy" to "economic diplomacy." China's 
economic reforms and open door policy put a theoretical base for Sino-South Korean 
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economic relations. China's earliest aim was to become another East Asian Newly 
Industrializing Countries (NICs, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong). 
Deng and pragmatic reformists were very interested in South Korea's economic 
development. 
China's favorable evaluation of South Korea's economic advancement served as a 
basis for Sino-South Korean indirect trade. This trend reflected China's decision to 
strengthen its open-door policy. Although China continued to affect official ignorance 
of Sino-South Korean trade, the volume of Sino-South Korean trade increased rapidly 
from 1979 to 1984, step by step with an unquestionable political thaw in Sino-South 
Korean relations. 
Since the early 1980s, China has seen South Korea's economic superiority and 
South Korea's increasing international visibility that North Korea has been unable to 
stymie or reverse. China needed technology and investment from South Korea. China's 
policy was to separate politics and economics in its foreign policy in order to improve 
ties with South Korea. These factors constituted a significant change in the political and 
economic environment that China's leaders confront in Northeast Asia, providing China 
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with new incentives and opportunities for a more differentiated policy toward the 
Korean peninsula.2 
In conclusion, during the period of 1978-1984, China's policy toward South Korea 
began to change bit by bit from a "non-policy" to a policy of Guanmen Bushangsuo (the 
door is closed but not locked). 3 Namely, China described its South Korean policy as 
Guanmen Bushangsuo. Ever since the Third Plenum, China has adopted a notably more 
pragmatic posture toward South Korea. Sino-American and Sino-Japanese 
rapprochement led to the relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula. Although 
China publicly discounted the political implications of the hijacking incident and the 
Rangoon bombing incident, China's relations with North and South were no longer the 
same following these incidents. And despite Pyongyang's strong objections, China 
started unofficial contacts with South Korea. Sino-South Korean unofficial ties 
represented a door increasingly aJar. China's open door policy prompted China's 
Korean policy to change from ideological and political considerations to more flexible 
and pragmatic foreign policy. 
What induced China to make a move toward a de facto "Two Koreas" policy 
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during the period of 1985-1988? As I argued m Chapter 3, China's torpedo boat 
incident m March 1985 led to another striking step forward m Sino-South Korean 
relations. China publicly apologized to South Korea for this incident. Through this 
incident, China was ready to deal visibly with South Korea. After the incident, non-
political contacts in Sino-South Korean relations increased incredibly, in spite of North 
Korea's opposition. It implied that China de facto acknowledged South Korea. Hence, 
the torpedo boat incident was a contributing factor which caused China by piecemeal to 
take a more realistic stance toward South Korea. 
Despite North Korea's boycott, China's participation in 1986 Seoul Asian Games 
created a precedent for future Sino-South Korean relations in both political and sporting 
fields. After the Seoul Asian Games, the volume of Sino-South Korean trade increased 
at a remarkable pace. Clearly, the Seoul Asian Games played a significant part m 
furthering China's positive view of South Korea. 
Despite General Secretary Hu Yaobang's resignation in January 1987, China's 
refonnists strengthened their power at the l3 1h National Party Congress in October 1987. 
Acting General Secretary Zhao Ziyang reasserted economic reform and open door 
375 
policy to the outside world. This suggested that conservatives as well as reformers 
evidently adopted open door policy to attract foreign technology and capital.4 The 
Chinese reformists' power consolidation at the Congress implied that China would 
continue to take a pragmatic posture toward South Korea. 
In November 1987, China was very perplexed by the bombing incident of a 
Korean Air jetliner by North Korean terrorists. China was disillusioned about North 
Korea's terrorism. China was very concerned about South Korea's menace to retaliate 
on North Korea. China's leadership profoundly worried that renewed war in Korea 
could break out. This bombing incident brought China to reexamine its Korean policy. 
China more and more changed from its traditional policies toward North Korea to a de 
facto "Two Koreas" policy. For example, at that time, China agreed to participate in the 
1988 Seoul Olympic Games in spite of North Korea's strong opposition. 
The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games gave China a handy pretext to begin direct 
discussions with South Korea concerning a variety of issues in Seoul. Then, China 
started talks with South Korea for setting up permanent China's trade missions in South 
Korea, representing several China's provinces. With this progress, China decided to 
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ignore North Korea's veto power over its Korean policy.5 This development frustrated 
North Korea's efforts to keep diplomatic distance between China and South Korea. 
China was significantly assured of its ability to maintain a de facto Two Koreas policy 
in playing a "double strategy". The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games apparently played an 
important role in furthering direct contact and trade between China and South Korea. 
Also China's participation in the Seoul Olympic Games indicated that China recognized 
South Korea as a sovereign state. 
China saw South Korea as an increasingly attractive economic partner for many 
reasons. The economic success ofthe East Asian NICs was incredible enough to attract 
the attention of China's leadership. Among the four East Asian NICs, South Korea may 
have been the useful model China considered worth emulating.6 
China found the intermediate technology of South Korea more suitable to their 
practical needs than the expensive high-teclmology of the United States, Japan, and 
Western Europe. China felt more comfortable with the sociable and outgoing South 
Koreans than with the Japanese, who were still under close scrutiny because of their 
past colonial ambitions. 7 China feared its own increasing dependence on Japanese 
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teclmology and capital and was also concerned by the huge imbalance in Sino-Japanese 
trade.8 Furthermore, China found that Japan was not active in technology transfers and 
its investment in China was very smal1.9 
Sino-South Korean economic relations benefited from many factors m 
comparison with China's other economic partners. For example, Sino-South Korean 
geographic proximity, linguistic complementarity, and historical familiarity reduced 
transportation costs and barriers to communications. Sino-South Korean economic 
complementarity made the two-way trade more and more promotive. 
Trade was the most important field in Sino-South Korean relations. The rapid 
increase of Sino-South Korean trade proved that the desire to exchange goods could 
break down the most solid and longstandiilg political obstacles. The two-way trade has 
continually elevated the stage of economic cooperation and has by piecemeal fostered 
the political reconciliation and rapprochement between China and South Korea. In 
addition, 111 1988, the setting-up of permanent trade office in Seoul, representing 
Shandong Province in China, was an impm1ant breakthrough toward Sino-South Korean 
normalization. 
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During the period of 1985-1988, China pursued a de facto "Two Koreas" policy, 
playing a "double strategy" deftly. In terms of government-to-government ties, China 
continued to deal exclusively with North Korea. In reality, however, there was an 
increasing, even though tacit, Chinese acceptance of the reality of South Korea. 
What influenced China's leadership to advance Sino-South Korean normalization 
during the period of 1989-1992? As I argued in Chapter 4, in May 1989, Sino-Soviet 
norn1alization signified that China and the Soviet Union stopped their competition for 
North Korea. As a result of the Sino-Soviet normalization, neither China nor the Soviet 
Union provided economic or military assistance to North Korea simply to oppose the 
other's influence. At the time of Sino-Soviet rapprochement, North Korea had little 
influence, and found that it could not stop the rapidly developing Sino-South Korean 
relations. Sino-Soviet normalization led to political isolation of Not1h Korea from the 
rest of the world, giving the Chinese leadership the freedom to pursue a "Two Koreas" 
policy. It also caused China and the Soviet Union to facilitate economic relations with 
South Korea. The Sino-Soviet normalization enhanced the successful fulfillment of 
South Korea's "Nm1hern Policy" which sought to tmprove its relations with the 
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communist countries. After Sino-Soviet normalization, China did not need to compete 
with the Soviet Union for North Korea. North Korea could no longer play one against 
the other. Irrespective of North Korea, China could take an increasingly pragmatic 
position toward South Korea and continue to develop economic relations with South 
Korea. 
South Korea's Northern Policy was aimed at giving top priority to setting up 
diplomatic relations with China, for the purpose of reducing tensions on the Korean 
peninsula. Although North Korea had turned down South Korea's new Northern Policy 
in 1988, China reacted positively to South Korea's Northern Policy. This implied that 
China was very interested in improving relations with South Korea. 
South Korea's Northern Policy caused drastic policy changes in Sino-South 
Korean relations. The three fundamental principles of South Korea's Northern Policy-
the separation of politics and economics, the pursuit of mutual benefits, and private 
sector leadership-closely mirrored China's policy of separating politics from 
economics in order to pursue mutually beneficial economic ties. Sino-South Korean 
trade was the backbone of South Korea's Northern Policy. 10 Such non-political 
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exchanges played an important role m setting up Sino-South. Korean diplomatic 
relations in August 1992. 
In September 1990, South Korean-Soviet normalization stopped the longstanding 
ideological and geopolitical Sino-Soviet competition for North Korea. For China the 
Soviet change from a "One Korea" policy to a "Two Koreas" policy provided an almost 
perfect example and almost perfect excuse for its own change from a "One Korea" 
policy to a "Two Koreas" policy in 1992. China followed the Soviet example, but 
proceeded in a more careful and calculating way. China showed the tendency of letting 
the Soviet Union set the diplomatic pace. 11 It had been China's practice to let the 
Soviet Union take the lead in approaching South Korea while it avoided lagging too far 
behind. After witnessing the swift development of South Korea-Soviet relations, China 
quickened its pace, leading to the conclusion of Sino-South Korean normalization 
process. 12 Obviously, the South Korean-Soviet normalization prompted China rapidly 
to expand political and economic relations with South Korea and facilitated the setting-
up of Si no-South Korean diplomatic relations. 
China did not exercise its veto against South Korea's accelerated entry to the UN 
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in May J 991. This suggested that China's Korean policy changed to a "two countries, 
two systems" strategy, supporting South Korea's UN membership entry. But it was a 
maJor contradiction m China's foreign policy because China has asserted a "one 
country, two systems" strategy for Taiwan. The reason why China has used a "two 
countries, two systems" strategy for Korea is that China's Korean policy has changed 
from an ideological policy to a realistic and pragmatic policy. China's Korean policy 
was led by the realistic strategy of maximizing its national interest, while minimizing its 
costs and responsibilities. 13 Evidently, North Korea's decision to enter the UN relieved 
China of a burden in deciding whether to normalize diplomatic relations with South 
Korea. 
In June 1989, the Tiananmen Incident put China m a difficult position m its 
international political and economtc relations. China needed friends after the 
Tiananmen Incident. That is why China took a more positive attitude toward South 
Korea. Both China and South Korea used the 1990 Beijing Asian Games to promote 
closer relations. In particular, South Korea used the Beijing Asian Games as an 
opportunity to set up diplomatic relations with China. China depended heavily on 
South Korea economically for the Beijing Asian Games. South Korea's econonuc 
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assistance for the Beijing Asian Games gave the rationale behind China's decision in 
late 1990 to set up trade offices with South Korea. Therefore, we can conclude that 
Sino-South Korean "sports diplomacy" was a contributing factor that made China 
gradually change to a "Two Koreas" policy. 
In 1991, the exchange of Sino-South Korean trade offices rapidly furthered trade 
and investment. In late 1991 and early 1992, agreements on trade, tariffs and 
investment guarantees sharply speeded up Sino-South Korean commercial exchanges. 
These backgrounds served as a catalyst for the eventual Sino-South Korean 
normalization. 
China's August 1992 Korean decision had a lot to do with Deng's "southern 
journey" in January 1992 to revive his economic reforms and open door policy, most of 
which had been slowed since the Tiananmen Incident. Deng Xiaoping saw South 
Korea's economic value m his campaign to foster China's "Four Modernizations." 
Deng saw South Korea as a potential market for China's products and a source of 
capital and technology. He was very interested in learning from South Korea's 
economic development strategy as a member of the East Asian NICs. Therefore, 
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China's economic diplomacy toward South Korea was the most decisive and important 
factor that made China change to a "Two Koreas" policy. In conclusion, China's 
economic reform and open door policy have caused China's Korean policy to change 
from ideological and political factors to economic consideration, and from rigid foreign 
policy to flexible and pragmatic multi-directional policy. 
How has China played a "double strategy" on the Korean peninsula since Sino-
South Korean normalization? As I argued in Chapter 6, China's policy toward North 
Korea's nuclear crisis m 1993 was inconsistent. On the one hand, China strongly 
upheld the principle of a denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, supporting the 
South Korean and American position. On the other hand, China opposed the imposition 
of any international sanctions on North Korea and tried to persuade the two Koreas and 
the US to substitute dialogue for confrontation. China wanted to protect North Korea's 
military and diplomatic positions and ensure its survival because of its strategic 
importance. Beijing also wanted to ensure that North Korea would be free from 
international pressure and sanctions, but at the same time it was unwilling to offend the 
United States and other Western countries. This meant that China played a 'double 
strategy" deftly on North Korea's nuclear Issue, extracting maximum payoffs at 
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minimum cost. 
Beijing opposed any UN-imposed economic sanctions against North Korea. 
China's memory of the UN collective security was very negative due to the UN's 
involvement in the Korean War. Collective-security measures taken by the UN, in 
Beijing's eyes, were usually synonymous with imperialist aggression and intervention. 
China politically feared a collapse of Pyongyang and thus the emergence of instability 
on the Korean peninsula. China argued that the international community should not 
push Pyongyang into a corner and leave it no choice but to resort to military 
adventurism. The most important aspect was the tactical intention of the Chinese 
leadership to politically capitalize on its influence on Pyongyang. They also wished to 
force the US to accept political compromises, contingent upon American concessions 
on the human rights issue and upon the unconditional extension of the most favored 
nation (MFN) arrangement, so vital for China's exports to the United States. 14 
Finally, China's opposition to international sanctions on North Korea gave Beijing 
a favorable position in the fight against the linkage of MFN and human rights by the 
US. After Washington indicated that the MFN would be extended unconditionally, 
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China played a decisive, behind-the-scenes role in persuading North Korea to freeze its 
nuclear program. It signified China used realistic and pragmatic foreign policy toward 
the Korean peninsula. 
During North Korea's nuclear cns1s, China was able to cash m on both its 
traditional special relationship with North Korea and its newly gained, unique position 
between the two Koreas, which allowed China to extract maximum payoffs at minimum 
cost. Playing its "double strategy" proficiently, China obtained many benefits through 
its exertion of influence on North Korea's nuclear crisis. China promoted the easing of 
tensions on the Korean peninsula, prevented the imposition of international sanctions on 
North Korea, resolved the problem of the MFN trade status, and succeeded in 
persuading the US to concentrate on bilateral negotiations with North Korea. This 
showed that China was very influential in the process to resolve North Korea's nuclear 
CriSIS. 
In the four-party peace talks, China has tried to play the role of "constructive 
broker" between North Korea on one side and South Korea and US on the other. 
Although China took a neutral posture throughout preliminary talks and full-scale talks, 
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China helped break the stalemate in negotiations and kept the process moving. China 
supported South Korea and the United States m opposmg North Korea's demand 
regarding a US-North Korea peace treaty and withdrawal of US troops in South Korea, 
though China supported North Korea's aspiration to normalize North Korea-US 
relations. Therefore, I argue that China in the four-party peace talks played its "double 
strategy" proficiently, to maximize its national interest. 
Since December 1978, China's top priority has been to facilitate economic reforms 
and open door policy. To continuously pursue its economic reforms, China needs peace 
and stability on the Korean peninsula. China does not want chaos or instabilities on the 
peninsula, which may lead to military conflicts between the two Koreas and eventually 
involve China and the US. Therefore, China played a positive and pragmatic role in the 
"four-party talks" in order to secure regional stability. During the fourth round of the 
four-party talks, China's proposals signified that China strongly wanted to set up a 
peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula, relieve tension, and accomplish a lasting 
peace and stability. China believed that the establishment of a peace mechanism in the 
Korean peninsula through the four-party talks would promote peace and stability in the 
Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. In other words, in China's eyes, building a 
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peace mechanism through the "four-party talks" has been a vital external condition for 
China's national security interest. 
The l51h CCP Congress was a historical turning point, as important as the 11 111 in 
1978 when Deng began his reforms. At the Congress, China's communist elite 
strengthened President .Tiang Zemin's power by supporting his ambitious economtc 
reforms and an anti-corruption drive and retiring key opponents. Jiang Zemin's re-
election as Communist Party chief strengthened his position as Deng Xiaoping's 
successor. This permitted China to pursue a pragmatic and realistic policy toward 
Korea. After the Congress, in November 1998, South Korea and China eventually 
agreed to upgrade their bilateral relations to a "cooperative partnership" for the 21 51 
century. The consolidation of Jiang Zemin's regime in the middle of economic reforms 
and open door policies was an important factor that made China enhance its relations 
with South Korea. This indicated that China emphasized pursuit of national interest 
over ideological and political considerations. 
China "downgraded" its relations with North Korea after 1992. But China's new 
leadership could not ignore North Korea because of its strategic importance on the 
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Korean peninsula. China did not want to hurt the sentiments of North Korea. China's 
new leadership still kept close military and strategic relations with North Korea and 
played a pivotal role in propping up North Korea. Namely, the new Chinese leadership 
tried to revive its weakening relations with North Korea. On the other hand, China's 
new leadership was further expanding political and economic relations with South 
Korea to strongly promote economic reforms and open door policies. This showed that 
China has played a "double strategy" and a "realist strategy" on the Korean peninsula to 
maximize its national interest since Sino-South Korean normalization. 
What is China's policy toward Nmth Korea's missile program and TMD (Theater 
Missile Defense) system? China's new leadership's position on North Korea's missile 
program is most complicated as they have to weigh both their relations with their 
longtime ally Pyongyang and the impact in the region, of the continued development of 
North Korea's missile program. Outwardly, China has been criticizing the United States 
and Japan for overreacting to North Korea's missile threat, claiming they are using it as 
an excuse to contain China militarily. China is concerned that TMD is really aimed at 
China as a US-Japan containment strategy. The deployment of the TMD system m 
Northeast Asia could destroy China's strategic influence. In particular, China IS 
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increasingly wonying that TMD could injure the influence of China's short- and mid-
range ballistic missile forces. 
China is wonying that the TMD program will include Taiwan. Missiles are an 
important part of China's strategy to get Taiwan's leaders to the bargaining table. If 
extended to include Taiwan, TMD could get rid of the only effective choice left to 
China to prevent Taiwan from seeking independence. 
China is concerned that North Korea's missile program may drive South Korea 
and Japan into an arms race, which would fundamentally shake the stability on the 
Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. China is also wonying that North Korea's 
missile program could renew potential Japanese militarism. China suspects that Japan 
is trying to become both a political and military power by force of TMD deployment. 
China is interested in limiting missiles because North Korea's missiles could place all 
parts of China within their effective range and North Korea's missile program provides 
justification for a US-led TMD program. 
China took an unclear attitude on North Korea's missile program. China did not 
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want North Korea to heighten tensions on the Korean peninsula by launching missiles 
or taking other aggressive actions. On the other hand, China opposed TMD system and 
handed over missile parts to North Korea. This indicated that China played its "double 
strategy," to extract maximum national interest at minimum cost. Meanwhile, there was 
the first historic South Korea-China defense ministers' meeting in Beijing in August 
1999, to set up a framework for new military relations between South Korea and China. 
But, during the meeting, conscious of North Korea, China turned down South Korea's 
request that China persuade North Korea not to launch another ballistic missile. 
Furthermore, to evade displeasing North Korea, China did not announce South Korea's 
defense minister visit. This showed that whatever North Korea's attitude might be, 
North Korea was still China's most important strategic ally, and that China skillfully 
played its "double strategy" between the two Koreas. 
How does China's leadership see Korea's unification? China officially supports a 
peaceful Korea's unification in principle. But China understands the unification of 
Korea ambivalently: in the long run, a unified Korea could produce peace and stability 
on the Korean peninsula and would get rid of the existence of external military and 
political forces. A unified and stronger Korea could serve as an important force 
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countering Japan in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, China has misgivings about the 
future of South Korea-US military alliance, the political fate of North Korea, and the 
adverse side effects of Korean unification. Considering the possibility of military 
alliance between a unified Korea and the United States, and fearing the political and 
economic consequences of rapid Korean unification, China clearly wants the stability of 
the status quo on the Korean peninsula. 
Obviously China feels the uncertainties and worries about the possibly unfavorable 
side effects of Korean unification. First, even if Korean unification is achieved 
peacefully, a capitalist, liberal and US-backed, unified Korea would become a threat to 
China's strategic and political security. Second, even if there is no military conflict on 
the Korean peninsula, the unification process is likely to produce refugees. They may 
cause socio-economic turmoil in Manchuria. Third, a unified Korea is expected to 
undergo economic stagnation, as was seen in the German case. China believes that 
stable, peaceful but divided Korean peninsula would better promote China's economic 
development than a sluggish unified Korea. Fourth, China believes that a unified Korea 
in the long run will become a regional power with world-influence. China worries that 
a unified Korea would finally become a formidable economic competitor. Fifth, China 
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fears that a unified Korean irredentism and nationalism will challenge- the territorial 
sovereignty of China over Manchuria. A unified Korean irredentism and. nationalism 
may raise China's concern about the etlmic Korean communities in Manchuria. 
China has no reason to hasten Korea's unification, even by peaceful means, 
because China sees North Korea as a buffer zone that is vital to its national security. 
Simultaneously China enjoys prosperous economic relations with South Korea, playing 
a "double strategy" on Korea's unification issue. China prefers peace and stability on 
the Korean peninsula, keeping balance between South and North Korea, and avoiding 
any war that could involve China and the US in a major military conflict, to 
continuously pursue economic reform and open door policy. 
The bottom line is that China will not advance Korea's unification. China is very 
much interested in preventing the collapse of North Korea. China does not really want 
Korea's unification under any circumstances. Clearly, to China, a stable, peaceful and 
friendly but divided Korean peninsula is better for China's national interest than rapid 
Korean unification. 
393 
China takes an ambivalent attitude toward US Forces Korea (USFK). China 
officially opposes the stationing of troops in foreign country. To the regional 
hegemony-conscious China, the American military presence in its neighboring countries 
is clearly unacceptable theoretically and practically. China has misgivings about the 
future of the South Korea-US military alliance. The American military presence near 
the Korea-China border would be threatening and intolerable to China. But, on the 
other hand, it is sensible and economical for China to let the US pay the cost to stabilize 
the Korean peninsula. China acknowledges that the American military presence m 
Northeast Asia keeps the stability on the Korean peninsula, while setting hopes on 
America to restrain Japan's remilitarization. This shows that China takes a "double 
strategy" on USFK to maximize its national interest. 
Under the existent circumstances on the Korean peninsula, China will not ask for 
the complete pullout of USFK, because China regards the continued presence of USFK 
as a stabilizer of regional security on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. But, 
China opposes a USFK presence after Korea's unification, because the USFK presence 
could lead to the domination of that area by one power and China does not want to meet 
USFK at Korea-China border. China will flexibly modify its position on USFK 
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presence according to its national security interest and the strategic environment of the 
Korean peninsula in the future. 
I prove that the two hypotheses are valid through empirical studies of China's 
Korean policy from December 1978 to 2000. I can conclude that China's economic 
priority was the most decisive factor and many political and strategic factors were a 
contributing factor which made China change from a "One Korea" policy to a "Two 
Koreas" policy. During the period of 1993-2000, to maximize its national interest, 
China has skillfully played a "double strategy" on the Korean peninsula. On the one 
hand, China has supported its traditional strategic and military ties with North Korea. 
On the other hand, China has promoted new political and economic ties with South 
Korea. China has refrained from openly supporting either South or North Korea. In 
other words, while keeping a "Two Koreas" policy, China does not want to openly 
support one Korea, at the cost of the other. Therefore, I argue that China's "double 
strategy" on the Korean peninsula IS synonymous with the "realist strategy" of 
maximizing its national interest, while minimizing its costs and responsibilities. 
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